Second Circuit Finds NY Conviction for Attempted First-Degree Assault is a Crime of Violence

The Second Circuit has determined that New York’s first-degree assault statute is divisible, but the prongs that require intent to cause physical injury and use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument match the definition of a crime of violence.

The full text of Singh v. Garland can be found here: https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fe9d6267-187a-43e6-822f-738f2704f49b/10/doc/19-2910_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fe9d6267-187a-43e6-822f-738f2704f49b/10/hilite/

Ninth Circuit Says WA First Deg Assault is a Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for first-degree assault is a crime of violence. It distinguished its prior case law on the overbreadth of Washington’s accomplice liability, finding it inapplicable to the elements-based definition of a crime of violence.

The full text of Amaya v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/10/07/18-70060.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Finds that MN Convictions are Removable Convictions

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Minnesota possession of a controlled substance conviction is divisible with respect to the identity of the substance, and that a Minnesota second-degree assault conviction is a crime of violence because it requires either the intentional use of violent force or the inducement of fear of immediate bodily harm. The court also determined that the detention of a detainee who obtains a stay of removal from the federal court is governed by 8 USC 1226, not 8 USC 1231.

The full text of Farah v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201912462.pdf

Second Circuit Finds that Second-Degree NY Assault is Crime of Violence

The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction for second-degree assault is a crime of violence because it requires an intent to cause serious harm to another person and the actual infliction of such harm.

The full text of Thompson v. Garland can be found here:

https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/17-3494/17-3494-2021-04-22.pdf?ts=1619101806

BIA Reaffirms that CA Conviction for Assault with Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury is CIMT

The Board of Immigration Appeals has reaffirmed that a California conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury is a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Matter of Aguilar Mendez can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1375736/download

Eighth Circuit finds that Iowa Conviction for Willful Injury Causing Bodily Harm is Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for willful injury causing bodily harm is a crime of violence because “[o]ne cannot cause bodily injury to another without using the force capable of producing that injury.”

The full text of Jima v. Barr can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/19/11/191104P.pdf

Eighth Circuit finds that Iowa Conviction for Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious Injury is Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for assault with intent to inflict serious injury is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines because it necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the federal sentencing law and the immigration law, this case could have persuasive impact in the immigration context.

The full text of U.S. v. Quigley can be found here:

https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/19/11/183317P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Finds that MN Second Degree Assault is Violent Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for second-degree assault is a violent felony even though the statute does not require the defendant to cause actual bodily harm but only fear of bodily harm.  The Court also rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The full text of US v. Pendleton can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/171527P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Deems MN 3rd Degree Assault a Violent Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for third-degree assault qualifies as a violent felony because it requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or injury.  

The full text of US v. Wadena can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/172131P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Find that Iowa Assault While Displaying a Dangerous Weapon Conviction is Crime of Violence

The Eighth circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for assault while displaying a dangerous weapon constitutes a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines because intentionally pointing a firearm at another person and displaying a dangerous weapon toward another in a threatening manner constitute a threatened use of physical force.  Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the criminal context and immigration context, this decision could have persuasive impact in the immigration context.

The full text of US v. McGee can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/05/172080P.pdf

Eighth Circuit finds that MO Second Degree Assault is a Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has concluded that a conviction for second-degree assault in Missouri, which forbids recklessly causing physical injury to another person by means of discharge of a firearm, is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines.  The Court concluded that reckless conduct causing injury to another by use of a firearm constitutes a use of force under the guidelines.  Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence under the guidelines and in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive impact in immigration proceedings.

The full text of US v. Ramey can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/01/164328P.pdf

Eighth Circuit finds that Missouri Attempted First Degree Assault Statute is a Crime of Violence under the Sentencing Guidelines

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction under Missouri's attempted first degree assault statute is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.  The court determined that Missouri's definition of attempt is not overbroad, and that the infliction of serious physical injury upon a victim is sufficient to demonstrate that physical force was employed.  Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing guidelines and in the immigration context, this decision has persuasive impact on immigration cases.

The full text of US v. Minnis can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/10/171017P.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds that Washington Conviction for Second-Degree Assault is not a Crime of Violence under Sentencing Guildelines

The Ninth Circuit finds that a Washington conviction for second-degree assault is not a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines.  The statute is not a categorical match to the definition of a crime of violence because it does not necessarily require the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another.  In addition, the jury need not decide between the various subsections of the statute, indicating that is both overbroad and indivisible.  

Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration and federal sentencing context, this decision likely has persuasive effect in the immigration context.

The full text of US v. Robinson can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/25/16-30096.pdf

First Circuit Remands for Further Analysis as to Whether Massachusetts Conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon is a CIMT

The First Circuit has remanded a case for further consideration as to whether a Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) is a crime involving moral turpitude.  The court that ABDW can be committed both intentionally recklessly, and that the Massachusetts definition of "recklessness" departs from the definition employed by the Model Penal Code and a majority of states in that a defendant in Massachusetts need not have been subjectively aware of the risk posed by his conduct in order to have acted recklessly.  Even in light of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (Board) decision in Matter of Wu, which construed a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon that could be committed through reckless conduct, the court was not convinced that the Board had adequately considered the definition of recklessness in Massachusetts.  As such, the court remanded the case for further consideration.

The full text of Coelho v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2220P-01A.pdf

Eighth Circuit Finds that Missouri Second-Degree Assault is not Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has determined that subsection (3) of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.060.1 (second-degree assault), which criminalizes reckless driving that results in injury, is not a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Given the similar definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and in the immigration law, this decision should have persuasive value in the immigration context.

The full text of US v. Fields can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/07/164140P.pdf

BIA Determines that CA Conviction for Assault with a Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury is Categorically a CIMT

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).  The Board note that most general assault crimes are not CIMTs, but clarified that because the California statute required either the use of a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury - both of which it considered to be aggravating factors - it was more reprehensible than a general assault.  This more serious conduct counterbalanced the lack of any specific intent to cause harm in the statute. 

The full text of Matter of Wu is available here:

https://www.justice.gov/file/957431/download

Fifth Circuit Determines that Texas Assault Statute is Indivisible

The Fifth Circuit has determined that the mens rea alternatives listed in the Texas assault statute are alternative means, not alternative elements.  Thus, with respect to whether a misdemeanor assault conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, the statute is overbroad and indivisible.  The court recognized that this finding was mandated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mathis v. United States. 

The full text of Gomez-Perez v. Lynch:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-60808-CV0.pdf

Eighth Circuit Determines that First Degree Assault in Arkansas is a CIMT

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for first degree assault in Arkansas is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.  A conviction for first degree assault requires recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.  The court agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that such conduct is "contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."

The full text of Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/06/152223P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Addresses Iowa Conviction for Assault While Using or Displaying a Dangerous Weapon

The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines because the requirement of intentionally pointing any firearm toward another and the requirement of displaying in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another categorically constitute a threatened use of physical force.  Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence under sentencing law and a crime of violence under immigration law, an Iowa conviction for assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon likely also qualifies as a crime of violence for immigration purposes.

The full text of United States v. Boots can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/03/151503P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Addresses Missouri Convictions

In a federal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit determined that a conviction in Missouri for second-degree is a categorical match to the generic definition of a burglary offense.  Thus, it is likely also a categorical match to the definition of a burglary aggravated felony in the immigration context.  The court also noted that a conviction for second-degree domestic assault in Missouri is not categorically a violent felony.  The statute at issue covers any person who:

(1) Attempts to cause or knowingly causes physical injury to such family or household member by any means, including but not limited to, by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or by choking or strangulation; or (2) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to such family or household member; or (3) Recklessly causes physical injury to such family or household member by means of any deadly weapon.

The court determined that only the first subsection qualified as a violent felony.  Though the court didn't specify why the other subsections are not violent felonies, it is likely because they involve merely reckless conduct, while the first subsection requires intentional conduct.  Given the similar definitions of a violent felony in the sentencing context and a crime of violence in the immigration context, similar conclusions can likely be drawn about the various subsections in the immigration context.

The full text of United States v. Phillips can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/03/151712P.pdf