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Ninth Circuit Addresses Impact of Pretrial Detention on Good Moral Character

The Ninth Circuit has determined that pretrial detention not credited toward a sentence is not “confinement, as a result of conviction” under § 1101(f)(7). In this case, the petitioner was sentenced to a term of 4 months of incarceration, with credit given for 183 days of pretrial confinement. The court determined that the excess days of pretrial confinement (i.e., those beyond the 4 month mark) are not confinement as a result of conviction.

The full text of Troncoso-Oviedo v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/21-70547.pdf

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Fifth Circuit Finds No Jurisdiction to Review Hardship Determination

The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Patel v. Garland forecloses any argument that a federal court has jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that a petitioner did not prove the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal.

The full text of Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-60492-CV0.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Reaffirms that Death Threats are Persecution

The Fourth Circuit has reaffirmed that death threats are a form of persecution, if even the threat doesn’t come to fruition.

“Today, we similarly refuse to discount a credible death threat, as the IJ and the BIA did here, because it ‘never came to fruition.’ To do so would not only defy our precedent but would also create an untenable standard for asylum seekers. We similarly reject the government’s argument that death threats alone, ‘unaccompanied by severe physical abuse or torture, do not constitute persecution.’ The seriousness of the threat Sorto-Guzman received is corroborated by the repeated harassment, violence, and death threats she repeatedly suffered at the hands of the same Mara 18 members.” “But even if these threats were not made because of Sorto-Guzman’s religion, they nonetheless bear on the seriousness of the initial threat, the one everyone agrees was made because of Sorto-Guzman’s attending a church and wearing a crucifix. Sorto-Guzman took the December 2015 threat so seriously that she stopped attending Catholic services or wearing her crucifix necklace. It makes good, common sense that any subsequent threats from the same persons, regardless of why they were made, would make Sorto-Guzman permanently afraid to express her religious beliefs.”

The full text of Sorto-Guzman v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201762.P.pdf

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BIA Finds that Federal Conviction for Unlawfully Selling or Disposing of Firearm or Ammunition is not Firearms Offense

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a federal conviction for unlawfully selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm or ammunition is not a deportable firearms offense. The BIA found the statute overbroad both because it involves offenses involving ammunition, and not firearms, and because disposing of a firearm does not require a transfer of money. The BIA further concluded that the statute is indivisible, and therefore, a conviction under the statute will never trigger firearms-related deportability.

The full text of Matter of Ortega-Quezada can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1522551/download

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Eleventh Circuit Finds Defective NTA Does not Impact Proper Notice if Hearing is Rescheduled

The Eleventh Circuit has held that a putative NTA (missing the date and time of an initial removal hearing) does not preclude an in absentia order if the hearing was rescheduled, and a notice of the rescheduled hearing was sent to the last known address. In this case, the petitioner did not receive that hearing notice because he moved without notifying the court. The court recognized that its interpretation created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit.

The full text of Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202013576.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Forecloses Sua Sponte Reopening of Reinstated Removal Order

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the agency lacks any sua sponte authority to reopen a reinstated removal order, even if a petitioner is alleging a gross miscarriage of justice.

The full text of Bravo-Bravo v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/18/20-71042.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/12/02/20-71042.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds No Exception to One-Year Filing Deadline for Asylum

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a petitioner’s argument that “youth, language barrier, ignorance of the legal requirement to file [the asylum] application within a year, and stress from fleeing [the applicant’s] home country, constitute a ‘form of incapacity or legal disability.’”

The full text of Martinez Alquijay v. Garland can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/27/20-70470.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Finds Deported Petitioner's Appeal Moot

The Seventh Circuit has determined that a petitioner’s appeal of his deferral of removal application in withholding-only proceedings was mooted by his removal from the country, since there was no direct challenge to the underlying removal order before the court, but rather, only an appeal of the denial of deferral of removal. “Garcia Marin is inadmissible by virtue of his unchallenged removal order and his criminal record. So even if we were to find an error in the BIA’s decision reversing the immigration judge, the action that Garcia Marin sought to prevent has already taken place, and there are no possible collateral legal consequences.”

The full text if Garcia Marin v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D07-29/C:20-3393:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2910359:S:0

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Sixth Circuit Finds that Ohio Robbery Conviction does not Necessarily Require Intentional Use of Violent Force

The Sixth Circuit has determined that an Ohio robbery statute does not necessarily require the intentional infliction of violence force, and therefore, does not match the definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the court noted that the reckless use of force can still result in injury to a victim.

The full text of US v. Butts can be found here:

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0163p-06.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Finds Conviction for Damage to Government Property is not Crime of Violence

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction under 18 USC 1361 for damaging government property is not a crime of violence. The court found the statute does necessarily require violent force to be used against the property. Noting that the damage had to exceed a specific amount to sustain a conviction, the court concluded that “[t]he amount of damage to property, while defining felonious conduct under Section 1361, does not necessarily correlate with the type of the force employed.'“

The full text of US v. Melaku can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/216122.P.pdf

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Third Circuit Finds that Non-VWP Citizen still Subject to VWP Restrictions due to Attempted Fraudulent VWP Entry

The Third Circuit has determined that an Albanian citizen who attempted to enter the US using a fraudulent Italian passport through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) waived his right to contest his removal through any means other than an asylum application, even though Albania is not a VWP country and even though he was not admitted to the United States for 90 days under the VWP.

The full text of Shkembi v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/212592p.pdf

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USCIS Rescinds Matter of Z-R-Z-C

USCIS has rescinded Matter of Z-R-Z-C, a published decision that stated that TPS holders who travel on advanced parole are not admitted or paroled under section 245(a) of the INA. USCIS has also determined that it will no longer issue advance parole to TPS holders, but will rather issue a new travel document that makes clear the travelers are being admitted to the United States upon return.

The new policy memorandum can be found here:

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/PM-602-0188-RescissionofMatterofZ-R-Z-C-.pdf

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CA Court of Appeals Reverses Denial of Motion to Vacate

The CA Court of Appeal has reversed the denial of a motion to vacate where defense counsel testified that she advised the defendant he would lose his residency status and the defendant signed a plea form advising him that he must expect his conviction would result in deportation, exclusion from admission, and denial of naturalization. The court noted that the defendant sent a letter requesting to withdraw his plea before sentencing, noting his fears that he could be deported. Even though he repeatedly told the judge he wanted to withdraw his plea if he was going to be deported, the judge denied his request.

Four years later, the defendant filed a motion to vacate under Penal Code 1473.7. He indicated that he had difficulty reading the plea because of cataracts, that his whole life was in the United States, and that the last time he was in Mexico, he was assaulted by the police due to his bisexuality. Although the DA agreed to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea and re-plead to a misdemeanor, the judge refused to abide by the agreement.

The court reasoned that defense counsel’s advisals were insufficient. Despite her testimony, her notes indicated that she had advised the client his immigration status would change and he would have an immigration hearing. Nonetheless, the immigration consequences of an aggravated felony (mandatory deportation) were crystal clear at the time of plea. “Counsel did not explain that Manzanilla faced mandatory deportation. Counsel’s advice was deficient for lack of specificity despite clear law establishing that Manzanilla’s removal was virtually certain.” Such advice is constitutionally deficient.

The court noted that the plea form, which described the immigration consequences in mandatory terms, did not cure this inadequate advisal. Even with the word “will,” the plea form is simply a generic advisement, not designed to substitute for accurate advice from counsel. The court noted that there was evidence other than the defendant’s testimony regarding counsel’s advice - namely, counsel’s notes and testimony.

The court found that defense counsel also failed to creatively plea bargain. “It is undisputed that counsel failed to make a counteroffer of 364 days in custody, which was more likely to be accepted by the prosecution than the more significant sentence reductions she sought of six or nine months.” “Moreover, counsel does not remember raising Manzanilla’s immigration status in plea bargaining, and her notes confirm this. Her notes and memory also confirm that she learned Manzanilla was a legal permanent resident only when they discussed the consequences of the plea, after he stated he would take it, and after her counteroffers. This suggests that counsel failed to bargain creatively with the prosecution in a manner that considered immigration consequences.”

The court further noted that the defendant was not required to affirmatively show the prosecution would have accepted 364 days. “Here, there is an indication the prosecution would reasonably accept a plea of 364 days because the prosecution’s opening offer was 365 days. The People offer no explanation as to why the prosecution would have not found a one-day reduction reasonable.”

The court determined that there was evidence the defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea. For example, he told his defense counsel it was “ok” if he was required to attend an immigration court hearing, so long as the hearing was in the United States. This statement shows that he did not understand the nature of an immigration process, which is designed to establish a non-citizen’s deportability. “If Manzanilla knew he was subject to mandatory deportation to Mexico, then his concern about the location of his immigration hearing seems irrelevant.”

The court also noted the swiftness with which the defendant brought his concerns about immigration to the attention of the criminal court. “He did not wait months or years to claim he did not realize he would be deported. He did not wait to claim he did not understand the consequences only after efforts to avoid deportation proceedings had failed. He was not making a desperate allegation to avoid the consequences of an immigration proceeding that had gone unexpectedly bad. Manzanilla advised the court at the first court hearing after entry of the plea, 21 days later, with no deportation proceeding underway, that he had not understood that deportation was a certainty.”

The full text of People v. Manzanilla can be found here:

http://sos.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0722//B313557

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USCIS Extends TPS for Venezuelans

US Citizenship and Immigration Services has announced an extension of Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans, effective until March 10, 2024.

The announcement can be found here:

https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-announces-extension-of-temporary-protected-status-for-venezuela

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Eleventh Circuit Finds that VA Drug Distribution Statute is CIMT

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction related to distribution of controlled substances is a crime involving moral turpitude. The court acknowledged that not all substances criminalized by Virginia appear in the federal statutes, but relied on the state’s determination that the substance should be criminalized as proof that distribution of the substance is base or vile. Notably, for the purpose of the appeal, the court assumed that the statute is not divisible with respect to the identity of the substance.

The full text of Daye v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014340.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds 212(a)(9)(C) bar to be retroactive

In a shockingly awful decision that breaks with all past interpretation, the Ninth Circuit has determined that section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) - the “permanent bar” related to reentry without inspection after removal - is retroactive to entries before April 1, 1997. The decision disregards past Ninth Circuit caselaw, as well as agency memorandum, which both determined that this statute only applies beginning on April 1, 1997. The court also seems to conflate the "permanent bar” with the reinstatement statute. It also finds that the question of whether someone is subject to a reinstated removal order is a question of fact, unreviewable by a federal appeals court. In sum, the decision is full of bad legal reasoning and bad legal conclusions. The only tiny ray of hope is that the Court seems to acknowledge that ICE is prohibited from reinstating a removal order before USCIS completes adjudication of a pending adjustment application.

The full text of Rivera Vega v. Garland can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/08/19-71750.pdf

An order vacating this opinion (hooray!) can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/31/19-71750.pdf

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