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Fifth Circuit Finds that TX Conviction for Online Solicitation of a Minor is Crime of Child Abuse

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Texas conviction for online solicitation of a minor is a crime of child abuse because it requires the knowing solicitation of a minor with the intention that the minor engage in a sex act. The court did not directly address the petitioner’s argument that the statute is overbroad because it defines a minor to include a person the defendant believes is under age 17.

The full text of Adeeko v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-60703-CV0.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Directs BIA to Consider Child's Age in Persecution Analysis

The Fourth Circuit, in an en banc decision, has determined that the agency must consider a child’s age when determining whether harm he suffered rose to the level of persecution. The court also acknowledged that an issue may be exhausted by virtue of the agency addressing it in its decision, even if not raised in detail in the briefing before the agency. Notably, the court also determined that the issue of government protection was raised in the Notice of Appeal to the Board, and did not have to find exhaustion based solely on the Board’s analysis of the issue.

The full text of Portillo Flores v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/191591A.P.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Finds that IJs have a Duty to Develop the Record

The Fourth Circuit has determined that Immigration Judges have a duty to develop the record in all cases, and that duty is especially important when the applicant is unrepresented. “[I]n pro se cases, immigration judges’ duty to develop the record includes adequately explaining the hearing procedures and the relevant legal requirements in plain language. In particular, immigration judges must provide respondents with sufficient guidance as to how they may prove the elements of their claims—i.e., what evidence will demonstrate their eligibility for relief from deportation and in what form that evidence could be presented.” “[W]hat the aforesaid duty requires of an immigration judge inevitably depends on the particulars of each case—the respondent’s characteristics, such as age, education level, detention status, and immigration history; the applicable ground(s) of removability; and the form(s) of relief sought.”

The court further determined that the Board’s decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, which requires asylum seekers to provide an exact delineation of proposed particular social group to the Immigration Judge at the penalty of forfeiting appellate review of any of social groups, should be applied to pro se applicants. “Requiring pro se asylum seekers to clearly indicate the exact delineation of their potential particular social groups would be completely inconsistent with immigration judges’ robust duty to help such applicants articulate a legally cognizable group.”

Finally, the court held that “that an immigration judge’s failure to satisfy his or her duty to fully develop the record is presumptively prejudicial, unless the error is plainly irrelevant to, or otherwise does not hinder in any way, the reviewing court’s ability to assess whether prejudice occurred.”

The full text of Arevalo Quintero v. Garland can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/191904.P.pdf

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Third Circuit Clarifies Standards for Changed Country Conditions MTRs

The Third Circuit has clarified the standards for reopening a removal proceeding based on changed country conditions, noting that there is both a materiality standard and a prima facie standard that must be met. “Materiality requires that applicant’s evidence address the deficiencies of her application, while the prima facie standard requires that the evidence be sufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements have been met. When an IJ denies relief upon finding that an applicant has failed to meet a particular element of the claim, the applicant moving to reopen must present evidence directly addressing the element the IJ found deficient. The applicant’s evidence, taken as a whole, is not material if it merely strengthens the other elements of her claim without addressing the element the IJ found deficient. But if the applicant presents new evidence that addresses the IJ’s findings and was previously unavailable, she clears the procedural hurdle. Then, if the new, material evidence of changed country conditions can show a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements [for relief] have been satisfied, she clears the substantive hurdle.”

The full text of Darby v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202107p.pdf

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Second Circuit Certifies NY Theft Case to State High Court

The Second Circuit has certified to the New York State Court of Appeals the question of whether an intent to “appropriate” property under New York Penal Law § 155.00(4)(b) requires an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded. The Court determined that an answer from the state high court was necessary to determine if New York convictions for petit larceny constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/18/doc/19-4111_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/18/hilite/

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Second Circuit Rejects BIA Definition of Conviction

The Second Circuit has determined the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of JM Acosta - which addresses the finality of a conviction on direct appeal - is not entitled to deference. The Court agreed that the definition of conviction in the INA is ambiguous with respect to whether it applies to convictions on appeal. However, it disagreed with the burden-shifting framework laid out in JM Acosta.

“We need not here decide whether some limits on the finality requirement may appropriately be read into the IIRIRA, because we conclude that the specific burden-shifting regime and evidentiary standard demanded by the BIA to show a merits-based appeal is not reasonable. Specifically, the BIA requires a non-citizen to make a merits-based showing at the notice stage, often before he is able to review the record or identify his arguments on appeal. The BIA points to nothing in the statutory text or legislative history indicating that this requirement reflects Congressional intent. Moreover, the requirement ignores the realities of appellate practice.”

The full text of Braithwaite v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/1/doc/20-27_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/eb96ed83-0767-49a4-9c47-cceb74705746/1/hilite/

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Third Circuit finds that NJ 2nd Deg Robbery Conviction is Theft Aggravated Felony

The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for second-degree robbery is a theft-related aggravated felony because the statute always requires that property be obtained without the owner’s voluntary and intelligent assent. Notably, the court includes various of forms of theft-by-deception in this definition of crimes committed without voluntary and intelligent assent.

The full text of K.A. v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173640p.pdf

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Third Circuit Finds that Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge Need Not Contact Time and Date of First Hearing

The Third Circuit has determined that a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge that does not contain the time and date of the first removal hearing is not jurisdictionally defective because the regulations do not require that such information be in the Notice.

The full text of Mejia Romero v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/193705p.pdf

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Third Circuit Clarifies Government Inability to Protect Standard

The Third Circuit has determined that the “government-unable-or-unwilling-to-control” test and the “condone-or-complete-helplessness” test are legal equivalents. “Both tests have an overriding commonality: they recognize that to constitute persecution, the government must be complicit to some degree in the harmful conduct of nongovernmental actors through either act or omission.”

“From that perspective, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test is a shorthand of sorts. It depends on more than merely the government’s inability or unwillingness to control a violent group in the abstract. Rather, that inability or unwillingness to control a violent group becomes relevant only in the context of a specific individual, the applicant. And a government’s inability or unwillingness to control a violent group as a general matter does not necessarily mean that the government cannot or will not protect the specific applicant. Accordingly, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test evaluates the government’s ability and willingness to control private actors not at a general level, but rather with respect to the specific applicant seeking relief. The condone-or-complete-helplessness test similarly focuses on the applicant, only more explicitly. The ‘complete helplessness’ component assesses the government’s ability to protect a particular applicant from private harmful conduct. And the ‘condone’ component examines whether the government condoned private harm to that applicant.” “Calibrating for context, however, harmonizes the two standards: when the government is unable to control private actors with respect to a specific potential victim, it demonstrates a complete helplessness to protect that victim from those actors.”

The full text of Galeas Figueroa v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/191419p.pdf

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CA Supreme Court Weights in on 1473.7 Standards

The California Supreme Court has determined that denials of motions to vacate under Penal Code section 1473.7 should be reviewed by appellate courts under an independent review standard. ‘“Under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ‘independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review .’ An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” “In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts should similarly give particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses. Where, as here, the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical matter, ‘the trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.”

The court also clarified the prejudice requirement for a motion to vacate. “So: showing prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences. When courts assess whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they consider the totality of the circumstances. Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” The court noted that a defendant’s ties to the United States and counsel’s notes or recollections of the case all “constitute contemporaneous objective facts that corroborate [the defendant’s] concern about the immigration consequences of his plea options.”

Finally, the court noted that a plea form that advises a defendant that certain immigration consequences may result from a plea does not mitigate the lack of proper advice from counsel on these consequences.

The full text of People v. Vivar can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0521//S260270

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Supreme Court Construes Stop-Time Rule (Again!)

The Supreme Court has determined that the time and place of a removal hearing must be included in a Notice to Appear - and not a subsequent notice of hearing - to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. In so doing, the court overturns any circuit precedent permitting a so-called “two-step stop-time rule.”

The full text of Niz-Chavez v. Garland can be found here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-863_new_5426.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit Upholds Denial of Adjustment to Asylee who Provided Material Support to Terrorism

The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the denial of adjustment of status to a Bangladeshi asylee who was a member of the BNP on the grounds that the BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization, and that the terrorism issue was not sufficiently litigated in his removal proceeding to preclude the consideration of it at the time of his application for adjustment.

The full text of Islam v. DHS can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913287.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Disallows Nunc Pro Tunc Custody Order for Derivative Citizenship

The Ninth Circuit has held that a nunc pro tunc custody order - entered after the child’s 18th birthday and purporting to retroactively modify a joint custody order to award sole legal custody of the child to a U.S.-citizen parent - is not effective for deriving citizenship under a prior derivative citizenship statute. “2013 state court order was a proper nunc pro tunc order. We hold that Congress did not intend for this type of nunc pro tunc order, one untethered from the facts as they were during Carino’s childhood, to give rise to automatic derivative citizenship under section 1432(a).” “We hold that where it has not been proven that a custody order was entered in error, was contrary to law, or otherwise did not reflect the true legal relationship between a petitioner’s parents, a nunc pro tunc order cannot retroactively establish a naturalized parent’s sole legal custody for the purposes of section 1432(a). “

The full text of Padilla Carino v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/18/18-72985.pdf

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