These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
Nebraska crimes
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the Nebraska shoplifting statute has a broader mens rea than the generic definition of a theft-related aggravated felony. “Because an offender can be convicted under Nebraska’s shoplifting statute when he acts with an intent not encompassed by a generic theft offense, we hold that the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic federal offense.”
The full text of Thok v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for negligent child abuse is a deportable crime of child abuse because the statute requires a mens rea of at least criminal negligence.
The full text of Al-Masaudi v. Garland can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for terroristic threats is not a violent felony because it encompasses reckless conduct.
The full text of US v. Williams can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/22/02/203311P.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for theft by receiving stolen property is a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the benefits of ownership of the property.
The full text of Reyna v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Nebraska’s false reporting statute is overbroad and divisible with respect to the issue of moral turpitude. The court then determined that subsection (1)(a) requires a specific intent to deceive a police officer, and as such, qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Adame-Hernandez v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the Nebraska statute defining criminal impersonation is divisible as compared to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. However, because the record of conviction was inconclusive as to which subdivision the petitioner was convicted under, he could not meet his burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.
The full text of Pereida v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for making terroristic threats is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The statute criminalized, among other things, "commit[ing] any crime of violence . . . With the intent of causing the evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation." The Nebraska Supreme Court has defined the term “crime of violence” as “an act which injures or abuses through the use of physical force and which subjects the actor to punishment by public authority.”
Fletcher, the defendant, argued that the statute could be violated by making threats to property, and thus, did not qualify as a violent felony. The Court disagreed. "Fletcher points to no case in which Nebraska has applied the terroristic threats statute to a threat to commit arson of an unoccupied building. As a result, even if the theoretical possibility exists that the Nebraska terroristic threats statute could encompass threats only to property, Fletcher has not demonstrated a realistic probability that Nebraska would apply the statute in that manner."
Given the similarity in definition between a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence aggravated felony for immigration purposes, this case could have persuasive effect in the immigration context.
The full text of Fletcher v. United States can be found here:
