BIA Narrows Definition of "Single Scheme" for CIMT Deportability

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has narrowed the instances in which two crimes involving moral turpitude will be considered part of the same scheme. The BIA has said that crimes that immediately follow one another are not necessarily part of the same scheme - in this case, the non-citizen was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and failure to render aid when he hit pedestrians with his car and kept driving. Rather, crimes will only be arising out of a single scheme if: 1) one crime is a lesser offense of the other; 2) he defendant performs a single act that concurrently harms multiple victims in essentially the same way (i.e., robbing multiple people at once); or 3) are acts that occur within a comparatively short time of each other, involve the same parties, and the first act or acts are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific criminal objective accomplished by the last of the criminal acts (i.e., assaulting a guard to commit a larceny).

The full text of Matter of Baeza-Galindo can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-02/4085.pdf

Third Circuit Finds that PA Felony Eluding Statute is Divisible

The Third Circuit has determined that a Pennsylvania statute criminalizing eluding the police as a felony is divisible between three grading factors. The Court further found that the third grading factor could be violated by a driver who recklessly flees or attempts to elude law enforcement in an attempt to transport himself or another person to a hospital would still violate the statute. This conduct is not reprehensible, and thus, the statute is not a categorical match to the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Ndungu v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202562p.pdf

Eighth Circuit finds that Iowa Conviction for Possession of Child Pornography is not Aggravated Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for possession or purchase of a visual depiction that shows a person under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or the simulation of a prohibited sexual act is not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The Court observed that federal law requires “the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in” the sexually explicit conduct, while Iowa Code § 728.12(3) does not. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the petitioner’s argument that the conviction is also not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require that the defendant know the person in the image is underage.

The full text of Huynh v. Garland can be found here:

https://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/24/05/231318P.pdf

Third Circuit finds that NJ Robbery Conviction is not CIMT

The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under the pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard because New Jersey’s definition of theft does not include an intent to permanently deprive others of their property. The Court further concluded that the force required to commit robbery is only that which is necessary to wrest the object from the victim, and does not require the infliction of any type of bodily harm.

The full text of Diaz Almanzar v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/213092p.pdf

Second Circuit Defers to BIA's Definition of Conviction

The Second Circuit has deferred to the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wong addressing what minimal constitutional protections must be accorded to a defendant for the proceeding to result in a conviction for immigration purposes. The court further determined that the “minimum constitutional protections” test espoused in Wong could be applied retroactively. Finally, the court concluded that a second-degree forgery conviction in New York categorically matches the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected the petitioner’s void-for-vagueness challenge to the term “crime involving moral turpitude.”

The full text of Wong v. Garland can be found here:

https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/dcca81a9-a8f1-4254-bef7-5aee7c442985/23/doc/22-6185_opn.pdf#xml=https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/dcca81a9-a8f1-4254-bef7-5aee7c442985/23/hilite/

Second Circuit Finds that Arkansas Conviction for Abuse of a Corpse is not Categorically a CIMT

The Second Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for abuse of a corpse is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it includes mere disinterment of a corpse. The court also concluded that the statute is divisible between disinterment and mistreatment of a corpse.

The full text of Giron-Molina v. Garland can be found here:

https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/db521802-9889-4682-9b27-66095f2ebbfd/7/doc/22-6243_amd_opn.pdf#xml=https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/db521802-9889-4682-9b27-66095f2ebbfd/7/hilite/

Fourth Circuit Defers to BIA's Definition of Receipt of Stolen Property-Related CIMTs

The Fourth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that receipt of stolen property offenses constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) if the defendant knows the property was stolen, even if the statutes do not require the defendant to intend to permanently deprive the owner of the property. The court further agreed that Virginia’s receipt of stolen property statute matches the definition of a CIMT. The court remanded because the Immigration Judge failed to advise the petitioner of the requirement of posting a voluntary departure bond before granting him voluntary departure.

The full text of Solis-Flores v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/221147.P.pdf

Ninth Circuit Reverses Finding that Oregon Conviction for Menacing Constituting Domestic Violence is a CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for menacing constituting domestic violence is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require the actual infliction of fear. “A CIMT determination requires both an evil or malicious intent and the infliction of actual substantial harm on another. In Latter-Singh, we explained that the injury required under § 422—that the victim experience sustained fear from the threat—ensured that the statute criminalized only ‘conduct which results in substantial harm’ and excluded non-turpitudinous conduct such as ‘emotional outbursts’ or ‘mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent.’” “The Oregon menacing statute prohibits words or conduct that is intended to place others in fear of imminent serious physical injury, but it does not require any intent to cause injury or that the victim experience any actual fear or injury as a result of the criminal act.”

The full text of Flores-Vasquez v. Garland can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/31/20-73447.pdf

Second Circuit finds that Arkansas Abuse of a Corpse Conviction is not CIMT

The Second Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for abuse of a corpse is overbroad as compared to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude because it includes the mere removal or disinterment of a corpse.

The full text of Giron-Molina v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/40b973a6-4b14-456c-9969-020104488757/9/doc/22-6243_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/40b973a6-4b14-456c-9969-020104488757/9/hilite/

Fifth Circuit Remands to Determine if TX Hit and Run is a CIMT

The Fifth Circuit has remanded to determine if the minimum culpable conduct under a Texas hit and run conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Zamaro-Silvero v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-60324-CV0.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-60324-CV1.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Finds that VA Drug Distribution Statute is CIMT

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction related to distribution of controlled substances is a crime involving moral turpitude. The court acknowledged that not all substances criminalized by Virginia appear in the federal statutes, but relied on the state’s determination that the substance should be criminalized as proof that distribution of the substance is base or vile. Notably, for the purpose of the appeal, the court assumed that the statute is not divisible with respect to the identity of the substance.

The full text of Daye v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014340.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds that CA Forgery Conviction is Categorically CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for forgery is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to defraud.

The full text of Vasquez-Borjas v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/06/17-70867.pdf

Second Circuit Finds that Conviction for NY Attempted Money Laundering in Second Degree is not CIMT

The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction attempted money laundering in the second degree is not a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute does not impose the scienter requirement needed to constitute a CIMT. “Although the statute requires the defendant’s knowledge that the financial transaction is ‘designed to . . . conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified criminal conduct,’ it does not require that the offender act with the ‘evil intent’ that the BIA has considered to be inherent in a CIMT: that is, an intention to conceal the underlying criminal activity that created the proceeds, to impair government function, or to deceive the government.“

The full text of Jang v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/6e78bae4-78ad-4640-8871-e1e0059d8c70/5/doc/19-4289_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/6e78bae4-78ad-4640-8871-e1e0059d8c70/5/hilite/

An amended opinion ca be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5c5858dc-da0d-4ad0-ae1b-9c1fe5429531/1/doc/19-4289_amd_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5c5858dc-da0d-4ad0-ae1b-9c1fe5429531/1/hilite/

Ninth Circuit Holds that CA Voluntary Manslaughter Conviction is CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires at least reckless conduct and serious harm (death of the victim).

The full text of Ortiz Narez v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/02/16/19-72039.pdf

Second Circuit finds NY Petit Larceny is CIMT

The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction for petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because an intent to appropriate property requires an intent to substantially erode the victim’s ownership rights.

The full text of Ferreiras v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/82e4ac18-2012-401b-8999-8ae9ad5e00e8/5/doc/19-4111_complete_opn_2.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/82e4ac18-2012-401b-8999-8ae9ad5e00e8/5/hilite/

Fifth Circuit Concludes that TX Conviction for Deadly Conduct is a CIMT

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Texas conviction for deadly conduct qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, even though it includes reckless conduct. “Deadly conduct . . . demands an imminent threat of serious physical injury. Because its potential harm is grave, no countervailing, heightened mens rea is necessary for deadly conduct to constitute a CIMT; recklessness suffices.” The court also reaffirmed that the petitioner, who had initially entered the United States without inspection, was admitted to the United States at the time he adjusted status to lawful permanent residence.

The full text of Diaz Esparza v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-60699-CV0.pdf

Fourth Circuit Finds that VA Eluding Statute is CIMT

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia felony conviction for eluding is a crime involving moral turpitude because it involves a mens rea (willful and wanton) that is higher than criminal negligence and reprehensible conduct (vehicular flight from law enforcement). In so doing, the court rejected an argument that the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is unconstitutionally vague or violates the nondelegation doctrine.

The full text of Canales Granados v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/202028.P.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds HI 4th Degree Theft not CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Hawaii conviction for fourth degree theft is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require the defendant to intend to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property interests. The court further determined that the statute is indivisible.

The full text of Maie v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/02/19-73099.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Deems FL Vehicular Homicide Conviction to be CIMT

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction for vehicular homicide is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires “willful or wanton conduct.”

The full text of Smith v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201912622.pdf

Third Circuit Determines that New Jersey Terroristic Threats Conviction is not CIMT

The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey terroristic threats conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The court first determined that the statute is overbroad and divisible. The court then determined that the the basis for the petitioner’s conviction is “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence 13 with the purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”

“New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute criminalizes threats that merely carry the risk of ‘convey[ing] menace or fear of a crime of violence’ to another person, and whereas those statutes required a mental state exhibiting ‘extreme’ and ‘depraved’ indifference to a person’s life, New Jersey defines recklessness to include ‘heedless[ness],’ ‘foolhardi[ness],’ or ‘scorn for the consequences’ of causing fear in another. New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, therefore, lacks the type of aggravating factors that we have previously recognized would make an offense inherently vile and depraved.”

“In sum, Larios’s crime of conviction has a minimum mens rea of recklessness but lacks any statutory aggravating factors, so the least culpable conduct is a reckless threat to commit a violent property crime, which . . . is not turpitudinous.”

The full text of Larios v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192594p.pdf