The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking is a crime of violence because the statute does not encompass reckless acts.
The full text of United States v. Pulley can be found here:
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Illinois crimes
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for willful injury is a violent felony because it requires the serious injury, which includes disabling mental illness. The court also determined that Illinois armed robbery statute requires a mens rea greater than recklessness.
The full text of US v. Bragg can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has determined that Illinois’ burglary statute is indivisible between an intent to commit a felony and a intent to commit theft.
The full text of Parzych v. Garland can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a child under age 13 qualifies as a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony.
The full text of United States v. Leal-Monroy can be found here:
Seventh Circuit finds that IL Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Statute is not Divisible
The Seventh Circuit has determined that a conviction under an Illinois statute criminalizing unlawful possession of a controlled substance is not a deportable offense. Both parties agreed that the statute criminalized possession of substances not listed in the Controlled Substances Act. The court found the statute at issue to be indivisible.
“Under the language of § 402(c) and its place in the larger Illinois act, any ‘controlled substance’ will do, subject to the explicit exceptions for methamphetamine, counterfeit substances, and anabolic steroids. The text and structure do not show that the identity of the controlled substance is an element under § 402(c).” The court also noted that while the charging document in the petitioner’s criminal case specified the identity of the substance, the sentencing document did not.
The full text of Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr can be found here:
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The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for aggravated battery on a public way is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Illinois definition of simple battery is divisible between force causing bodily injury (which qualifies as a crime of violence) and insulting or provocative touching (which does not qualify as a crime of violence). Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the language of the charging document indicated that the petitioner was convicted of bodily injury battery.
The full text of U.S. v. Roman can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under federal sentencing guidelines. Because the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration law is similar to the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing law, this decision may have persuasive impact in immigration cases.
The full text of U.S. v. Brown can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines because the statute requires the defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance.
The full text of United States v. Sykes can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has determined that Illinois' felon in possession of a firearm is broader than the definition of a firearms-related aggravated felony because Illinois' statute criminalizes possession of pneumatic weapons. The court further determined that the conviction is indivisible. As such, a conviction under Illinois' felon in possession of a firearm statute will never qualify as a firearms-related aggravated felony.
The full text of Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Illinois' burglary statute is overbroad as compared to the generic definition of burglary because the Illinois statute includes burglary of detached semitrailers. Given the similarity between the generic definition of burglary in the criminal and immigration contexts, this decision may have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United State v. Byas can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has determined that it has jurisdiction to review whether a petitioner was properly placed in administrative removal proceedings based on a conviction for an aggravated felony even if the petitioner does not challenge the aggravated felony finding before the Department of Homeland Security. The court further determined that an Illinois conviction for obstruction of justice is not an aggravated felony. In so doing, the court declined to defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, but instead referred to the definition of an obstruction-related aggravated felony in Matter of Espinoza‐Gonzalez. Because the Illinois statute at issue does not require interference with the proceedings of a tribunal, it is not categorically an aggravated felony, and the court remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did conclude that the petitioner was improperly placed in administrative removal proceedings.
The full text of Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for possession of more than 30 but less than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver is not an aggravated felony. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Moncrieffe, which determined that possession of a small amount of marijuana with intent to deliver for no remuneration is not an aggravated felony. In Moncrieffe, the Court discussed 30 grams of marijuana as a small amount. Given that the Illinois statute at issue criminalizes possession of slightly more than 30 grams with intent to deliver, the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to find that it necessarily involved a non-small amount of marijuana. Thus, the conviction is not an aggravated felony, and the Court remanded to determine if the petitioner's application for cancellation of removal should be granted as a matter of discretion.
The full text of Chen v. Sessions can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has rejected a challenge to term "crime involving moral turpitude," finding that it is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court noted that this phrase has been part of the immigration laws dating back to 1891 and that no case has been decided holding that the phrase is vague, or that it is so meaningless as to be a deprivation of due process.
The Court also determined that a felony burglary conviction in Illinois qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, at least under the modified categorical approach. The statute of conviction stated that "a person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.”
The full text of Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D05-05/C:14-3557:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:1748791:S:0