The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the Oregon statute governing first-degree burglary is overbroad as compared to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude because it proscribes any unlawful entry into any “building,” including a commercial space, with any criminal intent. However, the court determined that the statute is divisible between two distinct crimes: (1) first-degree burglary of a dwelling; and (2) first-degree burglary of a non-dwelling involving an aggravating factor. The court also deferred to Matter of J-G-D-F and found that burglary of a regularly or intermittently occupied dwelling is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Diaz-Flores v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/04/06/17-72563.pdf