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Seventh Circuit Finds Deported Petitioner's Appeal Moot

The Seventh Circuit has determined that a petitioner’s appeal of his deferral of removal application in withholding-only proceedings was mooted by his removal from the country, since there was no direct challenge to the underlying removal order before the court, but rather, only an appeal of the denial of deferral of removal. “Garcia Marin is inadmissible by virtue of his unchallenged removal order and his criminal record. So even if we were to find an error in the BIA’s decision reversing the immigration judge, the action that Garcia Marin sought to prevent has already taken place, and there are no possible collateral legal consequences.”

The full text if Garcia Marin v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D07-29/C:20-3393:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2910359:S:0

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Sixth Circuit Finds that Ohio Robbery Conviction does not Necessarily Require Intentional Use of Violent Force

The Sixth Circuit has determined that an Ohio robbery statute does not necessarily require the intentional infliction of violence force, and therefore, does not match the definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the court noted that the reckless use of force can still result in injury to a victim.

The full text of US v. Butts can be found here:

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0163p-06.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Finds Conviction for Damage to Government Property is not Crime of Violence

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction under 18 USC 1361 for damaging government property is not a crime of violence. The court found the statute does necessarily require violent force to be used against the property. Noting that the damage had to exceed a specific amount to sustain a conviction, the court concluded that “[t]he amount of damage to property, while defining felonious conduct under Section 1361, does not necessarily correlate with the type of the force employed.'“

The full text of US v. Melaku can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/216122.P.pdf

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Third Circuit Finds that Non-VWP Citizen still Subject to VWP Restrictions due to Attempted Fraudulent VWP Entry

The Third Circuit has determined that an Albanian citizen who attempted to enter the US using a fraudulent Italian passport through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) waived his right to contest his removal through any means other than an asylum application, even though Albania is not a VWP country and even though he was not admitted to the United States for 90 days under the VWP.

The full text of Shkembi v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/212592p.pdf

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USCIS Rescinds Matter of Z-R-Z-C

USCIS has rescinded Matter of Z-R-Z-C, a published decision that stated that TPS holders who travel on advanced parole are not admitted or paroled under section 245(a) of the INA. USCIS has also determined that it will no longer issue advance parole to TPS holders, but will rather issue a new travel document that makes clear the travelers are being admitted to the United States upon return.

The new policy memorandum can be found here:

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/PM-602-0188-RescissionofMatterofZ-R-Z-C-.pdf

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CA Court of Appeals Reverses Denial of Motion to Vacate

The CA Court of Appeal has reversed the denial of a motion to vacate where defense counsel testified that she advised the defendant he would lose his residency status and the defendant signed a plea form advising him that he must expect his conviction would result in deportation, exclusion from admission, and denial of naturalization. The court noted that the defendant sent a letter requesting to withdraw his plea before sentencing, noting his fears that he could be deported. Even though he repeatedly told the judge he wanted to withdraw his plea if he was going to be deported, the judge denied his request.

Four years later, the defendant filed a motion to vacate under Penal Code 1473.7. He indicated that he had difficulty reading the plea because of cataracts, that his whole life was in the United States, and that the last time he was in Mexico, he was assaulted by the police due to his bisexuality. Although the DA agreed to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea and re-plead to a misdemeanor, the judge refused to abide by the agreement.

The court reasoned that defense counsel’s advisals were insufficient. Despite her testimony, her notes indicated that she had advised the client his immigration status would change and he would have an immigration hearing. Nonetheless, the immigration consequences of an aggravated felony (mandatory deportation) were crystal clear at the time of plea. “Counsel did not explain that Manzanilla faced mandatory deportation. Counsel’s advice was deficient for lack of specificity despite clear law establishing that Manzanilla’s removal was virtually certain.” Such advice is constitutionally deficient.

The court noted that the plea form, which described the immigration consequences in mandatory terms, did not cure this inadequate advisal. Even with the word “will,” the plea form is simply a generic advisement, not designed to substitute for accurate advice from counsel. The court noted that there was evidence other than the defendant’s testimony regarding counsel’s advice - namely, counsel’s notes and testimony.

The court found that defense counsel also failed to creatively plea bargain. “It is undisputed that counsel failed to make a counteroffer of 364 days in custody, which was more likely to be accepted by the prosecution than the more significant sentence reductions she sought of six or nine months.” “Moreover, counsel does not remember raising Manzanilla’s immigration status in plea bargaining, and her notes confirm this. Her notes and memory also confirm that she learned Manzanilla was a legal permanent resident only when they discussed the consequences of the plea, after he stated he would take it, and after her counteroffers. This suggests that counsel failed to bargain creatively with the prosecution in a manner that considered immigration consequences.”

The court further noted that the defendant was not required to affirmatively show the prosecution would have accepted 364 days. “Here, there is an indication the prosecution would reasonably accept a plea of 364 days because the prosecution’s opening offer was 365 days. The People offer no explanation as to why the prosecution would have not found a one-day reduction reasonable.”

The court determined that there was evidence the defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea. For example, he told his defense counsel it was “ok” if he was required to attend an immigration court hearing, so long as the hearing was in the United States. This statement shows that he did not understand the nature of an immigration process, which is designed to establish a non-citizen’s deportability. “If Manzanilla knew he was subject to mandatory deportation to Mexico, then his concern about the location of his immigration hearing seems irrelevant.”

The court also noted the swiftness with which the defendant brought his concerns about immigration to the attention of the criminal court. “He did not wait months or years to claim he did not realize he would be deported. He did not wait to claim he did not understand the consequences only after efforts to avoid deportation proceedings had failed. He was not making a desperate allegation to avoid the consequences of an immigration proceeding that had gone unexpectedly bad. Manzanilla advised the court at the first court hearing after entry of the plea, 21 days later, with no deportation proceeding underway, that he had not understood that deportation was a certainty.”

The full text of People v. Manzanilla can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0722//B313557

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Eleventh Circuit Finds that VA Drug Distribution Statute is CIMT

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction related to distribution of controlled substances is a crime involving moral turpitude. The court acknowledged that not all substances criminalized by Virginia appear in the federal statutes, but relied on the state’s determination that the substance should be criminalized as proof that distribution of the substance is base or vile. Notably, for the purpose of the appeal, the court assumed that the statute is not divisible with respect to the identity of the substance.

The full text of Daye v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014340.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds 212(a)(9)(C) bar to be retroactive

In a shockingly awful decision that breaks with all past interpretation, the Ninth Circuit has determined that section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) - the “permanent bar” related to reentry without inspection after removal - is retroactive to entries before April 1, 1997. The decision disregards past Ninth Circuit caselaw, as well as agency memorandum, which both determined that this statute only applies beginning on April 1, 1997. The court also seems to conflate the "permanent bar” with the reinstatement statute. It also finds that the question of whether someone is subject to a reinstated removal order is a question of fact, unreviewable by a federal appeals court. In sum, the decision is full of bad legal reasoning and bad legal conclusions. The only tiny ray of hope is that the Court seems to acknowledge that ICE is prohibited from reinstating a removal order before USCIS completes adjudication of a pending adjustment application.

The full text of Rivera Vega v. Garland can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/08/19-71750.pdf

An order vacating this opinion (hooray!) can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/31/19-71750.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds Incomplete NTA Presents Claim Processing Rule

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has again determined that a Notice to Appear lacking information about the first removal hearing does not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction. However, the court also recognized that the failure to meet the regulatory requirement to include this information in the regulations is a claim processing rule violation. “The only sensible way to read 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), then, is as a docketing rule whose function extends no further than providing for the orderly administration of proceedings, including deportation proceedings, before the immigration judges.”

Notably, the court did not discuss when an objection to a violation of a claim processing rule would be timely, or what the proper remedy for such a violation would be.

The full text of US v. Bastide-Hernandez can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/11/19-30006.pdf

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Fifth Circuit Refuses to Reopen Proceedings for Petitioner who Failed to Provide an Address

The Fifth Circuit has again refused to reopen proceedings for a petitioner who failed to give a proper address, even though the Notice to Appear was missing information about the first hearing. “And this court has held that an alien has not provided a “viable mailing address” when he fails to provide any address, neglects to update an old address, or fails to correct an erroneous address.”

The full text of Gudiel-Villatoro v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-61050-CV0.pdf

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BIA Addresses Use of Impeachment Evidence

The Board of Immigration Appeals has approved of the use of impeachment evidence in a removal proceeding, finding “an Immigration Judge may rely on impeachment evidence as part of a credibility determination where the evidence is probative and its admission is not fundamentally unfair, and the witness is given an opportunity to respond to that evidence during the proceedings.”

The full text of Matter of E-F-N- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1516746/download

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Ninth Circuit Casts Doubt on Judicial Administrative Closure as a Form of Prosecutorial Discretion

A panel of the Ninth Circuit has refused to approve a joint motion to administratively close an appeal on its docket for petitioners that the Department of Homeland Security has deemed to not be an enforcement priority. In so doing, the Court placed the burden on the government to exercise its prosecutorial discretion to remand a case to the agency, and seek dismissal or administrative closure at that level.

“The burden is on the Government to use one of the many tools it has for not enforcing immigration law in a particular case if that is its policy preference. Shelving a case indefinitely on our docket to avoid having a final decision rendered in a case properly presented to us is not one of those tools. Indeed, this case demonstrates the absurdity of what the parties are asking. Sarkar filed his petition in August 2017. A stay of removal was entered a few months later, and the case has been fully briefed since August 2018. Given our significant backlog of immigration cases, this case was not moved toward resolution until over three years later in October 2021 when we asked the parties whether they still wanted to proceed to decision or whether they anticipated an alternative resolution. Both parties responded that they wanted to proceed. The court then scheduled the case for oral argument and we began our preparations only to have the parties request a few weeks later that the case be administratively stayed because it is not an enforcement priority. This is not a good use of judicial resources. The executive branch should sort out its enforcement priorities, about which we express no opinion, without burdening the already-strapped judiciary.”

The full text of Sakar v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/01/17-72212.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Emphasizes CAT Standard is an Aggregate Calculation

The Ninth Circuit has again emphasized that the agency must calculate the likelihood of future torture for Convention Against Torture purposes in the aggregate. As such, when a petitioner posits multiple potential sources of torture, “the relevant inquiry is whether the total probability that the applicant will be tortured—considering all potential sources of and reasons for torture—exceeds 50 percent.”

“The BIA considered his two separate theories of torture as a single hypothetical chain of events and denied his CAT claim because the probability of that hypothetical chain occurring was not high enough. But the BIA should not have considered his claim as a single hypothetical chain of events, when—as the BIA itself acknowledged—he posited two ‘alternative’ and distinct theories for why he would be tortured if he were removed to El Salvador. By requiring Velasquez-Samayoa to show that every step in two hypothetical chains was more likely than not to occur, the BIA increased his CAT burden. Velasquez-Samayoa was not required to show that he was more likely than not to be tortured under both theories, nor was he required to show that he was more likely than not to be tortured under any single theory considered individually. The law requires him to show only that taking into account all possible sources of torture, he is more likely than not to be tortured. Thus, the BIA should have assessed whether aggregating the risks posed by Velasquez-Samayoa’s two theories results in a probability greater than 50 percent that he will be tortured.”

The Court also found error in the agency’s treatment of expert testimony. “The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Dr. Boerman was a credible witness. Yet the BIA proceeded to reject key pieces of Dr. Boerman’s testimony regarding why Velasquez Samayoa faced a high risk of torture, agreeing with the IJ that the country conditions evidence did not corroborate the expert’s testimony that Velasquez-Samayoa will be perceived as a gang leader based on his age and other characteristics. The mere fact that Dr. Boerman’s testimony is not corroborated by country conditions evidence is not a valid reason for rejecting that testimony— expert testimony can itself provide evidence of country conditions.”

The full text of Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/24/21-70093.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/23/21-70093.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Remands to Determine Citizenship of Ethnic Eritrean Born in Addis Ababa

The Seventh Circuit has remanded a motion to reopen for the agency to address whether an ethnic Eritrean born in Addis Ababa before the founding of Eritrea is properly considered to be an Eritrean citizen. The Court noted that the petitioner’s citizenship was relevant to the likelihood that he would be tortured if deported to Ethiopia.

The full text of Menghistab v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D06-21/C:21-2099:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2892707:S:0

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Fifth Circuit Finds that Motion to Reopen Based on Changed Country Conditions is Number Barred

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions - although an exception to the 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen - is subject the numerical limitations on motions to reopen. Although the Court recognized that a regulation exempts changed country conditions motions to reopen from the numerical bar, they found the regulation to exceed the terms of the statute, and thus, be invalid. The Court further suggested that only VAWA-based motions to reopen can be exempted from the numerical limitation.

The full text of Djie v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-60448-CV0.pdf

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Fourth Circuit has Determined that PFR Can be Filed in Circuit Where IJ Sits Regardless of Where Noncitizen is Detained

The Fourth Circuit has determined that venue is proper in that circuit for a petition for review of a removal order when the presiding Immigration Judge was sitting at an adjudications center in Virginia, even though the non-citizen was detained in Louisiana, and the immigration court with administrative control was in Minnesota.

The full text of Herrera-Alcala v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201770.P.pdf

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