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discretion

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Second Circuit Applies Matter of Soram Retroactively

The Second Circuit has determined that Matter of Soram can be applied retroactively to pre-2010 child endangerment convictions. The court further held that it held no jurisdiction to review the agency’s reliance on uncorroborated arrest reports in its discretionary denial of cancellation of removal.

The full text of Marquez v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f7d6bf3f-b872-41b8-88da-4b6922237e5f/22/doc/18-3363_opn.pdf#xml=1://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f7d6bf3f-b872-41b8-88da-4b6922237e5f/22/hilite/

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Third Circuit Sustains Appeal of Discretionary Denial of Asylum

The Third Circuit has sustained an appeal of a discretionary denial of asylum where the IJ granted withholding of removal. The court noted that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) provides that a denial of asylum shall be reconsidered when an applicant is denied asylum solely in the exercise of discretion and is subsequently granted withholding, and requires that the IJ take into account the reasons for the denial and reasonable alternatives available to the applicant such as reunification with the spouse or minor children in a third country. The IJ in the instant matter refused to consider the issue of family reunification or the significance of the petitioner having established a well-founded fear of persecution.

The court went on to adopt a non-exhaustive list of factors for a court to consider when evaluating whether asylum should be granted in the exercise of discretion.

Positive factors include:1) Family, business, community, and employment ties to the United States, and length of residence and property ownership in this country; 2) Evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if deported to any country, or if denied asylum such that the alien cannot be reunited with family members (as derivative asylees) in this country; 3) Evidence of good character, value, or service to the community, including proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record is present; 4) General humanitarian reasons, such as age or health; [and] 5) Evidence of severe past persecution and/or well-founded fear of future persecution, including consideration of other relief granted or denied the applicant (e.g., withholding of removal or CAT protection).

Negative factors include: 1) Nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground; 2) Presence of significant violations of immigration laws; 3) Presence of a criminal record and the nature, recency, and seriousness of that record, including evidence of recidivism; 4) Lack of candor with immigration officials, including an actual adverse credibility finding by the IJ; [and] 5) Other evidence that indicates bad character or undesirability for permanent residence in the United States.

Based largely on the IJ’s refusal to consider family reunification, the court remanded the case to the agency.

The full text of Sathanthrasa v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/182925p.pdf

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Sixth Circuit Reverses Discretionary Denials of Asylum and 237(a)(1)(H) Waiver

The Sixth Circuit reversed the BIA's discretionary denial of asylum because it was inconsistent with the Board's precedent in Matter of Pula.  The BIA denied asylum as a matter of discretion solely because the applicant had used a stolen passport to enter the country, but Pula states that asylum may not be denied as a matter of discretion based solely on the applicant's circumvention of proper immigration procedures.  In addition, the BIA acknowledged that it is more likely than not that the petitioner would face harm due to his religion if returned to Syria.  According to its own precedent, this should “outweigh all but the most egregious adverse factors.”  The irregular entry cannot be deemed such an egregious adverse factor.  Thus, the denial of asylum on discretionary grounds was also inconsistent with this BIA precedent.  

With respect to the waiver, the Court found that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ's factual findings, engaging in a de novo review instead of a clearly erroneous standard.

The Court found the petitioner statutorily eligible for the waiver, too.  The Government argued that because the petitioner was inadmissible at the time of his admission as a nonimmigrant as well as at the time of his adjustment of status.  The waiver could cure his inadmissibility at the time of his adjustment only.  However, the language of the waiver indicates that "a petitioner who is eligible for a waiver of removal is 'also' eligible for a 'waive[r] [of] removal based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from [the relevant] fraud or misrepresentation.'  "The provision thus contemplates circumstances where an already admitted alien seeks to cure a prior misrepresentation."

The full text of Hussam F. v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0154p-06.pdf

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