These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
perjury
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a California conviction for perjury is categorically an aggravated felony. In so doing, the court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of a perjury-related aggravated felony in Matter of Alvarado.
The full text of Yim v. Barr can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/25/17-70624.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has adopted a new definition of an aggravated felony related to perjury. The BIA withdrew from its prior decision in Matter of Martinez-Recinos. Instead, the BIA surveyed state definitions of perjury and determined that the generic definition of an aggravated felony related to perjury requires that "an offender make a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation where an oath is authorized or required by law." The BIA then concluded that perjury in violation of section 118(a) of the California Penal Code matches this definition.
The full text of Matter of Alvarado can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/921701/download
The Ninth Circuit determined that a conviction in California for perjury is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The court recognized that common law perjury has long been considered a CIMT, but noted that California's definition of perjury was much broader, encompassing lies told outside of a judicial proceeding, as well as lies made where no oral oath of honesty was required. The court also observed that the fact that one need not be competent to give the false statement demonstrates that not all convictions result from evil or malicious intent. Similarly, the fact that lack of knowledge as to the false statement’s materiality is not a defense to conviction further demonstrates that not all conduct covered by the statue involves an intent to harm someone. Perjury does not necessarily involve intent to harm, actual infliction of harm, or an action that affects a protected class of victim, nor does it include a specific intent to defraud.
The court also determined that California's perjury statute is divisible, encompassing two separate crimes: written perjury and oral perjury. The court concluded that written perjury is not a CIMT.
The full text of Rosales Rivera v. Lynch can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/03/10/12-72668.pdf
