These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
administrative closure
The Second Circuit has determined that the agency’s now-defunct holding in Matter of Castro Tum, which held that Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals lacked the general authority to administratively close proceedings, was a reasonable interpretation of the regulations, and the subsequent reversal of that interpretation in Matter of Cruz Valdez does not render it unreasonable.
The full text of Garcia v. Garland can be found here:
The Attorney General has rescinded the decision in Matter of Castro Tum and restored the agency’s authority to administratively close removal proceedings, pending further rulemaking on the topic.
The full text of Matter of Cruz Valdez can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has determined that administrative closure is available in removal proceedings to non-citizens eligible for provisional waivers of unlawful presence. Although the court had previously deferred to the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Castro Tum, it limited its prior holding as inapplicable to provisional waiver applicants. “Administrative closure is ‘appropriate and necessary’ in this circumstance for the disposition of Garcia’s immigration case. Absent administrative closure, Garcia and other noncitizens in removal proceedings who are seeking permanent residency would be unable to apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver despite the authorizing regulation.”
The full text of Garcia-Deleon v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0127p-06.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that the regulations confer upon the Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals a general authority to administratively close proceedings.
The full text of Arcos Sanches v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has upheld the decision in Matter of Castro Tum, and determined that Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals do not have a general authority to administratively close proceedings. The opinion, which creates a circuit split with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, drew a strong dissent. It also included a wild footnote in the majority opinion about proper jurisdiction over an adjustment of status application filed by an applicant with a final removal order. It seems to suggest that jurisdiction over that application would reside with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Needless to say, this is inconsistent with how the immigration system actually works.
The full text of Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/20a0367p-06.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has rejected Matter of Castro Tum and reaffirmed the agency’s general authority to administratively close cases.
The full text of Meza Morales v. Barr can be found here:
The First Circuit has determined that a motion to recalendar at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) places the case in the same position it was in at the time of administrative closure. That is, if the case was already fully briefed, the BIA need only issue a final decision in the matter after recalendaring. Absent an explicit request for remand, the BIA is not required to consider any changed circumstances that may have occurred while the case was administratively closed.
The full text of Arevalo v. Barr can be found here:
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/18-1834P-01A.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has declined to follow Matter of Castro-Tum and has instead determined that Immigration Judges clearly have the authority to administratively close cases.
The full text of Zuniga Romero v. Barr can be found here:
The Attorney General (AG) has greatly restricted the authority of Immigration Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) to administratively close proceedings. The AG determined that IJs and the Board have no independent authority administratively close proceedings, and as such, they may only do so when a statute or settlement agreement authorizes them to do so.
The decision in Matter of Castro Tum can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to administratively close removal proceedings because the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Avetisyan provides a meaningful standard for review of the agency's decision.
The full text of Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/14/14-72472.pdf
The Attorney General has certified Matter of Castro-Tum, an unpublished case dealing with the docket control mechanism known as administrative closure, to himself for review. He also invited amicus briefs addressing the following questions:
1. Do Immigration Judges and the Board have the authority, under any statute, regulation, or delegation of authority from the Attorney General, to order administrative closure in a case? If so, do the Board’s decisions in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), articulate the appropriate standard for administrative closure?
2. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently lack the authority to order administrative closure, should I delegate such authority? Alternatively, if I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently possess the authority to order administrative closure, should I withdraw that authority?
3. The regulations governing removal proceedings were promulgated for “the expeditious, fair, and proper resolution of matters coming before Immigration Judges.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 (2017). Are there any circumstances where a docket management device other than administrative closure—including a continuance for good cause shown (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017)), dismissal without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) (2017)), or termination without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f))—would be inadequate to promote that objective? Should there be different legal consequences, such as eligibility to apply for a provisional waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility under the immigration laws or for benefits under federal or state programs, where a case has been administratively closed rather than continued?
4. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board do not have the authority to order administrative closure, and that such a power is unwarranted or unavailable, what actions should be taken regarding cases that are already administratively closed?
The full text of Matter of Castro Tum can be found here:
In Matter of Montiel, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that in certain circumstances, administrative closure of a pending immigration court proceeding may be proper when a respondent is appealing his criminal conviction. The BIA found such action appropriate in Montiel's case, in part, because the conviction was what made him removable, and a reversal on appeal would mean that he was not removable as charged. Notably, the motion for administrative closure had been joined by the Department of Homeland Security. The BIA reiterated the case-by-case analysis required for a motion for administrative closure and reaffirmed the factors outlined in Matter of Avetisyan.
The full text of Matter of Montiel can be found here: http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3834.pdf
