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Viewing entries tagged
Arkansas crimes
The Second Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for abuse of a corpse is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it includes mere disinterment of a corpse. The court also concluded that the statute is divisible between disinterment and mistreatment of a corpse.
The full text of Giron-Molina v. Garland can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for abuse of a corpse is overbroad as compared to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude because it includes the mere removal or disinterment of a corpse.
The full text of Giron-Molina v. Garland can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for third-degree assault on a family or household member is a crime of violence because it requires creating a purposefully creating an apprehension of imminent physical injury, which necessarily requires the threatened use of physical force.
The full text of Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/23a0097p-06.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for aggravated assault and a South Carolina conviction for pointing a firearm at another person are both crimes of violence for federal sentencing purposes. With respect to the Arkansas aggravated assault conviction, the court held that the statute is divisible, and subsection (a)(1) is not a crime of violence. However, subsection (a)(2), which criminalizes displaying a firearm in such a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person, necessarily involves the threatened use of violent force. With respect to the South Carolina firearms conviction, the court deferred to prior precedent finding that that pointing a gun at another person qualifies as a crime of violence.
The full text of United States v. Hataway can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit, interpreting Supreme Court precedent, determined that “burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation” qualifies as generic burglary. As such, it reversed its prior precedent and determined that an Arkansas residential burglary conviction, which includes burglary of certain types of vehicles, also matches the definition of generic burglary. Given the similar definitions of generic burglary in the criminal and immigration contexts, this case could have persuasive impact in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Sims can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for first degree terrorist threatening is divisible between threats of injury and threats to property. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that a conviction for threats of serious injury is a violent felony.
The full text of United States v. Myers can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that an Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction is a crime of violence because it requires sufficient force to overcome a victim’s resistance and does not criminalize mere snatching of property.
The full text of United States v. Smith can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas kidnapping statute does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it does require the use of physical force. The court also determined that the statute is indivisible. Because the definition of a violent felony is similar to definition of a crime of violence in the immigration law, this case may hav persuasive effect in immigration cases.
The full text of U.S. v. Coleman can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit determined that the Arkansas statute criminalizing terroristic threats is divisible between making threats against a person and making threats against property, and then determined that the petitioner's conviction for threatening his girlfriend qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In addition, a second-degree battery conviction, under the non-deadly weapon subsection, qualifies as a violent felony because it requires the infliction of serious physical injury, thus mandating the use of physical force. Given the similar definitions of a violent felony under the ACCA and the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Myers can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Arkansas convictions for third degree domestic battery and first degree battery are violent felonies because they require the use of violent force. Given the similar definitions of violent felonies and crimes of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Eason can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for aggravated assault on a family member is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it requires the use of violent force. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Pyles can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for third degree domestic battery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court determined that the statute is divisible, but subsection (a)(1), which requires the infliction of injury, meets the definition of a violent felony because the infliction of injury necessarily requires the use of violent force. Given the similar definition of a violent felony and crime of violence in the immigration context, this case may be persuasive in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Moore can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has had that an Arkansas conviction for residential burglary does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it encompasses the burglary of certain types of vehicles. The court also found that the statute was indivisible with respect to what type of structure was being burglarized. Given the similar definition of generic burglary for ACCA purposes and aggravated felony purposes, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Sims can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for second-degree battery with a deadly weapon other than a firearm in Arkansas qualifies as a violent felony. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the infliction of injury does necessarily require the use of violent force. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony and a crime of violence aggravated felony in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of U.S. v. Winston can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for domestic battery in the third degree is divisible in light of the decision in Mathis v. United States. In addition, the first subsection, which requests the infliction of injury on the victim, is a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes. The court rejected the argument that injury can be inflicted without the use of violent force. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing context and in the immigration context, this case could have persuasive value in an immigration case.
The full text of US v. Starks can be found here:
In the context of a criminal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for first-degree batter in Arkansas (Ark. Code. Ann. section 5-13-201) is a crime of violence. The court noted that the statute is divisible, but that subsection (a)(1), which requires the infliction of serious physical injury through the use of a deadly weapon, requires the requisite violent force to be a crime of violence.
The full text of United States v. Thomas can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for first degree assault in Arkansas is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. A conviction for first degree assault requires recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. The court agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that such conduct is "contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."
The full text of Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch can be found here:
In the context of a criminal sentencing proceeding, the Eighth Circuit determined that the statute governing aggravated assault in Arkansas is overbroad compared to the definition of a violent felony. The Court also determined that the statute is divisible, and determined that subsection (a)(1) - which requires a person to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life and to purposely engage in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person - did not match the definition of a violent felony because it only requires the government to prove that a defendant's conduct created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury, not to actually use violent force against another person. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony in the sentencing context and the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision likely has implications in the immigration context as well.
The full text of US v. Jordan can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/02/143444P.pdf
In the context of a criminal sentencing hearing, the Eighth Circuit determined that a conviction for second degree battery in Arkansas may qualify as a crime of violence. The statute is divisible, but subsection (a)(4) - which requires intentionally or knowingly, without legal justification, causing physical injury to a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, a correctional facility employee, a school employee, an elderly person, a young child, a state officer or employee, a healthcare provider, or incompetent - meets the definition of a crime of violence. Given the similarity in the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing context and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this ruling likely indicates the subsection at issue is a crime of violence for immigration purposes, too.
The full text of US v. Rice can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/02/143615P.pdf
