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Viewing entries tagged
Missouri crimes
The Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed that a Missouri statute criminalizing resisting arrest is divisible as compared to the definition of a crime of violence. “Our decisions concluded that resisting arrest by using or threatening the use of force is a ‘violent felony’ under the Armed Career Criminal Act, but that resisting arrest by fleeing is not a ‘crime of violence’ under the sentencing guidelines.”
The full text of U.S. v. Brown can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri statute for unlawful discharge of a weapon is divisible, and the prong criminalizing shooting at other persons from a motor vehicle is a violent felony.
The full text of United States v. Harris can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that in 2003, Missouri’s definition of cocaine included isomers not encompassed by the current federal definition. “Because Missouri’s definition of cocaine included positional isomers while the federal definition does not, the Missouri definition is unambiguously broader than its federal counterpart. Moreover, Missouri courts have interpreted the Missouri drug schedule as making all isomers of cocaine illegal.”
The full text of US v. Myers can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed its precedent that a Missouri conviction for unlawful exhibition of a weapon is a crime of violence, even in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden. The court noted that only a plurality of judges required that the violent force required be directed at another person, which Justice Thomas’ concurrence required only that intentional acts be an element of the offense.
The full text of US v. Larry can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri statute criminalizing the passing of bad checks is divisible, and subdivision one, which includes an intent to defraud, is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Dolic v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri conviction for first-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. In so doing, the court noted that first-degree robbery has the element of “forcibly steal[ing] property,” which involves the use of violent force.
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri second-degree domestic assault conviction that criminalizes recklessly causing injury to a household member does not qualify as a crime of violence. The court noted that the statute encompassed reckless driving, which is outside the scope of a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. Given the similar definitions of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and the immigration law, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Harris can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit, in a pair of decisions addressing Missouri convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, has determined that Missouri's drug statutes are divisible and that the identity of the drug is an element of these statutes. As such, the modified categorical approach can be employed to determine the identity of the substance.
The decision in Bueno-Muela v. Sessions can be found here:
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171267P.pdf
The decision in Lemus Martinez v. Sessions can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that violations of the Colombia, Missouri municipal code qualify as convictions for immigration purposes. The Court noted that a municipal ordinance violation still requires the prosecutor prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The full text of Rubio v. Sessions can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The statute has as an element the use of physical force upon another person or the threat of an immediate use of such force because it requires the use of force capable of preventing or overcoming resistance. The court overruled its prior, contrary decision in United States v. Bell. Given the similar definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence in the Immigration and Nationality Act, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Swopes can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri conviction for second-degree burglary is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it criminalizes conduct outside the generic definition of burglary offenses. The court found that the statute was overbroad because it criminalized entry into any building or inhabitable structure, and that these alternatives were means and not elements of the statute. Given the similarity between the definition of burglary under the ACCA and in immigration proceedings, this case may have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Naylor can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that a conviction for second-degree assault in Missouri, which forbids recklessly causing physical injury to another person by means of discharge of a firearm, is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Court concluded that reckless conduct causing injury to another by use of a firearm constitutes a use of force under the guidelines. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence under the guidelines and in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive impact in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Ramey can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed that Missouri's second-degree assault statute is divisible, even in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States.
The full text of US v. Welch can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction under Missouri's attempted first degree assault statute is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. The court determined that Missouri's definition of attempt is not overbroad, and that the infliction of serious physical injury upon a victim is sufficient to demonstrate that physical force was employed. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing guidelines and in the immigration context, this decision has persuasive impact on immigration cases.
The full text of US v. Minnis can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that subsection (3) of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.060.1 (second-degree assault), which criminalizes reckless driving that results in injury, is not a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. Given the similar definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and in the immigration law, this decision should have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Fields can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri conviction is a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes. The court consulted state court interpretations to determine that the conviction required the use of violent force. Because the definition of a violent felony is very similar to the definition of a crime of violence for immigration purposes, this decision may have persuasive value in immigration proceedings.
The decision in US v. Irons can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has concluded, in light of the decision in Mathis v. United States, that the Missouri statute defining second degree burglary is divisible, in so much as the alternative places listed (a building or inhabitable structure) are elements of the statute. Thus, under the modified categorical approach, a conviction for burglarizing a building matches the generic definition of burglary under federal sentencing law, and thus, qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Given the similarity between the definition of burglary for ACCA purposes and the definition of a burglary aggravated felony, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of U.S. v. Sykes can be found here:
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/12/143139P.pdf
In a criminal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for second-degree robbery in Missouri is not a crime of violence because it does not require violent touching. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing context and a crime of violent in the immigration context, this decision provides excellent arguments for practitioners to use in support of the contention that a conviction under this statute is not a crime of violence aggravated felony.
The full text of United States v. Bell can be found here:
In the context of a federal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit determined that a Missouri conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing is not a crime of violence because it does not require that a defendant use force or the threat of force. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing context and the immigration context, this case may provide valuable insight into the immigration consequences of a conviction under this statute.
The full text of United States v. Robinson can be found here:
In a federal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit determined that a conviction in Missouri for second-degree is a categorical match to the generic definition of a burglary offense. Thus, it is likely also a categorical match to the definition of a burglary aggravated felony in the immigration context. The court also noted that a conviction for second-degree domestic assault in Missouri is not categorically a violent felony. The statute at issue covers any person who:
(1) Attempts to cause or knowingly causes physical injury to such family or household member by any means, including but not limited to, by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or by choking or strangulation; or (2) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to such family or household member; or (3) Recklessly causes physical injury to such family or household member by means of any deadly weapon.
The court determined that only the first subsection qualified as a violent felony. Though the court didn't specify why the other subsections are not violent felonies, it is likely because they involve merely reckless conduct, while the first subsection requires intentional conduct. Given the similar definitions of a violent felony in the sentencing context and a crime of violence in the immigration context, similar conclusions can likely be drawn about the various subsections in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Phillips can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/03/151712P.pdf
