Viewing entries tagged
Motions to Reopen

Comment

Fifth Circuit Refuses to Reopen Reinstated Order

The Fifth Circuit has found that the reinstatement provision, which prevents reopening of a reinstated removal order, trumps the statutory provision allowing a non-citizen to file one motion to reopen.

“Although Rodriguez-Saragosa responds that we have ‘created a conflict’ between 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and § 1231(a)(5), we detect no inconsistency. The former provides that every alien ordered removed from the United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or her removal proceedings. And the latter provides that an alien forfeits that right by reentering the country illegally. That is the clear import of the statute’s unambiguous text.”

The full text of Rodriguez-Saragosa v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-60515-CV0.pdf

Comment

Comment

Ninth Circuit holds that Immigration Judge has Sua Sponte Authority to Reopen Reasonable Fear Review

The Ninth Circuit addressed the parameters of reasonable fear review before an Immigration, as well as the judge’s authority to reopen that review. A “reasonable fear review hearing is conducted by an IJ. It is not as comprehensive or in-depth as a withholding of removal hearing in removal proceedings. Either party may introduce oral or written statements, and the court provides an interpreter if necessary.” “Extensive proof is not needed; rather an IJ need only determine whether there is at least a ten percent chance that the alien would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal.” Thus, although an IJ may allow an alien to submit evidence to support his or her claim, the IJ is not required to do so. The Court found that an IJ has the sua sponte authority to reopen any proceedings in which he has made a decision, including a reasonable fear review.

The full text of Bartolome v. Sessions can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/14/15-71666.pdf

Comment

Comment

Eleventh Circuit Addresses Jurisdiction to Reopen Proceedings for Deported Individual

In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot deny a motion to reopen for the purpose of applying for asylum and withholding of removal solely because the petitioner has been physically deported from the United States.

The full text of Linton v. Attorney General can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201513378.pdf

Comment

Comment

First Circuit Finds that BIA Abused its Discretion by Refusing to Reopen

The First Circuit admonished the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) for failing to exercise its discretion.  The petitioner sought reopening after two attorneys (both later disciplined for their unethical representation of clients) provided him ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in the entry of an in absentia order of removal when he was approximately 30 minutes late to a hearing.  Though the Immigration Judge and the Board both agreed that the petitioner had received in effective assistance of counsel sufficient to toll the filing deadline for the motion to reopen, they declined to reopen because the petitioner had received notice of the proper time of his hearing.  The court doubted whether being 30 minutes late was really grounds for an in absentia, but noted that attorney's failure to inform the judge of the client's appearance (after the judge indicated a willingness to reopen the case if the petitioner appeared later that morning) was an exceptional circumstance.

The full text of Murillo-Robles v. Lynch can be found here:

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-2568P-01A.pdf

Comment

Comment

Sixth Circuit Reverses the Grant of the Department of Homeland Security's Motion to Reopen

In a somewhat scathing decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to reopen proceedings based on evidence presented by the Department of a Homeland Security (DHS) that an asylee had lied about her identity.  Noting that the asylee had revealed her use of alias on her application and that the DHS can the evidence submitted within its possession at the time of the decision granting asylum, the court noted that the DHS had not met the burden of introducing previously unavailable evidence to substantiate reopening of a proceeding.

"The government’s reasons for its failure to investigate are simply not compelling. Not only did Sakhawati admit to using an alias, including the explicit admission on her asylum application, but she also provided biometric information that would have enabled DHS to discover the existence of a second identity."  "Moreover, DHS specifically informed the IJ that it had completed all of the requisite background checks—which include the above-mentioned biometric screening—pursuant to DHS’s own regulatory requirements."

The full text of Sakhawati v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0063p-06.pdf

 

Comment

Comment

Seventh Circuit Addresses a Persistent Litigant

The decision in Joseph v. Lynch does not contain any particularly enlightening legal principles (except to confirm that the 7th Circuit will not exercise jurisdiction to review motions to reopen filed on purely discretionary grounds), but if you'd like to read the saga a man who has filed 8 motions to reopen, I recommend the case.  Mr. Joseph did not receive the relief he was seeking, but he shown an unusual level of persistence, and perhaps will try again.

The text of the decision can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D07-14/C:14-2935:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1587192:S:0

Comment

Comment

First Circuit Dismisses Appeal of a Denied Motion to Reopen

The First Circuit's decision in Mazariegos v. Lynch is not particularly noteworthy for its fact or the law that it applies.  It is, however, a reminder of how much more difficult it can be to attack a removal order collaterally (i.e. through a motion to reopen) than on direct appeal.  Mazariegos was granted adjustment of status and a waiver under 212(h) of the INA, but the Government appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the Immigration Judge, finding that Mazariegos did not merit an exercise of discretion.  Instead of appealing to a circuit court, he filed a motion to reopen with the Board, which was denied, and appealed to the First Circuit.  The First Circuit stated that "Mazariegos may have fared better had he sought review at this point [after the denial of his waiver by the Board] rather than following a motion to reopen denial, and we are not unsympathetic to the difficult place he finds himself in."

It's a curious statement, given that the court later recognizes that it would not have jurisdiction to review a discretionary denial of a 212(h) waiver.  "The law [the Government] cites indeed provides that courts cannot review the discretionary component of the Attorney General's section 212(h) waiver decision."

And yet, the procedural posture of a collateral attack is so much more difficult for a non-citizen to litigate, given the presumption of finality of orders of removal, that perhaps a circuit court appeal (to the extent that a judicially cognizable question of law or constitutional claim could be raised) would have served Mazariegos better.

The full text of Mazariegos v. Lynch can be found here: http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1431P-01A.pdf  

Comment

Comment

Ninth Circuit Invalidates the Departure Bar (Again!)

Two regulations that predate the passage of IIRIRA (collectively referred to as "the departure bar") provide that a noncitizen who is the subject of immigration proceedings may not make a motion to reopen or reconsider “subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” In Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the departure bar survived the passage of IIRIRA.  Previously, the Ninth Circuit had held that the departure bar does not apply to noncitizens who departed the United States either before removal proceedings have commenced, or after removal proceedings were completed.  The court has also held that the departure bar is invalid as applied to a noncitizen who is involuntarily removed from the United States. 

In Toor v. Lynch, the court addressed whether the departure bar may be applied to a noncitizen who voluntarily departs the United States during removal proceedings.  Consistent with the other circuits who have addressed the question, the Ninth Circuit held that the departure bar is inapplicable regardless of how the non-citizen left the United States.  Rejecting the decision in Armendarez-Mendez, the court stated that "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue; the text of IIRIRA makes clear that the statutory right to file a motion to reopen and a motion to  reconsider is not limited by whether the individual has departed the United States."  "IIRIRA limits the right to file a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider by number, time, and content, but not in any respect by whether the individual has departed the United States."

Notably, the Court stated that because Toor's motion to reopen was filed in a timely manner, it need not decide if the departure bar could be applied to untimely motions to reopen.  

The full text of Toor v. Lynch can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/06/17/10-73212.pdf

Comment

Comment

Supreme Court Addresses Federal Court Jurisdiction over Untimely Motions to Reopen

Mata, the petitioner, filed an untimely motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  He argued that his motion was not time barred because his prior attorney had provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel, which should excuse the tardy filing of the motion to reopen.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied the motion, finding that it was untimely and that the filing deadline need not be equitably tolled because Mata had not demonstrated any prejudice from his prior counsel's alleged ineffective assistance.  On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court construed any request for equitable tolling as a request for the Board's to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.  As the circuit court had no jurisdiction to review the Board's decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal.  The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that has ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to review equitable tolling requests, and the Supreme Court accepted review of Mata's case in order to resolve the circuit split on the issue.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the corcuit courts have jurisdiction when a non-citizen appeals from the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.  "Nothing changes when the Board denies a motion to reopen because it is untimely—nor when, in doing so, the Board rejects a request for equitable tolling.   Under the INA, as under our century-old practice, the reason for the [Board]’s denial makes no difference to the jurisdictional issue. Whether the [Board] rejects the alien’s motion to reopen because it comes too late or because it falls short in some other respect, the courts have jurisdiction to review that decision." 

The Supreme Court noted that even if the Board additionally noted that it would not exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen a case, that did not deprive a federal court of its authority to review any other statutory ground invoked by a non-citizen when requesting reopening of his proceedings.  The Supreme Court left open the question of whether a federal court could properly decline review on jurisdictional ground the Board's refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.

The full text of Mata v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-185_i4dk.pdf

Comment

Comment

Sixth Circuit Addresses Motion to Reopen Based on Lack of Notice

In a precedential decision addressing a motion to reopen based on lack of notice, the applicant claimed that the immigration officer inappropriately listed an address on the Notice to Appear that the applicant indicated belonged to an acquaintance, but which the applicant did not indicate was his address.  Though personally served with the Notice to Appear, the applicant did not attempt to correct the address by filing a change of address form with the Immigration Court.  As a result, the notice of hearing was mailed to the address on the Notice to Appear, the applicant did not receive the notice and did not attend his court hearing, and the Immigration Judge ordered the applicant removed in his absence.

Recognizing that the Ninth Circuit had reopened a case under similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit respectfully disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and determined that the "fact that the immigration official made the alleged error does not absolve Thompson.  Thompson had both the opportunity to provide his current, correct address at the time he received the Notice to Appear and the obligation to ensure that the INS had an address at which he could be reached throughout the proceedings.  This obligation necessarily included a duty to correct the address listed on the Notice to Appear, particularly since the Notice to Appear informed him that all future mailings would be sent to the address listed on the form."

The full text of Thompson v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0122p-06.pdf 

Comment

Comment

Seventh Circuit Finds that a Lawyer Provided Ineffective Assistance

Ashraf Habib was accused of gaining his lawful permanent residency through fraud.  Specifically, the Government alleged that Habib gained his residency through marriage to a US citizen, but that at the time, he was still married to a woman in Pakistan.  Habib failed to disclose his Pakistani wife or three children  on his application for residency or for his application for citizenship.  At trial, Habib's attorney denied the Government's allegation that Habib’s marriage to his deceased U.S. citizens spouse was not legally valid because not divorced from his wife in Pakistan.  His attorney, however, seemingly contradicted himself by admitting the materially identical allegation that Habib was not validly married to a United States citizen when he gained his residency.  His attorney also admitted that Habib had three children in Pakistan, but denied that Habib was removable for having committed fraud.

At the beginning of Habib's merits hearing, his attorney submitted a divorce decree which purported to show that Habib had divorced his Pakistani wife 2 years before marrying his American wife.  The attorney stated that he “believed” he previously had submitted a copy of this divorce decree to the government.  But when the government’s attorney disputed this assertion, the attorney said that he “just got it recently.”  The Immigration Judge (IJ) stated that Habib could be questioned about the divorce decree during his testimony but reserved ruling on the admissibility of the document.

Habib then testified about his marriage to his deceased U.S. citizen spouse and the reason he omitted his Pakistani wife and children from his immigration applications.  When asked about his divorce, Habib testified that he was divorced from his first wife in 1999, but the Government asserted that this was contradicted by his attorney's admission to the factual allegation about his invalid second marriage.  "In response, Habib’s lawyer mumbled something about a 'mistake' but did not move to retract the admission of [the] allegation."  

The IJ determined that Habib’s failure to disclose his children and his first marriage was material because the misrepresentation “cut off [a] line of inquiry and prevented the Government from conducting a full analysis of all factors relevant to the validity of” Habib’s second marriage.  The IJ noted that the divorce decree was an untimely submission and emphasized that Habib's attorney initially admitted that his second marriage was invalid and never sought to retract that admission.

Habib retained new counsel, appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and moved to reopen his proceedings on account of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He claimed that he had timely provided the divorce decree to his prior attorney.  His prior attorney did not respond to these allegations, but instead, another attorney at his firm claimed that the document was not timely received by the office.  Habib denied the accuracy of this statement.  The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and denied Habib's motion to reopen, stating that it could not conclude that Habib's prior attorney's failure to timely submit the divorce decree resulted from “deficient performance” because neither Habib nor his former lawyer specified precisely when Habib gave the divorce decree to his prior attorney.  The BIA also determined that Habib had not shown he was prejudiced by his prior attorney's admission that his second marriage was invalid because the Government submitted substantial evidence challenging the validity of that marriage and Habib had admitted during testimony that he “‘lied on purpose’ when he failed to mention his first wife and his children” in his applications.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that Habib's prior attorney's admission effectively waived Habib’s defense to removal, and an attorney’s waiver of a complete defense to removal prejudices the client.  In addition, the fact that the Government had put forward evidence that Habib had failed to disclose his first wife and children was no dispositive.  If Habib could prove that his second marriage was valid, he could demonstrate that he was still eligible for residency, despite the omissions in his application.  For this reason, his prior attorney's failure to timely submit the divorce decree was also substandard performance that prejudiced Habib's case.

The full text of Habib v. Lynch can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D05-29/C:14-3370:J:Williams:aut:T:fnOp:N:1560163:S:0

Comment

Comment

Eleventh Circuit Corrects BIA's Erroneous View of the Evidence in a Motion to Reopen

From time to time, I find a great unpublished case whether a circuit court really goes to town with the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Today I found one from the Eleventh Circuit that I wanted to share.

Zheng filed a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in China - namely, an increase in enforcement of the One Child Policy.  He submitted three reports which the Board of Immigration Appeals refused to consider because it determined they were incomplete.  The Eleventh Circuit, after reviewing the evidence, determined that Zheng submitted the entire contents of the first report.  Although he only submitted selected chapters of the second and third reports, he submitted the table of contents for each of these reports, demonstrating that he submitted the chapters relevant to his claim (and saved a lot of trees by not printing the rest). As such, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen and remanded the case for further consideration.

The full text of Zheng v. Attorney General can be found here: http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201411792.pdf

Comment

Comment

Seventh Circuit Reverses Denial of a Motion to Reopen based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner Chen applied for asylum on the basis of the harm he had suffered for violating China's One Child Policy.  At issue (among other things) was whether Chen, in fact, had two children.  At the request of his first attorney, Ming, he requested  birth certificates from china for both children.  A forensic document analysis determined that his son's birth certificate was fraudulent.  According to Chen, Ming did not inform him of his, but instead told him that certificate was useless and he needed another one.  Though he knew that a genuine certificate was not available in China for his son because his illegal birth was never registered, Chen asked his father in China to send another birth certificate for his son.  A forensic analysis determined that this certificate, too, was fraudulent.  At that point, Chen hired a new attorney (Zhang).  The Immigration Judge denied Chen's application.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed that decision.

Chen then retained new counsel and moved the Board to reopen based on Ming and Zhang’s ineffective assistance.  In a detailed brief, Chen methodically argued that each inconsistency or deficiency identified by the IJ could be attributed to his counsel’s incompetence, including a translation error in his application that Ming acknowledged making.  Chen also argued that Ming’s negligence misled him into submitting the fraudulent birth certificates because she never explained to him that the government was questioning the authenticity of his son’s birth certificate.  The Board denied the motion.  Although it agreed that the attorneys had behaved in a substandard manner and that Chen had complied with all of the procedural requirements to support a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it determined that he could not establish the requisite prejudice.  It focused exclusively on the submission of the two fraudulent birth certificates, essentially concluding that Chen had doomed himself by submitting them.  

On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Chen prevailed.  The court recognized that the Board's decision could be interpreted in two ways, both of which required remand.  

One possibility was that the Board "ruled that because [Chen] knew that his son’s birth certificates were fraudulent, his claim necessarily fails regardless of his attorneys’ representation.  If that is the correct reading of the Board’s decision, then its reasoning is erroneous.  A finding that an applicant knowingly offered fraudulent evidence allows an IJ to find an applicant not credible, but it does not require an adverse credibility ruling or compel the IJ to deny the claim solely based on the fraudulent submission."  Notably, the IJ had not actually rendered an adverse credibility determination in Chen's case!

The second possibility is that the "Board ruled that because Chen knowingly submitted false birth certificates, he did not corroborate the heart of his claim, and therefore, lacking this essential corroboration, Chen would have lost even with competent counsel.  But if the Board ruled that Chen must lose because he lacks corroboration, its ruling is procedurally flawed because it ignores Chen’s main argument in his motion to reopen: the IJ required corroboration only because his attorneys ineptly caused the IJ to find Chen’s testimony inconsistent.  If his attorneys had properly presented his testimony, Chen explains, any inconsistencies might have vanished, and the IJ might have found his testimony, standing alone, sufficient to carry his burden without the need for corroboration."  The Seventh Circuit deemed this a potentially meritorious argument, and found that the Board failed to adequately consider it.

The full text of Chen v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D04-01/C:14-2411:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1527153:S:0

Comment

Comment

Sixth Circuit Grants Petition for Review of a Denied Motion to Reopen; Finds that Unsworn Emails have Evidentiary Value

In a short but sweet disposition, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.  Uwineza, a citizen of Rwanda, submitted several emails from friends in Rwanda that indicated that government officials were looking for her because they believed she supported an opposition political figure.  The Board discredited the emails because they were unsworn and came from interested witnesses who were not subject to cross-examination.  The Sixth Circuit rejected this decision, deeming the Board's decision to be devoid of rational explanation.  "The new evidence appears to satisfy the requirements of not having been previously available and indicating a change in conditions in Rwanda material to Uwineza’s claim. The BIA rejected the evidence on the ground that the letters were unsworn and appeared to have been written in support of her case, which we have found invalid. The BIA also noted that the letters were from interested witnesses, but interested witnesses would normally be expected to have information relevant to a petitioner’s claim, and that the witnesses were not subject to cross-examination, which will also normally be the case in a motion to reopen."

The full text of Uwineza v. Holder can be found here: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0053p-06.pdf 

Comment

Comment

Ninth Circuit Affirms the Denial of a Motion to Reopen based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Martinez-Hernandez alleged that his prior counsel should have disputed an Immigration Judge's assertion that his criminal conviction barred him from applying for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.  Although he had a lawful permanent resident mother and U.S.-citizen child, Martinez-Hernandez provided no evidence that either of them would suffer the requisite hardship to make him eligible for cancellation.  In affirming the Board's decisions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the existence of a qualifying relative is not enough to demonstrate that it is plausible that Martinez-Hernandez was eligible for the relief he sought, and thus, he could not establish any prejudice stemming from his prior counsel's actions.

 

The full text of the decision can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/02/24/11-70492.pdf

Comment

Comment

First Circuit Addresses Equitable Tolling and Jurisdictional Issues for Motions to Reopen

Earlier this week, the First Circuit issued a decision in Wan v. Holder.  Wan challenged the denial of a motion to reopen.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied the motion, in part, because Wan had not exercised the due diligence necessary to toll the 180-day filing deadline for an exceptional circumstances motion to reopen.  On appeal to the circuit, Wan challenged this finding, and also asserted that the Board engaged in impermissible fact-finding.

The First Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to determine if the Board had engaged in impermissible fact-finding because Wan had not properly exhausted this argument.  Instead, Wan needed to raise this argument in a motion to reconsider before the Board, and thus, give the Board the opportunity to consider the issue.  In so holding, the court joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuit's decisions on this issue.

Turning to Wan's request to toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen, the court noted that whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applied in immigration proceedings remained an open question.  It declined to decide the issue, finding that in any event, Wan had not exercised the requisite due diligence to invoke the equitable tolling doctrine.

Interestingly, the court proceeded to issue a decision in this case, despite a motion informing the court of Wan's intention to apply for administrative relief under the newly-announced Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) program.  

The follow text of the decision can be found here: http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/13-1893P-01A.pdf

Comment

Comment

Ninth Circuit Addresses Motions to Reopen for Individuals Seeking Adjustment of Status before USCIS

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the Board of Immigration Appeal's decision in Matter of Yauri is not entitled to deference, and that the Board has jurisdiction to reopen removal proceedings using their sua sponte authority when an arriving alien seeks to adjust their status before USCIS.  It awaits to be seen if the Board determines that such circumstances rise to the level of "exceptional circumstances" required for a sua sponte reopening.

The most interesting part of the decision was the broad language used by the Ninth Circuit.  The court stated that the Board has broad power to grant a motion to reopen in any case for the
purpose of affording an alien the opportunity to pursue relief from removal before another agency.  I think it's an open (and very interesting!) question whether executive relief (i.e. DACA, prosecutorial discretion) constitutes "relief from removal before another agency."  If so, I'd say there's a new argument that the courts can (and perhaps should!) start granting MTRs for the purpose of applying for DACA and PD.  Let's keep our fingers crossed!

The full decision (Singh v. Holder) can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/11/13/09-73798.pdf

Comment