BIA Issues Ridiculous Decision on CA Vacatur Order

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has issued what I can only characterize as an absurd decision regarding a California vacatur order. The order cited California Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7 as the basis for the plea withdraw. Penal Code section 1016.5 is the code section that requires criminal courts to provide immigration warnings to defendants taking plea deals. I have never heard a single immigration official question that vacaturs under this code section are viable for immigration purposes. Penal Code section 1473.7, as the BIA noted, has three bases for vacatur: 1) an error resulting in a failure to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of a plea; 2) evidence of actual innocence; and 3) a plea or sentence entered as a result of racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination. The BIA complained that the respondent in this matter obtained an order that specified vacatur under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, but did not specify which subsection of 1473.7. Though it acknowledged that subsection (a)(1) (failure to understand the immigration consequences) is cognizable for immigration purposes, it implied that vacaturs for actual innocence or racial discrimination might not be vacaturs due to “legal or procedural errors.” The BIA wholesale ignored the reference to section 1016.5 in the vacatur order.

It’s overall a bad decision, with very poor legal analysis. I am hopeful it will be overturned on appeal. In the meantime, lawyer friends, make sure you add that “(a)(1)” to the end of your vacatur orders.

The full text of Matter of de Jesus-Platon can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-02/4086_0.pdf

CA Appellate Court Finds 1473.7 does not Apply to Sentence Deferral Program

The Appellate Division of the Superior Court has determined that defendants who take advantage of the Sentence Deferral Program cannot later seek relief under Penal Code section 1473.7.

“The threshold question in deciding the propriety of the trial court’s ruling is whether defendant had a conviction or sentence when he made his motion. Defendant was never sentenced so we turn to whether he sustained a conviction within the meaning of section 1473.7, subdivision (a). Under well-settled law, defendant sustained a conviction when the trial court accepted and entered his plea of no contest.3 Nonetheless, section 1473.7 relief was inapplicable because, at the time the motion was litigated, defendant’s plea (or “conviction”) no longer existed. In other words, there was no conviction to ‘vacate.’”

“While the surviving ramifications for the defendant who secures a section 1203.4 dismissal are indicative of a conviction, the same cannot be said for a dismissal under the Sentence Deferral Program. The only exception to complete nullification of the defendant’s criminal proceeding upon dismissal pursuant to the Sentence Deferral Program is (a) the Department of Justice may disclose the arrest ‘in response to a peace officer application request’ and (b) successful completion of the Sentence Deferral Program ‘does not relieve [the defendant] of the obligation to disclose the arrest in response to a direct question contained in a questionnaire of application for a position as a peace officer . . . .’ In other words, the target of potential adverse consequences is strictly limited to a narrow class of defendants who seek employment as a peace officer. For all intents and purposes, the dismissal of a case pursuant to section 1001.96 renders the conviction a complete nullity. A prerequisite for section 1473.7 relief is the existence of a conviction or sentence. Defendant had neither at the time he litigated his motion; because he successfully completed section 1001.94 diversion, his plea was withdrawn, his case was dismissed, and there was no conviction to vacate. Defendant was not eligible for section 1473.7 relief.”

The full text of People v. Kuzmichey can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?1124//JAD24-08

Ninth Circuit Affirms Validity of 1473.7 Vacaturs for Immigration Purposes

The Ninth Circuit has determined that convictions vacated under California Penal Code section 1473.7 are cognizable for immigration purposes. “We need not dust off our dictionary or delve into the legislative history of § 1473.7(a)(1) to see that the statute provides a vehicle to vacate a conviction to address a substantive or procedural error that renders a conviction ‘legally invalid.’ The plain text does not permit a state court to vacate a conviction to alleviate any immigration consequences arising from the conviction or sentence.”

The court also clarified the due diligence aspect of a motion to reopen based a vacatur. “[T}he proper starting point for measuring diligence in this case is when a reasonable person in Bent’s position would be put on notice of the error underlying his motion to reopen.” The Court then concluded that diligence should be measured from the date of issuance of a Notice to Appear citing the conviction as a basis for removal. “On the one hand, Bent did not pursue vacatur of his conviction for five years after he received the NTA. That may well undermine his ability to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights. But on the other hand, there is also good reason to believe that Bent did diligently pursue his rights during this period. After all, due diligence requires a showing of reasonable diligence, not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’ That is, we do not require petitioners to demonstrate ‘an overzealous or extreme pursuit of any and every avenue of relief.’ In assessing a petitioner’s diligence, we ‘consider the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his or her particular circumstances,’ and we are ‘guided by decisions made in other similar cases . . . with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.’

“Here, after Bent’s NTA put him on notice that he was removable, he fervently defended against removal, first before the IJ and then several times before the BIA and this court. He undertook these efforts after spending nearly a decade in prison and while in immigration detention.6 Indeed, the basis for Bent’s vacatur—§ 1473.7(a)(1)—did not come into effect until 2017, long after his unconstitutional conviction.7 But that was not all. In 2022, while his petition for review of his final order of removal was still pending, Bent pursued and obtained his state court vacatur. Approximately one month later, before his merits petition was even fully briefed before us, he also filed his motion to reopen. He was so diligent that his petitions for review on the merits and on the motion to reopen are both presently before us.” The Court also noted that it would “leave it to the BIA10 to determine on remand whether the vacatur of Bent’s conviction on constitutional grounds under § 1473.7(a)(1) demonstrates that he faced extraordinary circumstances for purposes of equitable tolling.”

The full text of Bent v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/15/22-1910.pdf

An amended decision can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/09/06/22-1910.pdf

BIA Addresses Insufficiency of a PCR Order

The Board of Immigration Appeals has addressed the insufficiency of a state court vacatur order, noting that the order did not specify the statute for vacatur, did not reference the allegations in the motion to vacate, and did not include any factual findings to support the vacatur order. The motion to vacate itself was not accompanied by any evidentiary support, such as sworn affidavits.

“Where a State court order granting a respondent’s motion to vacate a conviction does not indicate the reason for the vacatur, and there is no other basis in the record to independently establish the reason, the respondent has not satisfied his burden to show that the court vacated his conviction because of a substantive or procedural defect in his criminal proceedings. The bare fact that the State court granted the respondent’s motion does not establish the State court’s reason for doing so. Because the respondent has not demonstrated that the convictions underlying his removability were vacated because of a procedural or substantive defect in his criminal proceedings, we will deny his motion to reopen and terminate.”

The Board noted in a footnote that there is a split in authority over whether DHS or the respondent bears the burden of proving the basis of a vacatur in the motion to reopen context for a deported lawful permanent resident.

The full text of Matter of Azrag can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-02/4073.pdf

CA Fourth Appellate District Finds that Receipt of Stolen Property Misdemeanor is not CIMT or Aggravated Felony, Reverses Vacatur

The California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, has reversed the vacatur of a misdemeanor conviction for receipt of stolen property, finding that the conviction was neither an aggravated felony nor a crime involving moral turpitude. As such, the defendant - a lawful permanent resident - had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was causing an adverse immigration consequence.

The full text of People v. Coca can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?1023//E079703

Second Circuit Declines to Give Retroactive Effect to New York Sentencing Reform

The Second Circuit has declined to give retroactive effect to New York’s sentencing reform for misdemeanors (reducing the maximum sentence from 365 to 364 days of incarceration) in immigration proceedings.

The full text of Vasquez v. Garland can be found here:

https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fe90911e-cb1d-4077-83eb-4b6a4ff087c6/9/doc/21-6380_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fe90911e-cb1d-4077-83eb-4b6a4ff087c6/9/hilite/

First Circuit Rules Conviction is Final During Collateral Attack

The First Circuit has determined that a conviction remains final for immigration purposes during the pendency of a post-conviction motion.

The full text of St. John v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/22-1695P-01A.pdf

CA Ct. of Apps. Finds that Court is not Required to Dismiss Charges after Vacatur

The California Court of Appeals, First Appellate Division, has determined that a court is not required to dismiss charges after granting a motion to vacate under section 1473.7 of the California Penal Code.

The full text of People v. Vaca can be found here: http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0423//A164953

CA Appellate Court Finds Sufficient Error to Vacate Domestic Violence Conviction

The California Court of Appeal, Second District, has determined that a defense attorney who “probably likely” advised a client that if he reduced his felony to a misdemeanor, he could avoid mandatory deportation, provided sufficiently inaccurate advice to damage the client’s ability to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.

The full text of People v. Villalba can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0323//B318353

Shoutout to Doug Jalaie for a great decision!

CA Supreme Court Discusses Prejudice Prong of Motion to Vacate

The California Supreme Court has published guidance on how to establish prejudice for a motion to vacate under section 1473.7 of the California Penal Code.

The Court started by evaluating whether Espinoza Espinoza lacked a meaningful understanding of the consequences of his plea, and looked to the fact that he traveled abroad as evidence that he did. “[H]e took an international commercial flight to the United States, which predictably required subjecting himself to the scrutiny of United States immigration officials, which is not consistent with the behavior of a person who understood that his convictions effectively ended his lawful resident status.”

Turning to prejudice, the Court noted that a totality of the circumstances analysis must be applied. “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible. Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at trial. These factors are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief. A defendant must provide ‘objective evidence’ to corroborate factual assertions. Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.”

The Court acknowledged that ties to the United States are probative evidence of a defendant’s immigration priorities. Long-standing residency and strong family ties demonstrate that the prospect of deportation may be an integral (or even the most important) part of the calculus when accepting a plea. “Community ties may be established by length of residence; immigration status; lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to family, friends, or the community; work history or financial ties; or other forms of attachment. Objective evidence of a defendant’s community ties includes facts provided by a defendant’s declaration or declarations from family members, friends, colleagues, community members, or other acquaintances.”

“After Espinoza accepted the plea and served jail time, he returned home to care for his family and community. He became the caregiver for his elderly parents who suffer from severe medical conditions. He ran his own business to provide for his family. He volunteered, went to church, and took part in numerous community organizations. These facts lend credence to Espinoza’s assertion that his community ties were important to him at the time of his plea.”

“Another consideration is whether alternative, immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the defendant’s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of comparable offenses without immigration consequences.”

“Espinoza had no prior criminal history at the time of his plea. This fact is relevant because a defendant without an extensive criminal record may persuasively contend that the prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea without immigration consequences. Additionally, Espinoza presented evidence from an immigration attorney that there were alternatives the prosecution could have offered that would not have resulted in mandatory deportation.” “Espinoza’s lack of a criminal record, combined with the declaration of the immigration attorney, support his assertion that he had reason to expect or hope for a plea bargain without immigration consequences.”

The Court made several other valuable observations. First, a defendant is not required to have expressed contemporaneous confusion about immigration consequences at the time of the plea. Second, a defendant is not required to obtain a statement from defense counsel.

The full text of People v. Espinoza can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0123//S269647

CA Court of Appeals Applies Collateral Estoppel to Second Motion to Vacate

The California Court of Appeals, Fourth District has applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a second motion to vacate under Penal Code section 1473.7. The court noted that the appeal of the first motion applied the newer 2019 standard for relief, and the petitioner did not appeal that determination further.

The full text of People v. DeMontoy can be found here:

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D079532.PDF

Ninth Circuit Finds Evidentiary Hearing Necessary in Post-Conviction Matter

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a non-citizen is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the only evidence that his attorney provided inaccurate advice was his own affidavit.

With respect to whether the defendant would have rejected the plea had he been properly informed of the consequences, the court noted that that the judge’s advisal about possible removal and the plea agreement’s statement that removal was presumptively mandatory were not determinative on the issue of prejudice. “The record evidence contradicting Rodriguez’s argument is certainly strong. Rodriguez was told by the district court that removal was ‘a possible consequence’ of his plea and the plea agreement informed Rodriguez that his plea would make removal ;presumptively mandatory.’ But possibilities and presumptions are not conclusive, and even the plea agreement stated that ‘no one . . . can predict to a certainty the effect of [Rodriguez’s] conviction on his immigration status.’”

“When the court is faced with a fact-intensive analysis such as assessing whether a defendant would have gone to trial had he known the immigration consequences of his plea, and where the defendant presents some evidence not palpably false which suggests that he would have gone to trial, then it cannot be said that the record is conclusive against the defendant, nor can it be said that the defendant’s claim is ‘so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal.’ On these facts, it is ‘illogical’—and therefore an abuse of discretion—to deny an evidentiary hearing.”

The full text of US v. Rodriguez can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/23/21-15117.pdf

Ninth Circuit Concludes that Applicant for Relief Bears the Burden to Prove Basis of Vacatur

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an applicant for relief bears the burden of proof for proving that a conviction was vacated due to legal defect. The court found the applicant had met his burden of proof when his conviction was withdrawn under Penal Code section 1018. “The grounds for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea under § 1018 are substantive and procedural defects in the underlying proceeding.”

"The BIA noted that Ballinas-Lucero’s Memorandum ‘asserts that the respondent felt pressured, did not understand his options, did not discuss his case with an attorney, and was not adequately advised of the immigration consequences of his plea.’” “Any reasonable adjudicator reading Ballinas-Lucero’s Memorandum in support of his motion would be required to find that the factual grounds asserted pertained overwhelmingly to substantive and procedural defects in his pleas, as specified in § 1018.”

“Despite the clarity of Ballinas-Lucero’s Memorandum, and of the criteria in § 1018, the BIA found the ‘absence of any statement by the court regarding the reasons for permitting the withdrawal of the respondent’s guilty plea’ to be dispositive. This was error. As the Attorney General stated in In re Thomas, adjudicators applying the ‘Pickering test . . . frequently determine whether a vacatur is valid for immigration purposes by assessing the text of the order of vacatur itself or the alien’s motion requesting the vacatur.’”

The full text of Ballinas-Lucero v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/15/17-73260.pdf

Ninth Circuit Requires Former LPR to Show Diligence in Obtaining Post-Conviction Relief

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a lawful permanent resident who seeks reopening of his proceedings more than 90 days after the issuance of a final order of removal based on post-conviction relief must show that he was diligent in seeking that relief, such that the 90-day motion to reopen deadline should be tolled.

The full text of Perez-Camacho v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/01/19-72063.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/12/02/19-72063.pdf

CA Appellate Court Grants Vacatur for Defendant Advised Only of Possibility of Immigration Consequences

The California Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District, has sustained the appeal of a defendant who was only warned of the mere possibility of immigration consequences, and who had lived in the United States with his family for decades prior to his plea.

The full text of People v. Valdivias Soto can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0622//C092015

CA Appellate Court Rejects Motion to Vacate for Defendant who Admitted He Knew he Would be Deported

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate Division, has denied a motion to vacate for a defendant who admitted he knew he would be deported when he took his plea and who initially stated his attorney didn’t ask him about his immigration status but later admitted that he did.

The full text of People v. Garcia can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0622//B310824

BIA Reviews Nunc Pro Tunc Relief in Virginia

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a Virginia nunc pro tunc order to correct the identity of a controlled substance is cognizable for immigration purposes. The Board noted that a nunc pro tunc order is only available to correct a court error.

The full text of Matter of Dingus can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1496311/download

CA Ct of Appeals Affirms Denial of 1473.7 Motion for Former Temporary Resident

The California Court of Appeals, Second District, has affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a robbery plea brought by a former temporary resident. “Diaz knew he had temporary resident status that would soon expire and an upcoming appointment to obtain permanent resident status that he would necessarily miss if incarcerated. Although he was legally in the country at the time he pleaded no contest, he knew that he would lose his legal status if he made the plea.

Even if Diaz had believed that someone legally in the country would not face deportation or other immigration consequences as he claims, he also knew that his legal status would expire and that he would not have the ability to secure it. If he believed his fate relied on his legal status, he would have understood that if he made the plea he would not be in the country legally after his temporary resident status expired and that he would potentially be subject to adverse immigration consequences.

If Diaz’s attorney had not spoken to him about immigration consequences prior to Diaz making the plea, it seems highly unlikely that Diaz would not have consulted him when Diaz was advised of the potential dangers by the District Attorney just prior to pleading no contest. Diaz was aggressive in his self advocacy at the plea hearing. He asked multiple questions, spoke directly to the court several times, and attempted to bargain directly with the court as well. Diaz persevered in his efforts to obtain what he wanted, whether it was the significant benefit of a lesser sentence or the return of $17. It is simply not believable that he would leave his immigration status to chance without discussing it with his attorney. The more logical conclusion is that Diaz did, in fact, discuss deportation with Tanaka, knew it would be nearly impossible to avoid, and decided that the slim possibility of success at trial was not worth the risk that he would serve six years in prison.

'Moreover, Diaz declared that he was processed by immigration officials prior to being imprisoned for his 1989 conviction, and that they informed him he had been convicted of a deportable offense and would lose his legal resident status (although he would not be deported despite his illegal status). Diaz did not state that he was surprised, dismayed, or that he attempted to take any action to secure his legal status at that time. His inaction is inconsistent with his claim that he did not believe he would face any adverse immigration consequences and would not accept any resolution of the charges against him if he knew that he would not have a legal right to remain in the United States.

We further conclude that Diaz has failed to show he was prejudiced—i.e. that there was a reasonable probability Diaz would have rejected the plea agreement if he had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.

In addition to Diaz’s declarations, there was contemporaneous objective evidence in his favor. Diaz had entered the country as a six-year-old child; deportation would have separated him from his mother and from the country where he had spent two-thirds of his young life. These are compelling reasons for Diaz to wish to remain in the United States legally.

We cannot conclude that they are sufficient to meet his burden when weighed against other considerations, however. There is very strong evidence that Diaz made an informed decision to accept the plea bargain that he was offered. There was no other plea offer available to Diaz, as is evident from the plea colloquy and the sentencing hearing. The court stated that the sentence it was willing to give Diaz was better than the one the District Attorney was willing to offer, and it was also the court’s ‘bottom offer. . . . It isn’t going to get any better.’ Given the facts of this case—including that Diaz was the only one of the perpetrators who wielded a deadly weapon, held a knife to the victim’s neck, and drew blood—Diaz ‘had [no] reason to believe that the charges would allow an immigration-neutral bargain that a court would accept.’”

The court further noted that it appears Diaz had a prior criminal record (including possible prison time), that he had forcefully advocated for a lesser prison term and for the return of $17 that had been in his possession at the time of his arrest, and that despite that forceful advocacy, he had made no inquiry after being advised of potential immigration consequences by the court.

The full text of People v. Diaz can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0322//B307726

CA Court of Appeals, Second District Affirms Denial of Motion to Vacate

The California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, has affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate where the defendant was orally warned (through an interpreter) that he would be deported, he signed a written waiver with the same warning (translated by an interpreter), he went over that waiver with his attorney, his attorney verbally stated that she had explained the immigration consequences of the plea to him, and he orally acknowledged that he would “wait for immigration.” In addition, the victim of the offense testified at the preliminary hearing that she had reported the defendant to ICE and that ICE had said they would apprehend him if she could tell them his whereabouts, and an ICE agent was present at the defendant’s preliminary hearing.

“During the taking of the plea, appellant was told orally and in writing that he will be deported. Not that he ‘might’ be deported, or that he ‘could’ be deported. Appellant’s argument that he was not aware of the mandatory nature of the deportation flies in the face of the mandatory language used to describe the likelihood of deportation. Appellant is not entitled to simply ignore the admonitions he was given about the consequences of the plea, and argue that he unilaterally assumed he would be treated in direct contravention of what he was advised orally and in writing.”

“A defendant seeking to set aside a plea must do more than simply claim he did not understand the immigration consequences of the plea. The claim must be corroborated by evidence beyond the defendant’s self-serving statements.” The court noted the presence in other cases of testimony by the defense attorney or the defense attorney’s notes. “Here, appellant offered no contemporaneous evidence such as an affidavit and/or testimony by trial counsel, or counsel’s files, notes, or email correspondence. This is a case unlike Vivar, where the written advisal informed defendant he ‘may’ be subject to deportation, and counsel stated ‘possible’ deportation was discussed with defendant. Appellant has presented no independent evidence that he was told anything other than that he would be deported.”

“Appellant has also failed to present evidence that at the time of the plea, he ‘had reason to believe an immigration neutral negotiated disposition was possible.’ He did not offer an expert declaration opining hat alternative, nondeportable dispositions would have been available and acceptable to the prosecutor. His counsel now engages in speculation that he could have pled to burglary, without any citation from the record indicating that disposition would have been entertained by the prosecutor. And the issue is whether appellant had reason to believe a nondeportable disposition was available. He did not present a declaration from trial counsel that he was given such advice (which would have been contrary to the direct plea advisals that deportation would occur).”

“Appellant has not explained why anyone would reasonably have expected that ICE would forgo deportation proceedings against someone who admitted in writing they were temporarily getting married solely to obtain citizenship. Appellant has not shown that even if he had made an error in entering into the plea, it was ‘prejudicial’ within the meaning of the statute. At its core, this case comes down to answering the question: Can a defendant be told repeatedly that his plea will result in deportation, confirm he understood, present no contrary evidence from the attorney who advised him, and then withdraw the plea with the claim that he did not understand he would be deported? Our answer under the facts of this case is ‘no.’”

The full text of People v. Abdelsalam can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0122//B307375

Ninth Circuit Dismisses Attack on Reinstatement Order Based on Post-Removal Vacatur of Conviction

The Ninth Circuit has held that a vacatur of a criminal conviction after a petitioner has been physically removed from the United States does not demonstrate a gross miscarriage of justice in the underlying removal proceedings, such that he can challenge the reinstatement of a removal order premised on the vacated conviction. The gross miscarriage of justice standard looks at whether the removal order was valid at the time it was issued and at the time it was executed. Thus, any post-execution developments, such as vacatur of the conviction that formed the basis of the removal order, do not establish a gross miscarriage of justice. The court further noted that the petition was found deportable for having entered the United States without inspection, which provided a separate basis from the conviction for deporting him.

The full text of Lopez Vazquez v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/11/12/18-70329.pdf