Fourth Circuit Reverses Reasonable Relocation Finding

The Fourth Circuit reversed a reasonable internal relocation finding, noting that an asylum applicant’s ability to live in hiding for 3-4 weeks in Islamabad does not meet the government’s burden to prove that he could safely internally relocate there away from the Taliban.

The full text of Ullah v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/221026.P.pdf

The court granted a petition for rehearing and remanded the case for the agency to determine if asylum should be granted as a matter of discretion:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/221026R1.P.pdf

Tenth Circuit Overturns Internal Relocation Finding

The Tenth Circuit has reversed the agency’s determination that a Ghanian asylum seeker could safely relocate within Ghana to escape harm from a rival tribe. “The government has offered no evidence that Atwode are not present in other Ghanaian cities to which it would have Petitioner relocate. And more importantly, the government has no evidence linking the Atwode’s ability to track and threaten Petitioner in Accra with the ‘presence’ of Atwode migrants in that city. The government has thus failed to satisfy its burden to show that Petitioner’s experience in Accra––where he apparently was tracked, threatened, and shot at by Atwode as he moved from address to address––could not be duplicated in other parts of Ghana.”

The full text of Addo v. Barr can be found here:

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/18/18-9560.pdf

Ninth Circuits Finds Asylum Seeker in Hiding Could not Reasonably Relocate

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an asylum seeker who must remain in hiding to avoid harm cannot reasonably relocate in her country of origin. Though recognizing the regulations governing protection under the Convention Against Torture (unlike those related to asylum and withholding of removal) do not explicitly require internal relocation to be “reasonable,” the court assumed that the analysis would remain the same. The court also rejected the agency’s analysis of the social distinction of the petitioner’s proposed social group consisting of “women resistant to forced marriage proposals,” finding that the requisite distinction was established by the petitioner’s testimony that she was ostracized for refusing a local ruler’s marriage proposal, and that the local ruler has to authority to enforce traditional law in other parts of the country, allowing him in the past to hunt down women who refused his marriage proposals. Finally, the court recognized that inherent in the concept of forced marriage is forced rape, which would qualify as a form of torture.

The full text of Akosung v. Barr can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/14/17-72829.pdf

Ninth Circuit Construes Internal Relocation Regulations

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the regulations governing internal relocation do not require the government to propose a city, state, or other type of locality as the area of relocation, rather the Department of Homeland Security may properly propose a specific or a more general area as the place of safe relocation. The Board must then conduct its safe relocation analysis with respect to that proposed area, however specifically or generally defined. “Commensurate with DHS’s burden, a more generally defined area will likely require a more comprehensive showing of proof that the entirety of the area is safe for relocation, as compared to, for example, a specific city.”

The full text of Singh v. Whitaker can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/01/24/16-70823.pdf

Fifth Circuit Reverses Internal Relocation Finding

The Fifth Circuit has reversed a finding by the agency that an asylum applicant who had experienced past persecution could safely relocate within India.  "Before discussing the record evidence, we first note that the DHS produced no evidence on this issue despite the fact that it bore the burden of proof."  Reliance solely on the general reports submitted by the petitioner was insufficient to demonstrate that there is “a specific area of the country” where the petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of persecution.

The full text of Singh v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60320-CV0.pdf

Ninth Circuit Clarifies Standards Governing Internal Relocation and Protection under the Convention Against Torture

Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reviewed its previous case law on who bears the burden of demonstrating that internal relocation is not possible when an application requests deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.  The court recognized that its previous decisions in Hasan v. Ashcroft, Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, and Singh v. Gonzales suggested that an applicant must demonstrate that internal relocation is impossible before being granted deferral of removal.  It also recognized that its decision in Perez-Ramirez v. Holder, which applied the same burden shifting scheme that applies in asylum cases, suggested that once an application demonstrates past torture, the Government bears the burden of proving that internal relocation is reasonable.  Recognizing that the regulations governing deferral of removal direct an adjudicator to consider all relevant evidence, including evidence of the possibility of internal relocation, the court rejected both of these lines of cases, stating that the regulations do "not place a burden on an applicant to demonstrate that relocation within the proposed country of removal is impossible because the IJ must consider all relevant evidence; no one factor is determinative.  Nor do the regulations shift the burden to the government because they state that the applicant carries the overall burden of proof. To the extent that Hasan, Lemus-Galvan, Singh, and Perez-Ramirez conflict with the plain text of the regulations, they are hereby overruled."

The court also addressed whether the applicant's removal from the United States could moot the petition for review, but found sufficient evidence that the applicant was still present in the United States (namely, that he had renewed his driver's license) to determine that the case was not moot, as the applicant still had an interest in being granted deferral of removal.

The full text of Maldonado v. Holder can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/03/27/09-71491.pdf