These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
florida crimes
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a Florida deferred adjudication - which involved a defendant who pled nolo contendere and received a probationary sentence - not only qualifies as a conviction for immigration purposes, but also qualifies as a “conviction by final judgment” for particularly serious crime purposes.
The full text of Matter of D-L-S- can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has reversed a finding that a Florida conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is a crime involving moral turpitude because there is no requirement that the dwelling be intermittently occupied. The court remanded for further analysis by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The full text of Lauture v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913165.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that Florida defines marijuana more broadly in its criminal laws than in the federal law because it criminalizes acts involving the stalks of the plant. As such, Florida marijuana convictions should no longer trigger controlled substance-related removability.
The full text of Said v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202112917.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected a petitioner’s argument that Florida’s definition of cocaine is broader than the federal definition, finding the petitioner failed to prove the existence of nongeometric diastereomers of cocaine.
The full text of Chamu v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913908.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected an argument that Florida’s felon in possession of a firearm statute is broader than the definition of a firearms-related aggravated felony because it includes possession of antique firearms excluded from the federal definition. In so doing, the court noted that the petitioner had not identified any case in which Florida prosecuted an offense involving an antique firearm, and as such, had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the statute of conviction was broader than the deportability ground.
The full text of Aspilaire v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201912605.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction for vehicular homicide is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires “willful or wanton conduct.”
The full text of Smith v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201912622.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction for aggravated battery is divisible, and the subsection criminalizing battery using a deadly weapon is a crime of violence.
The full text of Lukaj v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913073.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida drug statute criminalizing the possession, sale, purchase, manufacture, delivery, or bringing into the state certain controlled substances to be both overbroad and indivisible when compared to the definition of a drug trafficking aggravated felony. The least of the acts it criminalized—mere possession of a listed narcotic—is not a felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The court further determined that the various acts criminalized under the statute are alternative means, and not alternative elements, because a jury need not determine which of the six acts was involved in order to convict a defendant.
The full text of Cintron v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512344.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida child abuse conviction, which criminalizes the battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces, is both a crime of child abuse and crime involving moral turpitude. With respect to the crime of child abuse, the Court noted that a child who has had blood or urine thrown at her by an adult is at substantial risk of mental or emotional harm, in addition to the possibility of physical injury through exposure to fluid-borne or fecal pathogens. With respect to the crime involving moral turpitude, the Court found that the acts criminalized under the statute were base and vile.
The full text of Pierre v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201615898.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction for delivery of cannabis is not a drug trafficking aggravated felony because it does not require that the person receive any consideration for the delivery.
The full text of Gordon v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201513846.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished decision, has deemed a Florida conviction for armed robbery to be a categorical match to the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the state crime must match the elements of the federal robbery statute in order to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Jaimes-Lopez v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201515532.pdf
Sometimes, you just can't make this stuff up. You read the title correctly - launching a missile at a structure. The question is, when a respondent is convicted of doing this in Florida, is he convicted of a crime of violence? In the context of a federal sentencing case, the 11th Circuit said "maybe."
The court found that the statute was divisible with regard to the level of intent required (wanton or malicious), and that only wanton conduct would demonstrate that the person had "acted intentionally or with reckless indifference to the consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person," and thus, committed a crime of violence. Because the record of conviction was inconclusive with regard to the intent involved in Estrada's conviction, the conviction could not be properly classified as a crime of violence. Although this case was decided in the context of federal sentencing, one of the definitions of a crime of violence for immigration purposes parallels the sentencing provision, and thus, the case could have "crimmigration" implications as well.
You can read the full text of U.S. v. Estrada here: http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201410230.pdf
