These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
Minnesota crimes
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota’s crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not match the generic definition of rape because the Minnesota crime includes digital or mechanical penetration, which are outside the generic definition of rape.
The full text of Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for intentionally hiring or offering or agreeing to hire an individual who the defendant reasonably believed to be under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony.
The full text of Aguilar-Sanchez v. Garland can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota’s definition of cocaine is broader than the federal definition because it includes isomers of cocaine not found in the federal statute. The court declined to apply the realistic probability test, finding the statutory language was unambiguous about the type of isomers criminalized in Minnesota.
The full text of US v. Owen can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the Minnesota first-degree burglary statute is overbroad compared to the definition of a violent felony, but that the subsection criminalizing burglary with assault is a violent felony.
The full text of US v. Fisher can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/22/02/212151P.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has rejected a defendant’s argument that a Minnesota conviction for attempted second-degree murder is not a violent felony because it encompasses reckless conduct, finding that one cannot attempt to commit reckless conduct.
The full text of US v. Matthews can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Minnesota possession of a controlled substance conviction is divisible with respect to the identity of the substance, and that a Minnesota second-degree assault conviction is a crime of violence because it requires either the intentional use of violent force or the inducement of fear of immediate bodily harm. The court also determined that the detention of a detainee who obtains a stay of removal from the federal court is governed by 8 USC 1226, not 8 USC 1231.
The full text of Farah v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201912462.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota’s definition of aiding abetting is no broader than the federal definition.
The full text of United States v. Yackel can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for obstruction of legal process is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court emphasized that the statute defines a general intent crime, and “ there is a realistic probability that Minnesota would apply its obstruction of legal process statute to cases that lacked the requisite degree of scienter necessary to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.” Moreover, the conduct criminalized “need not result in any harm or injury whatsoever.”
The full text of Ortiz v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the Minnesota statute criminalizing fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance is divisible, and that the identity of the controlled substance is an element of the offense.
The full text of Bannister v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota convictions for Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth Degree and Failure to Register as a Sex Offender are both crimes involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Tobar-Lobo. “We see no bright line rule that excludes a regulatory offense from the scope of the statute when it involves reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.”
The full text of Bakor v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the Minnesota drug statutes are divisible, and the identity of the controlled substance is an element of the statute.
The full text of Rendon v. Barr can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/20/03/182826P.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that a Minnesota conviction for making terroristic threats is a crime involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the BIA noted that the statute requires intentionally “caus[ing] extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” “First, we conclude that the communication of an intent to injure another by use of violence involves sufficiently reprehensible conduct to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.” “In this regard, we clarify that making a threat to commit a crime of violence in violation of Minnesota’s terroristic threats statute is a crime involving moral turpitude, even if the threatened crime would not necessarily qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.” “We note that the Minnesota statute requires either evacuation or ‘serious’ public inconvenience, which ensures that threats resulting in minor societal interference are not criminalized. Indeed, our review of Minnesota case law indicates that convictions that could fall under this prong of this statute involve, at minimum, reckless disregard that deployment of significant public resources would result from the violators’ actions.”
The full text of Matter of Salad can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1231366/download
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for aiding and abetting simple robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the statute requires the defendant to use the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in immigration litigation.
The full text of Ward v. United States can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/09/03/17-35563.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed, in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, that a Minnesota conviction for simple robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Given the similar definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of Taylor v. United States can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for second-degree assault is a violent felony even though the statute does not require the defendant to cause actual bodily harm but only fear of bodily harm. The Court also rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
The full text of US v. Pendleton can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for third-degree assault qualifies as a violent felony because it requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or injury.
The full text of US v. Wadena can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The Minnesota statute at issue makes it a crime for an actor to engage in “sexual penetration” with another when the other party is “at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 24 months older.” The Minnesota statute at issue here, however, requires a victim who is younger than sixteen, and thus, it still qualifies as an aggravated felony in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Esquival-Quintana.
The full text of Garcia-Urbano v. Sessions can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for simple robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it requires proof of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force. Given the similar definition of a crime of violence in immigration proceedings, this case could have persuasive force in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Pettis can be found here:
The Eight Circuit has determined that a Minnesota robbery conviction is a violent felony under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
"Minn. Stat. § 609.24 minimally requires that a defendant 'threaten[] the imminent use of force' in order to either 'compel acquiescence' or 'to overcome the person’s resistance or powers of resistance . . . . While a threat on its own may not present the requisite degree of force, a statute that contains as an element a threat of violent force will. Minnesota’s express requirement that a defendant communicate a threat to 'overcome . . . resistance' or to 'compel acquiescence' necessarily implicates such violent force."
Given the similarity between the force clause and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this case could have persuasive force in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Libby can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota's second- and third-degree burglary statutes are overbroad as compared to the generic definition of burglary because they do not require the defendant to have the intent to commit a crime at the moment of the unprivileged entry. The court also determined that the statutes are indivisible. Given the similarity between the generic definition of burglary in the criminal and immigration contexts, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Crumble can be found here:
