These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
The Third Circuit has determined that the 30-day deadline to file a petition for review of a final removal order is a claims processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. The court also determined that a reinstatement order is not administratively final until a final agency decision is issued on the applicant’s withholding of removal and CAT applications.
The full text of Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Supreme Court has determined that an Immigration Judge may order removed in absentia a non-citizen who received a Notice to Appear lacking the time and date of his first hearing, if the Immigration Court subsequently mailed a notice of hearing to the individual with that information.
The full text of Campos-Chaves v. Garland can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has reaffirmed that it lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that an asylum application is untimely and does not qualify for an exception to the one-year filing deadline. The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Guerero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson did not mandate a contrary conclusion.
The full text of APA v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202110496.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has determined that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the delay in adjudication of provisional waivers of unlawful presence (Form I-601A) under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court cited the prohibition in 8 USC 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) on federal court review of any action regarding waivers of unlawful presence.
The full text of Soni v. Jaddou can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has stated that choice of law is dependent upon venue in Immigration Court proceedings, and therefore, the controlling circuit law is not affected by a change in the administrative control court and will only change upon the granting of a motion to change venue.
The full text of Matter of M-N-I can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction under the 2008 version of the state’s lewd lascivious battery statute is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. “The least culpable conduct under § 800.04(4) is consensual sexual activity between adolescents who are 12 to 15 years old, with no minimum age required for the perpetrator. The statute therefore sweeps more broadly than the generic federal definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ which in the statutory rape context before us requires an age difference of at least one year between the perpetrator and the victim.”
The full text of Leger v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210971.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has reiterated the requirement that official documents be authenticated in removal proceedings. It suggested that the procedures for authentication of domestic records in 8 C.F.R. 287.6 may be mandatory, but did not ultimately conclude what procedures are required because the petitioner failed to object to the documents on authenticity grounds before the immigration judge.
The full text of Smith v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/03/22-954.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for possession or purchase of a visual depiction that shows a person under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or the simulation of a prohibited sexual act is not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The Court observed that federal law requires “the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in” the sexually explicit conduct, while Iowa Code § 728.12(3) does not. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the petitioner’s argument that the conviction is also not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require that the defendant know the person in the image is underage.
The full text of Huynh v. Garland can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for distribution a controlled substance near a school is not an aggravated felony. The Court noted that the New Jersey statute criminalizes dispensing a controlled substance near a school, while the federal school zone prohibition does not. In addition, New Jersey criminalizes conduct on school buses, while the federal statute only criminalizes conduct within 1000 feet of a school’s real property. Third, the general federal distribution statute exempts distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, while the New Jersey statute does not. The Court determined the statute was not divisible, and as such, was not an aggravated felony.
The full text of Stankiewicz v. Garland can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a petitioner seeking approval of a Form I-130 for an adopted child from a country that is a party to the Hague Convention must submit (1) a written statement from the Central Authority of the child’s country of origin stating that it is aware of the child’s presence in the United States and of the adoption, and that it has determined that the child is not habitually resident in the country of origin; (2) an adoption order or amended adoption order incorporating the language of the statement from the Central Authority; or (3) proof that the Central Authority of the child’s country of origin did not respond to the request for a habitual residence statement, that the Central Authority responded that it would not write a habitual residence statement, or that the United States Department of State has confirmed that the Central Authority does not issue habitual residence statements.
The full text of Matter of Furtado can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the statutory bar to reopening or reconsidering a reinstated removal is non-jurisdictional, and therefore, the Board of Immigration Appeals may exercise its jurisdiction to reopen a reinstated removal order.
The full text of Suate-Orellana v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/05/07/19-72446.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction in the District of Columbia for attempted second degree child sexual abuse is a crime of child abuse. The Court declined to find that a conviction must include as an element knowledge of the victim’s age in order to qualify as a crime of child abuse.
The full text of Marquez Cruz v. Garland can be found here:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services extends and redesignates Ethiopia for Temporary Protected Status, allowing Ethiopians who have resided in the United States since April 11, 2024 to apply.
The announcement can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee misdemeanor domestic assault is not a crime of violence because it includes inflict of mental harm.
The full text of Sanchez-Perez v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0098p-06.pdf
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a holistic analysis - rather than a statistics-based one - for determining whether a non-citizen faces a clear probability of torture.
The full text of Saleh v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0102p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the aggregate risk analysis in Convention Against Torture cases, requiring that adjudicators consider if the risk of torture from all possible sources exceeds fifty percent.
The full text of Abdulahad v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0082p-06.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that federal courts lack jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review the denial of an asylee adjustment of status application under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
The full text of Shaiban v. Jaddou can be found here:
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under the pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard because New Jersey’s definition of theft does not include an intent to permanently deprive others of their property. The Court further concluded that the force required to commit robbery is only that which is necessary to wrest the object from the victim, and does not require the infliction of any type of bodily harm.
The full text of Diaz Almanzar v. Attorney General can be found here:
Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas announced the extension and redesignation of Burma for Temporary Protected Status for 18 months, from May 26, 2024, to November 25, 2025, due to extraordinary and temporary conditions in Burma that prevent individuals from safely returning. The extension of TPS for Burma allows approximately 2,300 current beneficiaries to retain TPS through November 25, 2025, if they continue to meet TPS eligibility requirements. The redesignation of Burma for TPS allows an estimated 7,300 additional nationals of Burma (or individuals having no nationality who last habitually resided in Burma) to file initial applications to obtain TPS, if they are otherwise eligible and if they established residence in the United States on or before March 21, 2024, and have continued to reside in the United States since then.
The full text of the announcement can be found here:
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/03/22/secretary-mayorkas-announces-extension-and-redesignation-burma-myanmar-temporary
The California Court of Appeals, Fifth District, has confirmed that Penal Code section 1473.7 permits vacatur of jury verdicts and probation violations.
“First, to align the state statute with federal immigration law, we interpret the word ‘sentence’ used in section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to encompass the entire ‘term of imprisonment,’ as that phrase is used in the INA. Thus, a section 1473.7 motion may be based on the defendant’s failure to meaningfully misunderstand or defend against the ‘actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of’ the additional incarceration imposed for a probation violation.
Second, we address how a defendant may establish his or her error was ‘prejudicial’ for purposes of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) when adverse immigration consequences are caused by the admission of a probation violation and the incarceration imposed for that violation. In that context, prejudice may be established by demonstrating that, had the defendant been aware of the immigration consequences, (1) there is a reasonable probability he or she would not have admitted the probation violation or (2) there is a reasonable probability that an immigration-neutral punishment would have been available and obtained by the defendant. For example, a defendant might be able to ‘defend against’ the additional incarceration imposed for a probation violation and obtain an immigration-neutral punishment by waiving time credits from his earlier incarceration.
Third, on the question of the relief available under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), we interpret the statute as authorizing an order vacating (1) the initial conviction, (2) the sentence imposed for the initial conviction, (3) a subsequent admission of a probation violation, (4) the additional incarceration imposed for a probation violation, or (5) some combination of the foregoing. As explained below, a motion could challenge the admission of the probation violation, the additional incarceration imposed for the violation, or both.”
The court also provided a comprehensive list of details helpful to include in a declaration by the moving party. “Personal details addressed in a robust declaration include, without limitation, (1) the movant’s age upon arrival in the United States; (2) the identity of the persons with whom the movant came to the United States; (3) the persons with whom the movant lived upon arrival; (4) the movant’s immigration status and language abilities; (5) where the movant’s grandparents, parents, siblings, and other relatives live and their immigration status; (6) the movant’s marital status and, details about any spouse; (7) the ages and citizenship of any children and grandchildren; (8) the schools, if any, the movant attended in the United States; (9) the movant’s employment history; (10) the movant’s history of paying state and federal income taxes and property taxes; (11) persons for whom the movant acts as the primary care giver; (12) real property owned by the movant or the movant’s parents; (13) connections or lack of connections to the movant’s country of origin; (14) community involvement; (15) the movant’s or family members’ military service; and (16) the movant’s pre-plea and post-plea experience with the criminal justice system.”
The court also noted the credibility of a statement by defense counsel that he did not recall discussing immigration consequences when the defendant, when the conviction occurred well before the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. Other factors that corroborated the defendant’s assertion that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction were his young age at the time of trial (19), the complexity of immigration law, no 1016.5 advisement provided by the court, and his lack of prior criminal history.
The court also explored how to prove prejudice in an initial sentence when a subsequent probation violation actually caused the immigration consequences of the offense. “The idea of prejudice underlying this argument is that if the jail time imposed in 2002 had been less than 275 days, then his subsequent incarceration of 90 days for the probation violation would not have transformed Carrillo’s conviction into an aggravated felony because the total “term of imprisonment” would have been less than one year. We conclude this theory, if supported by sufficient evidence, is one way of establishing a misunderstanding of immigration consequences was prejudicial for purposes of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). In particular, Carrillo’s misunderstanding would have affected his ability to ‘defend against’ the adverse immigration consequences of the ‘sentence,’ as those terms are used in section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).”
Finally, the court noted that the fact that a conviction may have other immigration consequences (i.e., it may be a crime involving moral turpitude even if it’s no longer an aggravated felony) does not prevent a defendant from establishing prejudice when the Department of Homeland Security is not citing that alternate ground of deportability in the Notice to Appear.
The full text of People v. Carrillo can be found here:
