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Viewing entries tagged
Virginia crimes
The Fourth Circuit has affirmed that a Virginia conviction for solicitation of prostitution is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court rejected the argument that societal attitudes toward prostitution had sufficiently changed such that solicitation of prostitution was no longer base conduct.
The full text of Ortega-Cordova v. Garland can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/221700.P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that Virginia’s sexual battery statute is divisible between non-consensual acts and acts committed against a person restrained by the criminal justice system. The portion of the statute criminalizing non-consensual acts constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. The court additionally found that a Virginia conviction for solicitation of a minor under age 15 is a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute includes a requirement that the defendant has reason to believe he is soliciting someone under age 15.
The full text of Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that receipt of stolen property offenses constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) if the defendant knows the property was stolen, even if the statutes do not require the defendant to intend to permanently deprive the owner of the property. The court further agreed that Virginia’s receipt of stolen property statute matches the definition of a CIMT. The court remanded because the Immigration Judge failed to advise the petitioner of the requirement of posting a voluntary departure bond before granting him voluntary departure.
The full text of Solis-Flores v. Garland can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for common law robbery does not qualify as a violent felony because it does not include an element of the use of violent force. Instead, it can be committed by threatening to accuse the robbery victim of committing sodomy.
The full text of US v. Williams can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that the Virginia identity theft statute is divisible, and the subsection requiring an intent to defraud is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Salazar v. Garland can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction related to distribution of controlled substances is a crime involving moral turpitude. The court acknowledged that not all substances criminalized by Virginia appear in the federal statutes, but relied on the state’s determination that the substance should be criminalized as proof that distribution of the substance is base or vile. Notably, for the purpose of the appeal, the court assumed that the statute is not divisible with respect to the identity of the substance.
The full text of Daye v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014340.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia felony conviction for eluding is a crime involving moral turpitude because it involves a mens rea (willful and wanton) that is higher than criminal negligence and reprehensible conduct (vehicular flight from law enforcement). In so doing, the court rejected an argument that the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is unconstitutionally vague or violates the nondelegation doctrine.
The full text of Canales Granados v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/202028.P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for unlawful wound is a crime of violence because it requires the infliction of bodily injury with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill.
The full text of Moreno-Osorio v. Garland can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia statute criminalizing willful discharge of a firearm in a public place without resulting bodily injury is not a firearms offenses because it does not contain an antique firearms exception. “We hold that the plain language of Virginia Code § 18.2-280(A), as supported by later acts of Virginia’s legislature and by decisions of its appellate courts, prohibits conduct involving the use of ‘any firearm,’ including antique firearms. Thus, Gordon was not required to identify a prosecution under the Virginia statute involving an antique firearm to defend against removal.”
“Our conclusion is not affected by the government’s claim that the Virginia conviction nevertheless qualifies as a removable offense because Gordon failed to present evidence of a conviction in Virginia under Section 18.2-280(A) for the discharge of an antique firearm.” “The flaw in the government’s argument, however, is its failure to recognize that when the state, through plain statutory language, has defined the reach of a state statute to include conduct that the federal offense does not, the categorical analysis is complete; there is no categorical match.”
The full text of Gordon v. Barr can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that the Virginia statutes governing leaving an accident and identity theft do not match the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude.
“[T]he failure-to-stop conviction requires no culpable mental state or reprehensible conduct. As to the culpable mental state, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 does not require any showing of intent, nor has the Virginia Supreme Court read an element of intent into the statute; thus, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 cannot have the required culpable mental state to qualify as a CIMT. As the Government acknowledges, the statute does not require actual knowledge that an accident or injury took place, but rather that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the accident resulted in injury or property damage.”
“The Supreme Court of Virginia has made it clear that it is possible for a defendant to be guilty of violating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 for merely failing to satisfy the reporting requirements in the statute, even if the defendant remained at the scene of the accident. The Government does not argue that failing to comply with the reporting requirements categorically violates a social norm. And for good reason. We cannot see how failing to comply with the reporting requirements (e.g., failing to report one’s name, address, driver’s license number, and vehicle registration number) categorically violates a social norm. Failure to comply with the reporting requirements is not behavior ‘that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved.’”
The court noted that the identify theft statute does not require an intent to deceive the government or obstruct a governmental function. “In Virginia, it is a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) to provide false identification to someone who is not law enforcement, such as a ‘loss prevention manager at a store investigating a shoplifting accident.’” “Further, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) does not require a perpetrator to use the name of an actual person, as the statute proscribes the use of the identity of a ‘false or a fictitious person’.”
The full text of Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Virginia drug statute is divisible with respect to the substances regulated by the statute.
The full text of United States v. Vanoy can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/20/04/183165P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that Virginia’s drug schedules are divisible, and as such, the specific identity of a controlled substance is an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.
The full text of Bah v. Barr can be found here:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/181877.P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for taking custodial indecent liberties with a child is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The court emphasized that the statute targets conduct directed towards minors. requires a mental element focused on sexual gratification, and requires physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a child. The court also distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Esquivel-Quintana, which did not reach sexual offenses against children over age 16 when there is a relationship of trust between the adult and the child.
The full text of Thompson v. Barr can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for obstruction of justice is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it can be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element (such as the use of threats or force) that shocks the public conscience. In so doing, the court distinguished the statute at issue from the statute analyzed in Matter of Jurado-Delgado.
The court also clarified the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his arguments before the agency. "[T[he Government takes issue with appellate counsel citing certain cases for the first time on appeal in order to elaborate on the breadth of the Virginia statute. The Government has not provided any basis for applying the exhaustion requirement at this level of granularity. Indeed, such an approach would strip appellate counsel’s ability to bolster existing arguments—and limit the universe of available case law and precedent to those already cited below."
The full text of Ramirez v. Sessions can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a deferred adjudication program which requires a defendant to plead guilty at the outset still qualifies as a conviction if the judge imposes probation. The Court noted that it would have reached a different outcome if the defendant had not been required to enter a guilty plea. The Court recognized that its decision created "a disparity between defendants who plead guilty under the Virginia first offender statute and those who plead not guilty."
The full text of Payan-Jaquez v. Sessions can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that it maintains jurisdiction to review a final administrative order of removal issued against a non-lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony even if the Department of Homeland Security cancels that order after the person's removal from the United States. The court also determined that Virginia statutory burglary is not a burglary aggravated felony because it is overbroad and indivisible with respect to the manner and location of the entries criminalized.
The full text of Castendet v. Sessions can be found here:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/152484.P.pdf
The Fourth has determined that a Virginia conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require a conscious disregard of risk.
The full text of Sotnikau v. Lynch can be found here:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/152073.P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for forgery of a public record is categorically an offense related to forgery, and thus, an aggravated felony if accompanied by a sentence of one year or more of imprisonment.
The full text of Santos Alvarez v. Lynch can be found here:
