The Fourth Circuit has determined that the Virginia identity theft statute is divisible, and the subsection requiring an intent to defraud is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Salazar v. Garland can be found here:
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identity theft
The Fourth Circuit has determined that the Virginia statutes governing leaving an accident and identity theft do not match the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude.
“[T]he failure-to-stop conviction requires no culpable mental state or reprehensible conduct. As to the culpable mental state, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 does not require any showing of intent, nor has the Virginia Supreme Court read an element of intent into the statute; thus, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 cannot have the required culpable mental state to qualify as a CIMT. As the Government acknowledges, the statute does not require actual knowledge that an accident or injury took place, but rather that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the accident resulted in injury or property damage.”
“The Supreme Court of Virginia has made it clear that it is possible for a defendant to be guilty of violating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 for merely failing to satisfy the reporting requirements in the statute, even if the defendant remained at the scene of the accident. The Government does not argue that failing to comply with the reporting requirements categorically violates a social norm. And for good reason. We cannot see how failing to comply with the reporting requirements (e.g., failing to report one’s name, address, driver’s license number, and vehicle registration number) categorically violates a social norm. Failure to comply with the reporting requirements is not behavior ‘that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved.’”
The court noted that the identify theft statute does not require an intent to deceive the government or obstruct a governmental function. “In Virginia, it is a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) to provide false identification to someone who is not law enforcement, such as a ‘loss prevention manager at a store investigating a shoplifting accident.’” “Further, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) does not require a perpetrator to use the name of an actual person, as the statute proscribes the use of the identity of a ‘false or a fictitious person’.”
The full text of Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr can be found here:
In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction for criminal use of personal identification information is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. "Because the least culpable conduct under § 817.568(2)(a) involves the specific intent to possess personal information with intent to defraud, the BIA reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s offense involves moral turpitude."
The full text of Vlichez-Bello v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201616764.pdf
The Court addressed two subsections of California's identity theft statute, and noted that section 530.5(a) prohibits someone knowingly obtaining personal identifying information and using that information for any unlawful purpose, while section 530.5(d)(2) prohibits someone transferring that information to someone else, knowing that the transferee will use it for an unlawful purpose. The Court determined that conduct prohibited under the statute is not inherently fraudulent. The statutes do not require that the defendant obtain any tangible benefit from the act of theft. The court also noted that the conduct prescribed was not inherently base or vile because the defendant could obtain the victim's for any unlawful purpose, which including tortious, non-criminal behavior. The court declined to determine if the statutes at issue were divisible.
The full text of Linares-Gonzales v. Lynch can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/03/21/12-71142.pdf