These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
firearms
The First Circuit has determined that a Massachusetts conviction for defacing firearms is not a deportable firearms offense because it criminalizes conduct involving antique firearms.
The full text of Portillo v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that a Florida conviction for a felon in possession of a weapon does not match the definition of the firearms offense deportability ground because the statute includes carrying of non-firearm weapons and possession of ammunition. The statute is divisible between the possession of a prohibited item and the concealed carrying of a prohibited item. However, the possession prong includes possession of ammunition, which is not a firearm. In addition, the carrying prong includes non-firearm weapons, such as a dirk. Moreover, the statute is not divisible between the prohibited items.
The full text of Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201911156.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license is an aggravated felony. The court deferred to the agency’s determination that “illicit trafficking in firearms” means “any unlawful trading or dealing” in firearms.
The full text of Chacon v. Wilkinson can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/02/18/18-71515.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia statute criminalizing willful discharge of a firearm in a public place without resulting bodily injury is not a firearms offenses because it does not contain an antique firearms exception. “We hold that the plain language of Virginia Code § 18.2-280(A), as supported by later acts of Virginia’s legislature and by decisions of its appellate courts, prohibits conduct involving the use of ‘any firearm,’ including antique firearms. Thus, Gordon was not required to identify a prosecution under the Virginia statute involving an antique firearm to defend against removal.”
“Our conclusion is not affected by the government’s claim that the Virginia conviction nevertheless qualifies as a removable offense because Gordon failed to present evidence of a conviction in Virginia under Section 18.2-280(A) for the discharge of an antique firearm.” “The flaw in the government’s argument, however, is its failure to recognize that when the state, through plain statutory language, has defined the reach of a state statute to include conduct that the federal offense does not, the categorical analysis is complete; there is no categorical match.”
The full text of Gordon v. Barr can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that a Connecticut conviction for the unpermitted carrying of a pistol or revolver is not a firearms offense because the state statute criminalizes conduct involving certain antique firearms that is not covered by the federal definition of a firearms offense. “Connecticut criminalizes unlicensed carrying and transportation of loaded antique firearms; the federal definition excludes such conduct.” In addition, “the text of the Connecticut statute excludes only the ‘transporting’ of ‘unloaded’ antique pistols or revolvers from its general prohibition on ‘carrying’ unpermitted pistols and revolvers ‘upon [one’s] person.’ The INA definition of ‘firearm offense,’ in contrast, expressly excludes all conduct involving antique firearms.” The court also rejected the application of the realistic probability test, finding that the plain language of the statute demonstrated its overbreadth.
The full text of Williams v. Barr can be found here:
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/0c7b55a5-be7b-43f5-ac93-5989936afec3/28/doc/18-2535_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/0c7b55a5-be7b-43f5-ac93-5989936afec3/28/hilite/
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for aggravated assault and a South Carolina conviction for pointing a firearm at another person are both crimes of violence for federal sentencing purposes. With respect to the Arkansas aggravated assault conviction, the court held that the statute is divisible, and subsection (a)(1) is not a crime of violence. However, subsection (a)(2), which criminalizes displaying a firearm in such a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person, necessarily involves the threatened use of violent force. With respect to the South Carolina firearms conviction, the court deferred to prior precedent finding that that pointing a gun at another person qualifies as a crime of violence.
The full text of United States v. Hataway can be found here:
The Fifth Circuit has determined that 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(C), which defines the firearms deportability ground, does not encompass offenses involving the transportation of firearms. As such, the petitioner, who had been convicted of transporting a firearm in Oklahoma, remained eligible for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.
The full text of Flores Abarca v. Barr can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60236-CV0.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has determined that Illinois' felon in possession of a firearm is broader than the definition of a firearms-related aggravated felony because Illinois' statute criminalizes possession of pneumatic weapons. The court further determined that the conviction is indivisible. As such, a conviction under Illinois' felon in possession of a firearm statute will never qualify as a firearms-related aggravated felony.
The full text of Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that a conviction in Oklahoma for transporting a firearm qualifies as a firearms offense under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the INA. Even though this section of the INA does not explicitly encompass transportation of a firearm (but rather includes possession, sale, use, ownership, purchase, and exchanging of a firearm), the Board determined that the broad wording indicated an intent to encompass all convictions related to firearms.
The full text of Matter of Flores-Abarca can be found here:
