Ninth Circuit Finds that Idaho Conviction for Possession with Intent to Deliver is an Aggravated Felony

The Ninth Circuit has determined that Idaho conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance is an aggravated felony. First, the court determined the statute is divisible with respect to the identity of the drug. Second, the court found that Idaho’s mens rea requirement matches the federal requirements. Third, the court found that Idaho’s aiding and abetting liability is no broader than the federal counterpart.

The full text of Tellez-Ramirez v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/11/29/22-1168.pdf

Ninth Circuit finds that Idaho Petit Theft Statute is Overbroad with Respect to Definition of a CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that Idaho's petit theft statute is overbroad as compared to the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude because it criminalizes temporary takings of property.  

The court also noted that the effect of an inconclusive record is unclear because it remains an open question whether the burden allocations in Young v. Holder survived the Supreme Court's decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder.  However, the panel declined to reach that question because another panel has priority to do so.  

The court also directed the BIA to reconsider its decision in Matter of Cortez, in which the BIA found that the unambiguous text of the cancellation statute disqualified any person from seeking cancellation who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of at least one year could be imposed, regardless of whether the conviction took place more than five years after the person's admission to the United States.  The court found the statute is not unambiguous, and thus, directed the BIA to examine its analysis using its discretion to interpret the statute in a reasonable manner. 

The full text of Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/08/11-72422.pdf                              

Ninth Circuit Finds that an Idaho Conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child Under Age 16 does not Match the Generic Definition of Sexual Abuse of a Minor

In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that an Idaho conviction for sexual abuse of a child under age 16 does not match the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor.   The generic definition includes statutes where (1) the conduct proscribed is sexual; (2) the statute protects a minor; and (3) the statute requires abuse. Abuse is “physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the victim in question,” and sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen is per se abusive.  The elements of the Idaho statute at issue are: (1) sexual contact, defined as any physical contact; (2) with a minor child under sixteen; and (3) with the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor child, or third party.  Because the statute does not “expressly include physical or psychological abuse of a minor as an element of the crime,” and is “not limited to conduct targeting younger children,” it is overbroad.  Though this decision arose in the context of a criminal sentencing case, the same definition of sexual abuse of a minor is employed in the immigration context, and thus, the decision provides guidance on the immigration consequences of a conviction under this statute.

The full text of United States v. Haycock can be found here: 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2016/06/14/14-30152.pdf