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Second Circuit Certifies NY Theft Case to State High Court

The Second Circuit has certified to the New York State Court of Appeals the question of whether an intent to “appropriate” property under New York Penal Law § 155.00(4)(b) requires an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded. The Court determined that an answer from the state high court was necessary to determine if New York convictions for petit larceny constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/18/doc/19-4111_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/18/hilite/

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Second Circuit Rejects BIA Definition of Conviction

The Second Circuit has determined the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of JM Acosta - which addresses the finality of a conviction on direct appeal - is not entitled to deference. The Court agreed that the definition of conviction in the INA is ambiguous with respect to whether it applies to convictions on appeal. However, it disagreed with the burden-shifting framework laid out in JM Acosta.

“We need not here decide whether some limits on the finality requirement may appropriately be read into the IIRIRA, because we conclude that the specific burden-shifting regime and evidentiary standard demanded by the BIA to show a merits-based appeal is not reasonable. Specifically, the BIA requires a non-citizen to make a merits-based showing at the notice stage, often before he is able to review the record or identify his arguments on appeal. The BIA points to nothing in the statutory text or legislative history indicating that this requirement reflects Congressional intent. Moreover, the requirement ignores the realities of appellate practice.”

The full text of Braithwaite v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/1/doc/20-27_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/1/hilite/

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Third Circuit finds that NJ 2nd Deg Robbery Conviction is Theft Aggravated Felony

The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for second-degree robbery is a theft-related aggravated felony because the statute always requires that property be obtained without the owner’s voluntary and intelligent assent. Notably, the court includes various of forms of theft-by-deception in this definition of crimes committed without voluntary and intelligent assent.

The full text of K.A. v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173640p.pdf

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Third Circuit Finds that Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge Need Not Contact Time and Date of First Hearing

The Third Circuit has determined that a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge that does not contain the time and date of the first removal hearing is not jurisdictionally defective because the regulations do not require that such information be in the Notice.

The full text of Mejia Romero v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/193705p.pdf

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Third Circuit Clarifies Government Inability to Protect Standard

The Third Circuit has determined that the “government-unable-or-unwilling-to-control” test and the “condone-or-complete-helplessness” test are legal equivalents. “Both tests have an overriding commonality: they recognize that to constitute persecution, the government must be complicit to some degree in the harmful conduct of nongovernmental actors through either act or omission.”

“From that perspective, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test is a shorthand of sorts. It depends on more than merely the government’s inability or unwillingness to control a violent group in the abstract. Rather, that inability or unwillingness to control a violent group becomes relevant only in the context of a specific individual, the applicant. And a government’s inability or unwillingness to control a violent group as a general matter does not necessarily mean that the government cannot or will not protect the specific applicant. Accordingly, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test evaluates the government’s ability and willingness to control private actors not at a general level, but rather with respect to the specific applicant seeking relief. The condone-or-complete-helplessness test similarly focuses on the applicant, only more explicitly. The ‘complete helplessness’ component assesses the government’s ability to protect a particular applicant from private harmful conduct. And the ‘condone’ component examines whether the government condoned private harm to that applicant.” “Calibrating for context, however, harmonizes the two standards: when the government is unable to control private actors with respect to a specific potential victim, it demonstrates a complete helplessness to protect that victim from those actors.”

The full text of Galeas Figueroa v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/191419p.pdf

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CA Supreme Court Weights in on 1473.7 Standards

The California Supreme Court has determined that denials of motions to vacate under Penal Code section 1473.7 should be reviewed by appellate courts under an independent review standard. ‘“Under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ‘independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review .’ An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” “In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts should similarly give particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses. Where, as here, the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical matter, ‘the trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.”

The court also clarified the prejudice requirement for a motion to vacate. “So: showing prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences. When courts assess whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they consider the totality of the circumstances. Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” The court noted that a defendant’s ties to the United States and counsel’s notes or recollections of the case all “constitute contemporaneous objective facts that corroborate [the defendant’s] concern about the immigration consequences of his plea options.”

Finally, the court noted that a plea form that advises a defendant that certain immigration consequences may result from a plea does not mitigate the lack of proper advice from counsel on these consequences.

The full text of People v. Vivar can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0521//S260270

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Supreme Court Construes Stop-Time Rule (Again!)

The Supreme Court has determined that the time and place of a removal hearing must be included in a Notice to Appear - and not a subsequent notice of hearing - to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. In so doing, the court overturns any circuit precedent permitting a so-called “two-step stop-time rule.”

The full text of Niz-Chavez v. Garland can be found here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-863_new_5426.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit Upholds Denial of Adjustment to Asylee who Provided Material Support to Terrorism

The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the denial of adjustment of status to a Bangladeshi asylee who was a member of the BNP on the grounds that the BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization, and that the terrorism issue was not sufficiently litigated in his removal proceeding to preclude the consideration of it at the time of his application for adjustment.

The full text of Islam v. DHS can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913287.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Disallows Nunc Pro Tunc Custody Order for Derivative Citizenship

The Ninth Circuit has held that a nunc pro tunc custody order - entered after the child’s 18th birthday and purporting to retroactively modify a joint custody order to award sole legal custody of the child to a U.S.-citizen parent - is not effective for deriving citizenship under a prior derivative citizenship statute. “2013 state court order was a proper nunc pro tunc order. We hold that Congress did not intend for this type of nunc pro tunc order, one untethered from the facts as they were during Carino’s childhood, to give rise to automatic derivative citizenship under section 1432(a).” “We hold that where it has not been proven that a custody order was entered in error, was contrary to law, or otherwise did not reflect the true legal relationship between a petitioner’s parents, a nunc pro tunc order cannot retroactively establish a naturalized parent’s sole legal custody for the purposes of section 1432(a). “

The full text of Padilla Carino v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/18/18-72985.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Interprets Old Citizenship Provision

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a now-repealed derivative citizenship provision required the child of a U.S. citizen to merely manifest an objective intent to reside permanently in the United States - and not to have acquired lawful permanent residency - in order derive citizenship. That objective intent is met when the child enters the US lawfully and applies for permanent residency before his 18th birthday.

The full text of the en banc decision in Cheneau v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/13/15-70636.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds that Memory Problems and Cultural Misunderstanding of Date Constitute Exceptional Circumstances

The Ninth Circuit has found that a woman who suffers chronic memory problems, and whose relatives misread the date of her hearing because of their belief that the first number in a numerical date represents the day of the month (and not the month itself), missed her hearing due to exceptional circumstances.

The full text of Hernandez-Galand v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/12/17-70538.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Defers to BIA's Interpretation of CIMT Deportability

The Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Alyazji, which held that the five year period for deportability based on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) starts with the last admission to the US that puts the person physically in the US. Thus, if a person enters on a temporary visa, then adjusts status, and then is convicted of a CIMT, the five years began at the time of admission on the temporary visa.

The full text of Route v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/06/19-72854.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds Asylum Application Abandoned by Failure to Complete Biometrics

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an asylum applicant abandoned her application for asylum by failing to complete the biometrics process. The court faulted the applicant and her counsel for not following up with USCIS when a receipt notice was not timely issued after the submission of the request for biometrics.

The full text of Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/04/19-72090.pdf

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Eighth Circuit Finds TPS is not Admission for LPR Cancellation Purposes

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission in any status for cancellation of removal purposes. The Eighth Circuit recognized that it had determined that TPS is an admission for adjustment of status purposes, but limited that decision to the adjustment context only.

The full text of Artola v. Garland can be found here:

https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/05/191286P.pdf

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