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Viewing entries tagged
Equal Protection
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected a litigant’s challenge to a derivative citizenship claim, finding that even under a gender-neutral revision to the statute, he would not be entitled to citizenship.
The full text of Lodge v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210416.op2.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has rejected an equal protection challenge to derivative citizenship statute found at 8 USC 1432(a)(3).
“Section 1432(a)(3)’s second clause discriminates on the basis of gender. It grants citizenship upon ‘the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation,’ but it does not grant citizenship in the converse scenario: upon the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and the child’s maternity has not been established by legitimation.” “Petitioner, however, does not challenge the clearly disparate treatment identified above. Nor could she, because both her paternity and her maternity were established during her youth. Instead, she argues that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates ‘because it does not contain any equivalent provision stating that a child automatically becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and the mother has relinquished parental rights’ or has abandoned the child.”
The full text of Roy v. Barr can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/06/04/15-72942.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has rejected a challenge to the derivation of citizenship statute, finding that the differing treatment for the children of married parents from those of legally separated parents bears a rational basis to the congressional goal of protecting the parental rights of the non-citizen parent. The court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales Santana requires the application of a heightened standard of scrutiny to any law that differentiates based on parental marital status, finding that the discussion of parental marital status in Morales Santana was limited to laws that discriminate based on the child’s legitimacy. Since the law at issue looks at the parents’ marital status at a time after the child’s birth, the heightened standard of review related to legitimacy distinctions does not apply.
The full text of US v. Mayea-Pulido can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/01/03/18-50223.pdf
The petitioner was born abroad to a U.S. citizen mother and a foreign national father. He challenged the constitutionality of the citizenship statute that required his mother to have resided in the United States for ten years prior to his birth in order to transmit citizenship to him. The petitioner “maintains that there is no rational basis on which to distinguish between him—a minor child, born abroad to a United States citizen, who lawfully entered the Country and lived in the custody of that United States citizen parent in the United States—and a lawful permanent resident minor child living in the custody of a lawful permanent resident parent when that parent naturalizes.” The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the statute “bears a rational relation to the Government’s legitimate interest in ensuring that children born abroad who become citizens have ties to the United States.”
The full text of Lopez Ramos v. Barr can be found here:
The Third Circuit has determined that the laws governing transmission of citizenship to a child born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen father, whose mother is deceased, and who was born in a jurisdiction where the death of the mother legally precludes the father from legitimizing the child, violate equal protection.
Petitioner Jose Francisco Tineo was born in the Dominican Republic to unwed noncitizen parents who never married. His father moved to the United States and naturalized. His noncitizen mother soon after passed away. At the time, under the law of either his or his father’s residence or domicile—the Dominican Republic and New York—legitimation could only occur if his birth parents married. Under the immigration laws, a naturalized mother can transmit her citizenship to her out-of-wedlock child, regardless of whether the father is alive; whereas a naturalized father in the same position has the additional requirement of having to legitimate the child in order to transmit his citizenship. Thus, the petitioner in this matter was left unable to receive citizenship from his father because his mother was deceased, eliminating the only avenue of legitimation in the Dominican Republic.
The court declared that the petitioner is, in fact, a U.S. citizen, by applying the standards applicable to children born out of wedlock to U.S.-citizen mothers to his situation.
The full text of Tineo v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Third Circuit has rejected a challenge to the acquired citizenship law found in INA 309, insomuch as it treats adopted children of US citizens differently than natural born children of US citizens.
“The Supreme Court has recognized the important government interest in developing the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States. We also agree with many 7 of our sister circuits that preventing immigration fraud is a legitimate interest. And finally, we have recognized the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the rights of alien parents in the immigration context.” “We also agree with the Government that the disparate treatment in Section 309 is at least rationally related to advancing these interests. Requiring an adoptive parent to apply for citizenship on behalf of his or her child, as opposed to conferring citizenship automatically upon the child, increases the probability that those who take the time to navigate that process have a real parent-child relationship. These additional requirements also reduce the likelihood that an adoption will occur solely to obtain citizenship.” “Furthermore, if adopted children could obtain automatic derivative citizenship, then the child’s biological, alien parents could be cut out of the process of determining their child’s citizenship.”
The full text of Cepeda Cabrera v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute that required the adoptive parents of children to file naturalization petitions for those children. The Court also determined that Arizona’s third degree escape statute does not require the use of violent force, and therefore, is not a crime of violence aggravated felony.
The full text of Dent v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/17/17-15662.pdf
The Second Circuit has rejected an equal protection challenge to 212(h) waivers for lawful permanent residents charged with inadmissibility (who are eligible for a stand-alone 212(h) waiver) and those charged with deportability (who must apply for the waiver in conjunction with an adjustment of status application). "Congress might have wanted to ensure that dangerous people, including those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, remain outside the United States while their applications for discretionary relief are being considered. Congress might have wanted aliens seeking such waivers to do so from outside the United States in order to discourage them from attempting to fly under the radar' of the immigration authorities in the event that the discretionary waiver is ultimately denied. Congress might have rationalized that an alien who self-deports and returns through proper admission procedures provides immigration authorities a second bite at the apple to intercept and consider otherwise unlawful aliens. Congress might have rationalized that granting a waiver to those who self-deport and seek readmission at the borders provides an incentive for such aliens to voluntarily depart at their own expense."
The full text of Seepersad v. Sessions can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that chronic alcoholism should be considered a medial disability, and as such, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from discriminating against an applicant in immigration court proceedings based on this disability. "Just as a statute targeting people who exhibit manic and depressive behavior would be, in effect, targeting people with bipolar disorder and just as a statute targeting people who exhibit delusional conduct over a long period of time would be, in effect, targeting individuals with schizotypal personality disorder, a statute targeting people who habitually and excessively drink alcohol is, in effect, targeting individuals with chronic alcoholism." "Like any other medical condition, alcoholism is undeserving of punishment and should not be held morally offensive." The Court expressed concern that based on the government's logic, veterans who drink excessively as a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder would be considered to lack good moral character. The Court was also concerned about disproportionate impact on other populations where alcoholism rates are high, such as Native Americans and the homeless. The Court concluded that the good moral character bar was merely a result of animus against those who suffer from chronic alcoholism, and thus, the government had no rational basis for discriminating against chronic alcoholics in this manner.
The full text of Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/03/24/12-73289.pdf
