These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
terroristic threats
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for terroristic threats is not a violent felony because it encompasses reckless conduct.
The full text of US v. Williams can be found here:
https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/22/02/203311P.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey terroristic threats conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The court first determined that the statute is overbroad and divisible. The court then determined that the the basis for the petitioner’s conviction is “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence 13 with the purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”
“New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute criminalizes threats that merely carry the risk of ‘convey[ing] menace or fear of a crime of violence’ to another person, and whereas those statutes required a mental state exhibiting ‘extreme’ and ‘depraved’ indifference to a person’s life, New Jersey defines recklessness to include ‘heedless[ness],’ ‘foolhardi[ness],’ or ‘scorn for the consequences’ of causing fear in another. New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, therefore, lacks the type of aggravating factors that we have previously recognized would make an offense inherently vile and depraved.”
“In sum, Larios’s crime of conviction has a minimum mens rea of recklessness but lacks any statutory aggravating factors, so the least culpable conduct is a reckless threat to commit a violent property crime, which . . . is not turpitudinous.”
The full text of Larios v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that a Minnesota conviction for making terroristic threats is a crime involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the BIA noted that the statute requires intentionally “caus[ing] extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” “First, we conclude that the communication of an intent to injure another by use of violence involves sufficiently reprehensible conduct to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.” “In this regard, we clarify that making a threat to commit a crime of violence in violation of Minnesota’s terroristic threats statute is a crime involving moral turpitude, even if the threatened crime would not necessarily qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.” “We note that the Minnesota statute requires either evacuation or ‘serious’ public inconvenience, which ensures that threats resulting in minor societal interference are not criminalized. Indeed, our review of Minnesota case law indicates that convictions that could fall under this prong of this statute involve, at minimum, reckless disregard that deployment of significant public resources would result from the violators’ actions.”
The full text of Matter of Salad can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1231366/download
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for first degree terrorist threatening is divisible between threats of injury and threats to property. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that a conviction for threats of serious injury is a violent felony.
The full text of United States v. Myers can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Nebraska conviction for making terroristic threats is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The statute criminalized, among other things, "commit[ing] any crime of violence . . . With the intent of causing the evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation." The Nebraska Supreme Court has defined the term “crime of violence” as “an act which injures or abuses through the use of physical force and which subjects the actor to punishment by public authority.”
Fletcher, the defendant, argued that the statute could be violated by making threats to property, and thus, did not qualify as a violent felony. The Court disagreed. "Fletcher points to no case in which Nebraska has applied the terroristic threats statute to a threat to commit arson of an unoccupied building. As a result, even if the theoretical possibility exists that the Nebraska terroristic threats statute could encompass threats only to property, Fletcher has not demonstrated a realistic probability that Nebraska would apply the statute in that manner."
Given the similarity in definition between a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence aggravated felony for immigration purposes, this case could have persuasive effect in the immigration context.
The full text of Fletcher v. United States can be found here:
In the context of a criminal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for terroristic threats does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. McFee can be found here:
