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Viewing entries tagged
mental illness
The Fourth Circuit has determined that the forcible institutionalization of a mentally ill man does not compel the granting of asylum when the man’s mental illness caused him to behave in a disruptive and violent manner.
The full text of Joshi v. Garland can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that “Mexicans with mental health disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior” is not a cognizable particular social group for asylum purposes.
The full text of Uribe v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/03/01/21-1244.pdf
The Attorney General has determined that the agency may consider an applicant’s mental health conditions when determining if the applicant has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. “In some circumstances, a respondent’s mental health condition may indicate that the respondent does not pose a danger to the community— for instance, where the respondent ‘suffered from intimate partner violence, was convicted of assaulting his or her abuser, and reliable evidence showed that the individual’s diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder had played a substantial motivating role in the assault.’ Of course, an individual may pose a danger to the community notwithstanding a mental health condition, and in those cases, the ‘particularly serious crime’ bar to asylum and withholding of removal may apply. But the potential relevance of mental health evidence to the dangerousness inquiry suffices to establish that such evidence should not categorically be disregarded, as G-G-S- held.”
The full text of Matter of B-Z-R- can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has remanded a mentally ill Somali man’s application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, ordering the agency to consider if he would experience torture in an Internally Displaced Persons camp.
The full text of Salat v. Garland can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the agency must only reference a petitioner’s mental illness during a particularly serious crime analysis if the petitioner presents evidence attributing the crime to mental illness. The court also determined that the agency was not required to terminate proceedings for a mentally ill petitioner who physically attacked his qualified representative and who refused to cooperate in any document collection efforts made by his representative.
The full text of Benedicto v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/09/09/18-73237.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that the agency need not consider an applicant’s mental health in its particularly serious crime analysis when invoking the presumption in Matter of Y-L- that drug trafficking crimes are particularly serious crimes, unless the applicant first overcomes that presumption.
The full text of Gilbertson v. Garland can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has joined the Ninth Circuit in finding that a petitioner’s mental health struggles must be considered by the agency when determining if a petitioner has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. “However, we fail to understand how a petitioner’s mental health can never be relevant to the circumstances and underlying facts”of the conviction, especially, as the BIA noted, in light of the impact mental illness can have on an individual’s behavior. As such, we find that the BIA’s categorical bar of consideration of mental health evidence, as contemplated in Matter of G-G-S-, is an arbitrary and capricious construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and we reject such a categorical evidentiary bar in the particularly serious crime analysis.”
The full text of Shazi v. Wilkinson can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has rejected the Board of Immigration Appeals' (Board) categorical rule, established in Matter of G-G-S-, that an adjudicator may not consider a petitioner's mental health condition when determining whether he has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. "This decision is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the analysis of whether a crime is particularly serious requires the agency to conduct a case-by-case analysis of convictions falling outside the category established by Congress, because such categorical rules undermine the ability of the agency to conduct a case-by-case analysis in each case."
"The IJ is not retrying the question of guilt but assessing whether the circumstances of the crime are so serious as to justify removal to a country where there is a significant risk of persecution. Therefore, an IJ, as a fact finder focused on that question, may choose to examine what he or she deems reliable evidence of mental health and decide whether such evidence bears on the dangerousness determination, and ultimately whether the individual committed a particularly serious crime, without disturbing, or 'reassessing' the criminal court’s findings."
"Second, the Board’s concerns about 'going behind' a conviction are unreasonable given that, pursuant to various provisions of the INA, IJs regularly scrutinize the factual circumstances surrounding crimes of conviction."
"Third, the Board’s assumption that consideration of mental health would implicate reassessment of the criminal court’s finding is flawed because the mental health evidence the individual wishes to offer in the immigration court may never have been presented to the criminal court. For example, no specific mental state is required as an element of strict liability offenses, and similarly, mental illness is not a defense to crimes that require only negligence; and at sentencing judges may exercise their discretion and choose not to consider mental illness in making their decision."
The Court also recognized that the decision in G-G-S- is inconsistent with the Board's caselaw permitting an adjudicator to consider "all reliable information" when making a particularly serious crime determination. Finally, the Court disagreed with the Board's determination that mental illness is never relevant to the particularly serious crime assessment because it is inconsistent with the Board's precedent recognizing the relevance of motivation and intent to the particularly serious crime determination and fails to recognize that mental illness bears on intent.
The full text of Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/04/06/14-72506.pdf
