These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
receipt of stolen property
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Pennsylvania conviction for receipt of stolen property is an aggravated felony, rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the statute’s mens rea is lower than that required by the generic definition of a theft offense.
The full text of Khan v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-60146-CV0.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for exporting stolen vehicles qualifies as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the federal mens rea of “willful blindness” was broader than required mens rea prescribed by the agency for receipt of stolen property.
The full text of Tantchev v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0195p-06.pdf
The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction for third-degree possession of stolen property is a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony even though the statute does not require the lack of consent of the owner to obtain the property, which brings it outside the generic definition of a theft offense. The court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of a possession of stolen property aggravated felony in Matter of Alday Dominguez, which provided a separate definition for a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony than a theft aggravated felony.
The petitioner also argued that the statute does not require an intent to deprive the owner of the benefits of ownership. The court disagreed, finding that an intent to deprive the owner of property is inherent in the knowing possession of stolen property under New York law.
The full text of Santana v. Barr can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for receipt of stolen property constitutes a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” aggravated felony. The court acknowledge that California’s theft statutes are broader than the federal definition of theft. However, the court held that the word “including” could have been used by Congress to add a theft-related crime, receipt of stolen property, into the list of qualifying offenses even though it may not otherwise technically be a generic “theft offense.” The court further noted that the elements of generic theft, “[1] the taking of property or an exercise of control over property [2] without consent [3] with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent,” are distinct from the elements of receipt of stolen property,” [1] possession [2] of stolen property [3] knowing it was stolen,” As such, “the difference between the generic theft definition, which requires lack of consent, and that of California law, which does not, is irrelevant to a conviction for receipt of stolen property. The offender must know (or believe) the property was ‘stolen’; he does not need to know how it was stolen to be convicted.” In so holding, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ precedent on the definition of a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony.
“BIA decisions define ‘receipt of stolen property’ as having the following elements: (1) receipt, possession, concealment, or retention of property, (2) knowledge or belief that the property has been stolen, and (3) intent to deprive the owner of his property. A mens rea equivalent to the presence of a reason to believe that the property had been stolen is insufficient. Intent to deprive can be inferred from knowledge that the property was stolen.” “The BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the elements of generic receipt of stolen property is a categorical match to the elements of that crime in California Penal Code section 496(a). To secure a conviction under section 496(a), the government must prove these elements: (1) stolen property; (2) knowledge that the property was stolen; and (3) possession, purchase, receipt, concealment, sale, or withholding of the stolen property. The mens rea element requires actual knowledge of or belief that the property is stolen.”
The full text of US v. Flores can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/28/16-50096.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for receipt of stolen property in the third degree qualifies as an aggravated felony. The mens rea element of the statute - which requires a defendant to know the property is stolen or to believe that it is probably stolen - meets the mens rea requirement enumerated in Matter of Deang.
The full text of Lewin v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had determined that the generic definition for a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony includes a requirement that the defendant have knowledge or belief that the property has been stolen. The South Dakota receipt of a stolen vehicle statute only requires a reason to believe that the vehicle has been stolen. Thus, this statute does not match the generic definition of a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony. "We cannot infer that a violator who received property with a “reason to believe” that the property was stolen (or a similar mens rea) intended to deprive the true owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. This is so because such a violator need not be actually aware of the stolen character of the item received in order to be convicted of the offense." The BIA acknowledged that the statute at issue is indivisible, and thus, will never qualify as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony.
The full text of Matter of Deang can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the generic definition of a receipt of stolen property does not require that the property be obtained by common law theft. Even if the property is obtained by fraudulent means, the conviction can qualify as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony. Thus, a conviction under section 496(a) of the California Penal Code qualifies as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony if a sentence of at least one year of imprisonment is imposed.
The full text of Matter of Alday-Dominguez can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/970806/download
The Tenth Circuit determined that a conviction for receipt of stolen property in Oklahoma qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude even though it does no require a permanent taking. The fact that the defendant must know the property is stolen is sufficient to implicate morally turpitudinous conduct. The court acknowledged that its decision was at odds with Ninth Circuit precedent.
The full text of Obregon v. Lynch can be found here: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-9601.pdf
