Din is a U.S. citizen, married to an Afghani national. Din filed an immigrant petition on her husband's behalf, which was approved. However, when Berashk (Din's husband) went to the U.S. consulate, his request for an immigrant visa was denied on account of the State Department's determination that Berashk had engaged in terrorist activities. The consular officer did not provide any further details as to how that determination had been reached. Din sued in federal court, alleging that the consular official's decision (and failure to adequately explain that decision) impinged on her constitutional right to live with her husband in the United States. The Supreme Court determined, unfortunately for Din, that there is no such constitutional right.
The Court first addressed whether the denial of Berashk’s visa application deprived Din of any life, liberty, or property interests. "Din, of course, could not conceivably claim that the denial of Berashk’s visa application deprived her—or for that matter even Berashk—of life or property; and under the [] historical understanding [of the Fifth Amendment right to due process], a claim that it deprived her of liberty is equally absurd. The Government has not 'taken or imprisoned Din, nor has it 'confine[d]' her, either by 'keeping [her] against h[er] will in a private house, putting h[er] in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining h[er] in the street.' Id. Indeed, not even Berashk has suffered a deprivation of liberty so understood."
Din had specifically alleged that her liberty interest in her marriage, her right of association with her spouse, her liberty interest in being reunited with certain blood relatives, and her liberty interest as a U. S. citizen under the Due Process Clause to be free from arbitrary restrictions on her right to live with her spouse had been violated by the consular official's determination. Turning to the question of whether any of Din's fundamental rights had been violated, the Court acknowledged that "Din does not explicitly argue that the Government has violated this absolute prohibition of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, likely because it is obvious that a law barring aliens engaged in terrorist activities from entering this country is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. She nevertheless insists that, because enforcement of the law affects her enjoyment of an implied fundamental liberty, the Government must first provide her a full battery of procedural due-process protections."
The Court determined that nothing in its jurisprudent "establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest in marriage (or any other formulation Din offers) sufficient to trigger constitutional protection whenever a regulation in any way touches upon an aspect of the marital relationship." Moreover, "a long practice of regulating spousal immigration precludes Din’s claim that the denial of Berashk’s visa application has deprived her of a fundamental liberty interest."
Finally, the Court concluded Because Fauzia Din was not deprived of “life, liberty, or property” when the Government denied Kanishka Berashk admission to the United States, there is no process due to her under the Constitution. To the extent that she received any explanation for the Government’s decision, this was more than the Due Process Clause required.
Justice Kennedy, concurring with plurality opinion, would not address whether Din has a fundamental right that is implicated in the immigration process of her husband, but would instead decide that any due process rights she has were satisfied by the process provided by the consular official (i.e. the denial notice stating that he had participated in terrorist activities).
The full text of Kerry v. Din can be found here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1402_e29g.pdf