The Eleventh Circuit has determined that the application of the stop-time rule to a pre-IIRIRA conviction would be impermissibly retroactive when the conviction did not render the individual deportable at the time of the plea, and when the individual would have been eligible for 212(c) relief.
“When he pled guilty to resisting an officer with violence on July 17, 1995, he would likely have known that his guilty plea would not render him immediately deportable. And but for the later enactment of the stop-time rule, that guilty plea also would not have cut off his accumulation of continuous presence towards eligibility for waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c). Thus, by pleading guilty, Mr. Rendon gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. Applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.”
The full text of Rendon v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.pdf
An amended opinion can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.op2.pdf