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removability

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BIA finds that Exception to 212(a)(6)(A)(i) only Applies to VAWA Self-Petitioner

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the exception to removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA (present without admission or parole) applies only to a VAWA self petitioner.  It does not apply to a respondent who has been subjected to extreme cruelty, but who has not applied for benefits as a VAWA self petitioner.  The instant case involved a respondent who fled domestic violence in Guatemala at the hands of family members.  

The full text of Matter of Pangan-Sis can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1001951/download

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Fourth Circuit Defers to BIA Interpretation Regarding Date of Admission for CIMT Charge

Sijapati first entered and was admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant L-2 visa on January 25, 2001. On December 31, 2002, Sijapati departed the United States for a two-and-a-half week vacation to Nepal, reentering the United States on January 18, 2003, pursuant to his existing L-2 visa. On March 16, 2005, federal immigration officials approved Sijapati’s application for adjustment of status as a lawful permanent resident. On December 12, 2007—more than five years after Sijapati was first admitted into the United States on January 25, 2001, under the L-2 visa, but less than five years after his most recent admission on January 18, 2003, under that visa—a circuit court in Virginia convicted Sijapati of felony embezzlement and imposed an eighteen-month suspended sentence. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security issued to Sijapati a Notice to Appear before the immigration court to face the charge of removability from the United States under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five years of the date of admission. 

Sijapati argued that the plain language of the statute unambiguously establishes that Congress intended "the date of admission" to correspond to the entry marking the commencement of an alien’s current or most recent period of admission.  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (Board) decision in Matter of Alyazjiin which the Board held that  "the most natural reading of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) is that the phrase ‘the date of admission’ refers to the date of 10 admission by virtue of which the alien was present in the United States when he committed his crime."  As such, the relevant date of admission for Sijapati was January 18, 2003 entry on the L-2 visa; by virtue of this admission, he was present in the United States when he committed the embezzlement offense.

The full text o Sijapati v. Boente can be found here: 

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/151204.P.pdf

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Second Circuit Limits the Applicability of the REAL ID Act

The Second Circuit determined that the REAL ID Act, by its terms, applies only to applications for relief.  Thus, the Board of Immigration Appeals erred by applying the standards of the Act to a contested removability determination.  This is a great decision for attorneys to reference when litigation so-called Quilantan cases, where there is an assertion that the non-citizen was admitted to the United States, but there may not be any documentary evidence to support the assertion.  

The full text of Ahmed v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/89caf325-4154-40e2-96f2-eebb31168c44/4/doc/14-1396_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/89caf325-4154-40e2-96f2-eebb31168c44/4/hilite/

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