Third Circuit finds that NJ Robbery Conviction is not CIMT

The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under the pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard because New Jersey’s definition of theft does not include an intent to permanently deprive others of their property. The Court further concluded that the force required to commit robbery is only that which is necessary to wrest the object from the victim, and does not require the infliction of any type of bodily harm.

The full text of Diaz Almanzar v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/213092p.pdf

BIA Finds that NJ Drug Statute is Divisible

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that a New Jersey statute criminalizing possession of a dangerous substance is divisible with respect to the identity of the controlled substance. The agency found several authoritative state law decisions that didn’t seemingly support its conclusion, but instead of concluding that state law does not consider the identity of the substance as an element, the BIA (in a well-choreographed tap dance) decided the decisions were so old as to not properly use the terms “means” and “element” as they are understood today. All in all, the decision reads as a fairly desperate attempt by the BIA to avoid the possibility that people convicted of drug possession in New Jersey won’t be deportable.

In the BIA’s defense, their analysis of the structure of the statute seems more consistent with case law, and less like an analysis focused on outcome only.

The full text of Matter of Laguerre can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1464011/download

Ninth Circuit Finds that New Jersey Aggravated Assault is not a Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit determined that a mens rea of extreme indifference recklessness is insufficient to sustain a finding of an aggravated assault crime of violence.  As such, a conviction for aggravated assault in New Jersey encompasses conduct not covered by the generic definition of a crime of violence, and the conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes (and very possibly, for immigration purposes as well, since the Ninth Circuit's definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) excludes reckless or negligent acts).  The court also noted that the New Jersey definition of "attempt" is broader than the federal definition.

The full text of United States v. Garcia Jimenez can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/11/19/14-10484.pdf