Ninth Circuit Reverses Finding that Oregon Conviction for Menacing Constituting Domestic Violence is a CIMT

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for menacing constituting domestic violence is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require the actual infliction of fear. “A CIMT determination requires both an evil or malicious intent and the infliction of actual substantial harm on another. In Latter-Singh, we explained that the injury required under § 422—that the victim experience sustained fear from the threat—ensured that the statute criminalized only ‘conduct which results in substantial harm’ and excluded non-turpitudinous conduct such as ‘emotional outbursts’ or ‘mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent.’” “The Oregon menacing statute prohibits words or conduct that is intended to place others in fear of imminent serious physical injury, but it does not require any intent to cause injury or that the victim experience any actual fear or injury as a result of the criminal act.”

The full text of Flores-Vasquez v. Garland can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/31/20-73447.pdf

Tenth Circuit Concludes UT Terroristic Threats Conviction is CIMT; Affirms Matter of G-G-S-

The Tenth Circuit has determined that a Utah terroristic threats conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude. “We hold that recklessly threatening substantial property damage with the intent of interrupting public access to a portion of a building is a CIMT.” The court also affirmed Matter of G-G-S- and determined that the agency need not consider a petitioner’s mental health when determining whether the petitioner has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.

The full text of the extremely sad case of Birhanu v. Wilkinson can be found here:

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/19/19-9599.pdf

BIA Finds that OR Menacing Conviction is a CIMT

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that an Oregon conviction for menacing is a crime involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the Board has stated that the element of actual inflicted fear is not necessary to determine that a crime categorically involves moral turpitude where the statute requires evil or malicious intent, and the level of threatened harm, or magnitude of menace implicit in the threat, is serious and immediate.

The full text of Matter of J-G-P- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1208861/download