These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
Tennessee crimes
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee misdemeanor domestic assault is not a crime of violence because it includes inflict of mental harm.
The full text of Sanchez-Perez v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0098p-06.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee money laundering statute is divisible, and the subsection criminalizing using the proceeds of illegal activity to promote illegal activity is an aggravated felony.
The full text of Fakhuri v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-60275-CV0.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that Tennessee’s first-degree burglary statute is overbroad as compared to the generic definition of burglary because it includes breaking into a container (i.e., a drawer) after a lawful entry.
The full text of Cartwright v. United States can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0203p-06.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a Tennessee statutory rape conviction is a crime of child abuse, even though it includes victims over age 16. The Board concluded t that section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) covers a broader range of criminal conduct than the “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony provision. “Thus, we conclude that the minimum criminal conduct proscribed by the respondent’s statute of conviction—sexual penetration between a victim who is 17 years old and a perpetrator who is at least 27 years old, committed with a mens rea of recklessness—necessarily involves maltreatment or impairment of a child’s physical or mental well-being and falls within the generic definition of a crime of child abuse.”
The full text of Matter of Aguilar-Barajas can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee conviction for manufacturing, delivering, selling, or possessing with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a controlled substance is both a crime involving moral turpitude and a drug trafficking aggravated felony. With respect to the aggravated felony ground, the Court found the statute to be overbroad because it criminalizes possession with intent to deliver one half-ounce, or approximately 14 grams, of marijuana and does not include any reference to remuneration. Such conduct is punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law.
However, the Court found the statute to be divisible because each subsection provides for a different punishment depending on the quantity and type of drug involved. Examining the record of conviction, the Court determined that the petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 4,000 grams of marijuana.
In addition, because the statute requires a mens rea (knowingly) and involves reprehensible conduct (drug trafficking), it also qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).
Finally, the Court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Balderas. In Balderas, the BIA considered whether a CIMT that has been used as part of the basis for a "two or more CIMTs” charge of removability in an immigration proceeding that terminated with a § 212(c) waiver may later be used as part of the basis for a “two or more CIMTs” charge of removability if the petitioner in question commits another CIMT after the first immigration proceeding was terminated. The BIA held that such a previously found CIMT could be used with a new CIMT to support a charge of removability because a grant of section 212(c) relief waives the finding of excludability or deportability rather than the basis of the excludability itself." Thus, because the petitioner was also convicted of a CIMT in 2000, a waiver of the 1995 CIMT under 212c would not prevent a finding that the petitioner was removable for two CIMTs.
The full text of Guevara-Solorazano v. Sessions can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a crime of violence. The court noted that different punishments are prescribed for reckless and intentional conduct. Thus, the alternative mens reas are alternative elements. A conviction for intentional conduct under the statute qualifies as a crime of violence, as it requires the infliction of serious bodily injury or the use or display of a deadly weapon. Therefore, force more violent than mere offense touching is required to sustain a conviction. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision will likely have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Perez-Silvan can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/06/28/16-10177.pdf
In a published decision, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that a conviction for aggravated burglary in Tennessee matches the generic definition of a burglary offense, and thus, qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). For immigration purposes, a conviction for this crime will very likely qualify as a burglary aggravated felony in the immigration context if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year.
With respect to Tennessee's burglary statute, the court determined that the statute is divisible with respect to whether it matches the generic definition of a burglary because one of the subsections of the statute criminalizes burglary of non-buildings, such as vehicles and motor boats. This subsection does not match the generic definition of a burglary offense. Because the petitioner was convicted under one of the subsections involving a building, his conviction matched the generic definition of a burglary offense, and qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. Again, a conviction under this statute will likely be considered overbroad but divisible when analyzing whether it qualifies a burglary aggravated felony in the immigration context.
Finally, with respect to a conviction for robbery in Tennessee, the court confirmed that the statute qualified as a violent felony under the "use of force" prong in the ACCA. This prong is nearly identical to the definition of a crime of violent found in 18 USC 16(a), and thus, a conviction for robbery in Tennessee, if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year, will likely be considered a crime of violence aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
The full text of United States v. Priddy can be found here: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0292p-06.pdf
