Viewing entries tagged
derivative citizenship

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Eleventh Circuit Construes Former Derivative Citizenship Statute

The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that the requirements of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act are not met when the citizen mother re-married the non-citizen father prior to her naturalization, even though the mother naturalized before the child’s 18th birthday, and had earlier separated from the non-citizen father. Because the mother re-married the non-citizen father prior to her naturalization, not all of the elements of derivative citizenship (namely, a legal separation from the non-citizen parent) when the last element (the mother’s naturalization) took place.

The full text of Turner v. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202211207.pdf

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First Circuit Construes Former Citizenship Statute

The First Circuit, in construing former section 321(a) of the INA, has assumed that manifesting an intent to reside permanently in the US would be sufficient for derivation of citizenship, but found that a minor who abandoned his adjustment application by failing to appear at an interview without a reasonable explanation did not manifest such intent.

The full text of Sharma v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/22-1496P-01A.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Rejects Derivative Citizenship Claim

The Ninth Circuit has rejected the derivative citizenship claim of a lawful permanent resident whose father naturalized before his 18th birthday. In doing so, the court noted that even assuming the petitioner’s parents entered into a de facto union in Peru (roughly the equivalent of a common law marriage), there was no proof of a legal separation between his parents. “Nothing about the Peruvian court’s determination that Hernandez had abandoned the family and lost her parental rights says anything about the type of relationship that existed between her and Walter, much less that it had been formally terminated.”

The full text of Giha v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/09/02/15-73085.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Disallows Nunc Pro Tunc Custody Order for Derivative Citizenship

The Ninth Circuit has held that a nunc pro tunc custody order - entered after the child’s 18th birthday and purporting to retroactively modify a joint custody order to award sole legal custody of the child to a U.S.-citizen parent - is not effective for deriving citizenship under a prior derivative citizenship statute. “2013 state court order was a proper nunc pro tunc order. We hold that Congress did not intend for this type of nunc pro tunc order, one untethered from the facts as they were during Carino’s childhood, to give rise to automatic derivative citizenship under section 1432(a).” “We hold that where it has not been proven that a custody order was entered in error, was contrary to law, or otherwise did not reflect the true legal relationship between a petitioner’s parents, a nunc pro tunc order cannot retroactively establish a naturalized parent’s sole legal custody for the purposes of section 1432(a). “

The full text of Padilla Carino v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/18/18-72985.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Interprets Old Citizenship Provision

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a now-repealed derivative citizenship provision required the child of a U.S. citizen to merely manifest an objective intent to reside permanently in the United States - and not to have acquired lawful permanent residency - in order derive citizenship. That objective intent is met when the child enters the US lawfully and applies for permanent residency before his 18th birthday.

The full text of the en banc decision in Cheneau v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/13/15-70636.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Grants Request for En Banc Rehearing in Derivative Citizenship Case

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for rehearing in Cheneau v. Barr, in which it determined that former 8 USC 1432(a)(5) requires a child to have obtained lawful permanent residence in the United States prior to age 18 in order to derive citizenship.

My blog post about the original three-judge decision can be found here:

http://www.sabrinadamast.com/journal/2020/8/30/ninth-circuit-construes-prior-derivative-citizenship

The order granting rehearing can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/01/06/15-70636.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Rejects Equal Protection Challenge to Statute Governing Derivative of Citizenship

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a challenge to the derivation of citizenship statute, finding that the differing treatment for the children of married parents from those of legally separated parents bears a rational basis to the congressional goal of protecting the parental rights of the non-citizen parent. The court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales Santana requires the application of a heightened standard of scrutiny to any law that differentiates based on parental marital status, finding that the discussion of parental marital status in Morales Santana was limited to laws that discriminate based on the child’s legitimacy. Since the law at issue looks at the parents’ marital status at a time after the child’s birth, the heightened standard of review related to legitimacy distinctions does not apply.

The full text of US v. Mayea-Pulido can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/01/03/18-50223.pdf

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Second Circuit Construes Physical Custody for Citizenship

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a child under the age of eighteen who is a legal permanent resident (LPR) of the United States acquires citizenship when that child’s parent becomes a U.S. citizen if the child is residing in the United States in the “legal and physical custody” of the citizen parent. 8 U.S.C. § 7 1431(a). In this matter, the Second Circuit determined that a child who was in juvenile detention when his father naturalized was still in his father’s legal and physical custody, and as such, acquired derivative citizenship.

“[A] parent’s physical custody of a child does not cease due to a child’s brief, temporary separation from a parent.” “State family law definitions of the term ‘physical custody’ are often at odds with the government’s assertion that a child must be ‘actually resid[ing]’ with a parent for the child to be in that parent’s ‘physical custody.’ For example, physical custody can be split between parents, and two parents can share and retain ‘physical custody’ even if the child does not actually reside in any one parent’s home full‐time.” “Indeed, in the state where Khalid lived with his family prior to his detention and conviction, ‘[p]hysical custody . . . means the right and obligation to provide a home for the child and to make the day‐to‐day decisions required during the time the child is actually with the parent having such custody.’” “The BIA’s decision reduces ‘physical custody’ to an ‘actual residency’ requirement at some point after the citizen parent naturalizes, but before the child’s eighteenth birthday—even in cases involving short, temporary separations, like this one. State law rarely uses such a narrow definition of physical custody, and we do not think that ‘physical custody’ is determined exclusively by the small moment in time immediately following a citizen parent’s naturalization, even when looking to state law for guidance.”

In addition, “the history of the derivative citizenship statute supports reading the statute—and the term ‘physical custody, in particular—to ensure that a child’s ‘real interests’ are in the United States through a genuine connection between the United States citizen parent and that parent’s child.” “Here, there is no dispute that Khalid had such a connection to his United States citizen father at the time Khalid’s father naturalized. Khalid had lived at home with his parents since entering the United States. Thus, Khalid’s acquisition of derivative citizenship does not violate Congress’s demand that the child has a strong connection to the United States to acquire derivative citizenship.”

:Finally, we note that we do not deal in this case with a juvenile adjudicated guilty and imprisoned pursuant to a court‐ordered sentence at the time the juvenile claims to have acquired citizenship. There may be reason in such situations to determine that a minor is not in a naturalizing parent’s physical custody for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1431.”

The full text of Khalid v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/77c6d41c-6bd7-4c5a-8d9a-3ffb65202f94/10/doc/16-3480_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/77c6d41c-6bd7-4c5a-8d9a-3ffb65202f94/10/hilite/

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The Fifth Circuit Rejects a Derivative Citizenship Claim Based on Legitimation under Mexican Law

The Fifth Circuit has rejected a derivative citizenship claim.

The statute governing the petitioner's claim to derivative citizenship is the version of the INA in place at the time of his birth.  The INA dictates that a child born out of wedlock to a non-citizen mother and a citizen father can establish derivative citizenship “if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation.” The INA also dictates that his claim to legitimation is governed by the laws of Tamaulipas, Mexico—where he resided as a child. Even if he can prove his legitimation under Tamaulipan law, the INA imposes an additional hurdle for claiming derivative citizenship: legitimation must have occurred before Gonzalez–Segura turned twenty-one years old. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals defines “legitimation” as “the act of putting a child born out of wedlock in the same legal position as a child born in wedlock.” Legitimation requires a formal act. A child may be legitimated under the laws of either the child’s or the father’s domicile—whether in the United States or elsewhere.

The 1961 Civil Code of Tamaulipas (“CCT”) establishes how a father can legitimate a child who was born out of wedlock.  CCT Article 370 provides that a child may be legitimated by either (1) the father’s voluntary acknowledgment or (2) a court judgment declaring paternity. CCT Article 379 provides five ways that voluntary acknowledgement of a child born out of wedlock can occur: 1) In the birth certificate before the Civil Registry official; 2) By special acknowledgement proceeding before the same official; 3) By a notarial instrument; 4) By a will; and 5) By direct and express judicial confession.

The petitioner argued that he satisfied the CCT legitimation requirements in three ways. First, his amended birth certificate qualifies as a voluntary acknowledgment of his paternal lineage. Second, the 2007 ruling by the Tamaulipas court that ordered the rectification of his original birth certificate qualifies as a court judgment declaring paternity. Third, his father’s 1970 holographic will qualifies as a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.

Only the amended birth certificate and the 2007 judicial decree are valid forms of legitimation under Tamaulipan law. The Court held that the petitioner cannot rely on these otherwise valid forms of legitimation for his claim to derivative citizenship because the legitimation occurred after he had turned twenty-one years old.

The full text of Gonzalez-Segura v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-41413-CV0.pdf

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BIA Determines that a Fraudulently Procured Certificate of Citizenship does not Confer Citizenship

The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that a certificate of citizenship procured by fraud does not confer citizenship on the applicant.  Thus, the applicant is still subject to charges of removability in an immigration court.  "A certificate of citizenship only provides documentation of United States citizenship for persons who claim to have obtained that status derivatively.  It does not confer United States citizenship but only furnishes recognition and evidence that the applicant has previously obtained such status derivatively, that is, upon the naturalization of a parent or parents.  Thus, the issuance of a certificate of citizenship, like a United States passport, only serves as indicia of citizenship. It is not a grant of United States citizenship.  Because the respondent’s United States citizenship claim was based on fraud, his Certificate of Citizenship is void. Once it was discovered that the respondent’s Certificate of Citizenship had been issued in error, the District Director had an affirmative duty to institute administrative proceedings to cancel it."

The full text of Matter of Falodun can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/971036/download

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First Circuit Denies Citizenship Claim Based on Legitimation Laws

The First Circuit found that Frank Monteiro Miranda, a lawful permanent resident who was born in Angola to unmarried parents of Cape Verde citizenship, did not derive citizenship under former section 321 of the INA when his mother naturalized.  The Court noted that Angola, Cape Verde, and Massachusetts (the state in which his parents later wed) had all abolished the legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children before Miranda's mother naturalized.  Moreover, Miranda's father signed his birth certificate in front of witnesses, evidencing his acknowledgement of paternity.  Thus, Miranda did not derive citizenship by virtue of his mother's naturalization.  In addition, in light of this legal framework, a second Immigration Judge was not required to give res judicata effect to an earlier Judge's finding that Miranda had derived citizenship.

The full text of Miranda v. Sessions can be found here:

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2174P-01A.pdf

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Second Circuit Construes Old Derivative Citizenship Statute

The Second Circuit has construed the legitimation requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as they pertain to former section 321 of the INA, which governed derivative citizenship claims for children who were over 18 on February 27, 2001.  Under this section, an individual derived citizenship if one parent was deceased and the surviving parent naturalized before the child's 18th birthday.  However, if the individual was born out of wedlock, he would only be considered the child of the naturalized parent if he was legitimized before his 16th birthday.  

July Gil argued that the Dominican Code for the Protection of Children (DCPC) retroactively abolished all distinctions between children born in and out of wedlock.  Thus, he is considered under Dominican law to be legitimated since his birth.  However, the DCPC was enacted after his 16th birthday.  The court disagreed, and held that "the legitimizing act at issue here was the enactment of the Code, a law that became effective well after Gilʹs sixteenth birthday.   Because Gil did not gain legitimated status under the new law before he turned sixteen years old, he is not a legitimated child." 

The full text of Gil v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a41ed0f7-8933-48f7-8278-abeb3772baac/1/doc/15-3134_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a41ed0f7-8933-48f7-8278-abeb3772baac/1/hilite/

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Fifth Circuit Denies Applicant's Claim to Citizenship

The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Child Citizenship Act does not convey derivative citizenship on the child of a citizen who was interview for his permanent residence before his 18th birthday, but whose application for residence was not approved until after his birthday.  The Court declined to estop the Government from denying the applicant's citizenship claim even though there was a four-year delay in approving his application.

The full text of Gutirrez v. Lynch can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-60693-CV0.pdf

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First Circuit Construes Derivative Citizenship Statute

The First Circuit has determined that a child whose surviving parent naturalized before his 18th birthday does not derive citizenship if he does not live in the United States as a lawful permanent resident prior to his 18th birthday.  The court construed former section 321(a) of the INA.

The full text of Thomas v. Lynch can be found here:

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1805P-01A.pdf

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Second Circuit Invalidates Old Derivative Citizenship Law on Constitutional Grounds

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provided different rules for when a U.S.-citizen father could transmit citizenship to his child born out of wedlock than for when a U.S.-citizen mother could transmit citizenship to her child born out of wedlock.  The rules for paternal transmission were far more stringent.  In the context of an equal protection claim being evaluated under intermediate scrutiny, the Government proffered two interests (ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the United States and avoiding statelessness), but the Second Circuit found that the statute was not substantially related to these or any other actual and important government interests.  The court then severed the more onerous provision applied to fathers and deemed that the less stringent requirement for mothers would apply to both parents.

The Second Circuit's decision now creates a split with the Ninth Circuit, who affirmed the constitutionality of statute's differential treatment of parental transmission of citizenship.

The full text of Morales-Santana v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/485dec25-f79a-4061-94c0-6aaecad5562c/1/doc/11-1252_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/485dec25-f79a-4061-94c0-6aaecad5562c/1/hilite/

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