These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that “[t]he lack of time and place information on the notice to appear does not render untrue or incorrect a respondent’s admission to the factual allegations or invalidate the charges of removability in the notice to appear and therefore is not a proper basis for granting a respondent’s motion to withdraw pleadings.”
The full text of Matter of Lopez-Ticas can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that “[a] supplemental filing to a motion to reopen that raises claims that are fundamentally different from those raised in the original motion is treated as a separate motion.”
“The Board entered the final administrative order in these proceedings on July 30, 2021, and the respondent timely moved to reopen this decision on October 27, 2021. The respondent filed a ‘supplement’ requesting VAWA relief on February 6, 2023, over 18 months after our final order. The contents of these two filings are wholly unrelated. A motion claiming a respondent suffered battery or extreme cruelty by a spouse is fundamentally different from a motion claiming that spouse has petitioned for the respondent to become a lawful permanent resident or would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the respondent were removed. Accordingly, we find the respondent’s ‘supplemental’ motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal under VAWA is in fact a second motion to reopen that was not timely filed within 1 year of the final administrative order of removal. “
The full text of Matter of D-E-B- can be found here:
The Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia has issued a decision permitting a challenge to the Foreign Affairs Manual’s guidance that a visa can be denied if there is a “reason to believe” the applicant has previously made a material misrepresentation. The court found that this forward facing challenge to the FAM was not a challenge to a visa denial, and thus, was not covered by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. “[W]e are not confident that Congress authorized a consular officer unilaterally to deem a person to have made willful misrepresentations and thereby trigger permanent ineligibility for a visa based only on an implicit ‘reason to believe’ standard – especially considering its decision to make that standard explicit for other categories of noncitizens posing elevated risks to national interests.”
The full text of Pietersen v. Department of State can be found here:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/05/24-5092-2118190.pdf
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has addressed the seemingly conflicting evidentiary standards laid out by USCIS in a 2007 memo - which requires an I-130 petitioner who has been convicted of certain crimes against children to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not a danger to the non-citizen beneficiary - and the decision in Matter of Chawathe, which holds that petitioner must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition should be granted. “In other words, the issue before us is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), in granting USCIS ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ to ‘determine[] that the citizen poses no risk,’ also affords the agency discretion to depart from its own binding regulations or precedents in making this determination. We hold that it does not.”
“While Congress has granted USCIS unreviewable discretion to determine whether a citizen petitioner poses no risk to the Form I-130 beneficiary, USCIS has not provided ‘clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review’ over its decision to exert this discretion in a manner that violates its own binding regulations and published precedents. As the Supreme Court has explained, Congress may shield from judicial review an agency’s ultimate determination without precluding courts from reviewing the ‘practice[s] or procedure[s] employed in making’ such individual determinations.”
“It is possible that Chawathe does not apply in the AWA context and that, in making its preponderance-of-the-evidence standard precedential, the Department did not mean to disturb the beyond-any-reasonable doubt standard that may have already been in place for no-risk determinations under the AWA. But because the District Court did not address this possibility, and because the Government does not make this argument before us, we cannot conclude that the agency has not violated its own binding precedent. Nothing in the Act required the agency to adopt any particular standard. But if there was a standard in place, then the agency was required to follow it.”
The full text of Castaneira v. Noem can be found here: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/05/23-5204-2118185.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a non-citizen ceases to accrue residence in the United States after the filing of a Notice to Appear, even if the Notice to Appear is missing the time and date of the initial removal hearing.
The full text of Hamilton v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202314095.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that it will apply substantial evidence review to the agency’s determination that an applicant has not demonstrated exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative for the purpose of an application for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.
The full text of Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi can be found here:
Https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/05/20/21-927.pdf
The Second Circuit has determined that 8 USC 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review not only of judgments by an immigration court, but also of decisions by USCIS to deny adjustment of status applications.
The full text of Xia v. Bondi can be found here:
The First Circuit has declined to apply the mailbox rule to a detainee whose petition for review was mailed prior to the filing deadline by his spouse, when the petition did not arrive at the clerk’s office until after the deadline had passed.
The full text of Ramos Goncalves v. Bondi can be found here:
www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1511P-01A.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA.
“An ‘applicant for admission; is defined, in relevant part, as an alien ‘who arrives in the United States whether or not at a designated port of arrival.’ An alien, like the respondent, ‘who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission.’” The Board further noted that the only exception to mandatory detention of applicants for admission is parole, which suggests that anyone who meets the definition of an applicant for admission who is not detained is actually paroled in the United States. However, the parole is terminated by the service of a Notice to Appear, which in turn, permits later detention under section 235(b) of the non-citizen.
The full text of Matter of Q. Li is found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an Immigration Judge may consider a State court’s decision as to dangerousness and the amount of bail that was set in criminal proceedings, but that the Immigration Judge does not owe a State court custody order deference in immigration bond proceedings. “The legal standards for bail in State court may be different than in Immigration Court and there may be a variety of reasons why an Immigration Judge may or should reach a different determination than a State court judge. It is for the Immigration Judge to make his or her own determination as to dangerousness under the custody redetermination provisions of the INA and applicable precedent.”
The full text of Matter of Choc-Tut can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has concluded that electronic notification of a briefing schedule sent to the email address of record is sufficient notice in a case eligible for electronic filing, regardless of whether an alien’s attorney or accredited representative opens the email or accesses the document via the ECAS Case Portal. “As with documents served through the mail, a rebuttable presumption of delivery applies when a party has been sent electronic notification of a briefing schedule through the procedures provided for in the ECAS regulations, but this presumption is weaker than the presumption that applies to documents sent by certified mail because electronic service through ECAS does not involve the use of a signed receipt or other affirmative evidence of delivery.“
The full text of Matter of F-B-G-M & J-E-M-G- can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined the acquiescence standard for CAT protection differs from the unable-or-unwilling standard for asylum and withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.
The full text of Matter of M-S-I-I can be found here:
The Tenth Circuit has issued a decision addressing a visa denial to a worship leader, and how the doctrine of consular nonreviewability intersects with the First Amendment rights of American citizens to hire a religious worker. First, the court determined that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s (RFRA) cause of action does not expressly authorize federal court of review of consular officers’ visa decisions. The court then concluded that the consulate has provided a bona fide and legitimate reason for denying the applicant’s visa by citing the fraud and misrepresentation inadmissibility statute. This citation was also supported by evidence in the record that the applicant had received honoraria while in the United States on a tourist visa. Finally, the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged bad faith because did not allege that the officer did not in good faith believe the information that he had.
The full text of Calvary Albuquerque v. Rubio can be found here: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111230435.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Massachusetts conviction for unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal is an attempted theft-related aggravated felony. The court rejected the argument that a conviction could be obtained when a defendant stole property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent. “The [jury] instruction states that the taking of property must be against the victim’s will for a defendant to be convicted of robbery. In other words, a person can’t commit robbery in Massachusetts through fraud or embezzlement.” “We find that the force element of Massachusetts’s unarmed assault statute excludes the possibility that a person may be convicted of that offense for a taking committed with the victim’s consent.”'
The full text of Baptista v. Bondi can be found here:
The First Circuit has remanded a motion to reopen filed by applicants for cancellation of removal. “It is unclear whether the BIA concluded that (1) as a matter of fact, Petitioners failed to corroborate their assertions about the serious educational hardship L.C. would face in Guatemala, or (2) as a matter of law, L.C.'s claimed hardship would not be exceptional and extremely unusual even if it were corroborated.” “If the BIA meant to hold that Petitioners provided insufficient factual corroboration for their claim that L.C. would be deprived of an education in Guatemala, it did not explain its reason for so holding. In particular, the BIA does not appear to have addressed the salient aspects of the country conditions evidence that would seem to support the claimed hardship if considered in light of L.C.'s individual circumstances.”
The full text of Garcia v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1296P-01A.pdf
The First Circuit has remanded an Ecuadorian woman's asylum claim, finding that the agency failed to engage in the appropriate “mixed motives” analysis. “Testimony identifying a non-protected motivation animating an asylum applicant's persecutor is therefore insufficient in and of itself to defeat an asylum claim. That principle applies with particular force when, as here, an asylum applicant was persecuted during childhood, as rarely will an applicant know the exact motivation of her persecutors -- especially when she was victimized as a young child -- and, of course, persecutors may often have more than one motivation."
The full text of Mayancela Guaman v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1295P-01A.pdf
The Third Circuit has upheld the discretionary denial of asylum to an applicant who entered the US using a passport and ESTA in someone else’s name, who had no family members that he could immigrate as asylee derivatives.
The full text of Thankarasa v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Supreme Court has determined that if the 60th day of a voluntary departure period falls on a weekend, the deadline to depart is extended to the next business day.
The full text of Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has reversed a grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture to a Salvadoran former gang member. While acknowledging that perceived gang members are subject to widespread arrest in El Salvador, the Board stated that, “[t]he evidence the Immigration Judge relied upon does not evaluate whether there are characteristics or circumstances that make certain classes of detainees, such as deportees from the United States, any more or less likely to be victims of torture. Further, the applicant has not shown that the majority of current or former gang members detained in El Salvador are likely to suffer harm satisfying the legal definition of torture, such that he would need to show nothing more than gang affiliation and a likelihood of detention to meet his burden of proof.”
The full text of Matter of A-A-R- can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has affirmed the denial of asylum to a former police officer, finding that the majority of the harm he experienced took place while he was a police officer, and thus, was not related to his status as a “former” officer.
“The respondent has not established that the FARC has any desire to punish or overcome his status as a former police officer, or any animus toward former police officers as a group. The respondent’s feared future harm is based on the physical assault and subsequent threat he received by the FARC when he was a then-serving police officer. The Immigration Judge found, and the respondent admitted, that the FARC targeted him because of his involvement in a law enforcement operation that confiscated military materials and cattle held by the rebel group and compromised their criminal enterprise—official actions that a former police officer would no longer be authorized to conduct.”
“Reprisals against former police officers as a class (for example, after a coup or revolution) may give rise to asylum eligibility. However, the respondent here established only that the FARC harmed him in the past and may harm him in the future to punish him because of official acts he took as a then-current police officer. Harm inflicted on account of specific conduct as a then-current police officer is distinct from harm inflicted on account of membership in a group of former police officers.”
“Where a particular social group is defined by ‘former’ status, Immigration Judges must ensure the persecutor’s conduct was based on a desire to overcome or animus toward the respondent’s membership in a group defined specifically by that former status, not retribution for conduct the respondent engaged in while a current member of the group.“
The full text of Matter of O-A-R-G- can be found here:
