Viewing entries tagged
Seventh Circuit

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Seventh Circuit Construes Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship

The Seventh Circuit has determined that the agency’s definition of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives is not entitled to any deference. Further, the Court construed “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as requiring hardship sustained by a deported alien’s qualifying relatives that’s significantly different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.

The full text of Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0274p-06.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Finds No Jurisdiction to Review Delay in I-601A Waiver Application

The Seventh Circuit has determined that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the delay in adjudication of provisional waivers of unlawful presence (Form I-601A) under the Administrative Procedure Act.  The court cited the prohibition in 8 USC 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) on federal court review of any action regarding waivers of unlawful presence.

The full text of Soni v. Jaddou can be found here: 

https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2024/D06-06/C:23-3220:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:3

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The Seventh Circuit Finds that KY Conviction for Complicity to Robbery in the First Degree is COV

The Seventh Circuit has determined that a Kentucky conviction for complicity to robbery in the first degree is a crime of violence. In so doing, the court concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is a categorical match for generic aiding-and-abetting liability; that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute requires sufficient force to overcome the victim’s will; and that the robbery statute requires that an individual use force with the specific intent to accomplish theft.

The full text of Mwendapeke v. Garland can be found here: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2023/D12-07/C:22-2383:J:Brennan:aut:T:fnOp:N:3140778:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Construes Crime of Domestic Violence Deportability Ground

The Seventh Circuit has determined that the domestic relationship between perpetrator and victim need not be an element of the statute of conviction to establish deportability under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA. Instead, the relationship may be established using the circumstance specific approach outlined in Nijhawan v. Holder.

The full text of de Jesus Caldera-Torres v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2023/D04-27/C:22-2282:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:3036912:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Finds that Jurisdictional Statute Precludes Review of USCIS Denial of Adjustment Application

The Seventh Circuit has determined that district courts have no jurisdiction to review denials of adjustment of status applications, precluding any judicial review of arriving alien adjustments, U visa adjustments, and T visa adjustments.

The full text of Britkovyy v. Mayorkas can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2023/D02-17/C:21-3160:J:St__Eve:aut:T:fnOp:N:3004080:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Finds Jurisdiction to Review Good Moral Character Determination Based on Undisputed Facts

The Seventh Circuit has determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Patel v. Garland does not strip it of jurisdiction to review the agency’s negative good moral character determination in connection with an application for cancellation of removal when the determination is based on undisputed facts.

The full text of Cruz-Velasco v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2023/D01-24/C:21-1642:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2992048:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Limits Retroactive Application of Thomas & Thompson

The Seventh Circuit has determined that retroactive application of Matter of Thomas & Thompson to sentencing modifications entered before the issuance of the decision would be impermissible. The decision, however, was entitled to deference as applied to more recent sentence modifications.

The court also determined that an Indiana conviction for neglect of a dependent is a crime involving moral turpitude. The statute requires intentional or knowing conduct, namely confinement which is likely to result in a harm such as disfigurement, mental distress, extreme pain or hurt, or gross degradation, and yet does not necessarily endanger the dependent’s life or health.

The full text of Zaragoza v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D11-08/C:19-3437:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2959226:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Finds No Prejudice from Defective Reinstatement Order

The Seventh Circuit has recognized the defects in a reinstatement order (namely, that it was signed more than 6 months before the petitioner was given an opportunity to respond to it), but denied the petition for review due to a lack of prejudice caused by the deficiencies.

The full text of Casas v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D08-29/C:20-1739:J:Jackson-Akiwumi:aut:T:fnOp:N:2924397:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Finds Deported Petitioner's Appeal Moot

The Seventh Circuit has determined that a petitioner’s appeal of his deferral of removal application in withholding-only proceedings was mooted by his removal from the country, since there was no direct challenge to the underlying removal order before the court, but rather, only an appeal of the denial of deferral of removal. “Garcia Marin is inadmissible by virtue of his unchallenged removal order and his criminal record. So even if we were to find an error in the BIA’s decision reversing the immigration judge, the action that Garcia Marin sought to prevent has already taken place, and there are no possible collateral legal consequences.”

The full text if Garcia Marin v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D07-29/C:20-3393:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2910359:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Remands to Determine Citizenship of Ethnic Eritrean Born in Addis Ababa

The Seventh Circuit has remanded a motion to reopen for the agency to address whether an ethnic Eritrean born in Addis Ababa before the founding of Eritrea is properly considered to be an Eritrean citizen. The Court noted that the petitioner’s citizenship was relevant to the likelihood that he would be tortured if deported to Ethiopia.

The full text of Menghistab v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D06-21/C:21-2099:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2892707:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Finds Indiana Definition of Methamphetamine Broader than Federal Definition

The Seventh Circuit has determined that Indiana’s definition of methamphetamine is broader than the federal definition. “Under federal law, methamphetamine is a Schedule II or III controlled substance that includes ‘its salts, isomers, and salt of isomers.’ Under federal law, ‘isomer’ of methamphetamine only refers to ‘the optical isomer.’” “Because the Indiana legislature chose to limit the types of isomers defining other drugs but did not do so with methamphetamine, we must read the schedules to define methamphetamine as including at least optical and positional isomers.” The court noted that as of 2020, Indiana had narrowed the definition of an isomer of methamphetamine to optical isomers only. However, that definition was not present at the time of the petitioner’s conviction.

The full text of Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D06-16/C:21-1201:J:Jackson-Akiwumi:aut:T:fnOp:N:2891535:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Lays Out Timeliness Factors for Objections to Incomplete NTAs

The Seventh Circuit has laid out a number of factors to assess when determining if a petitioner made a timely objection to a Notice to Appear that was lacking the time and date of the first hearing. These factors include: how much time passed, in absolute terms, between the receipt of the Notice and the raising of the objection; did the immigration court set a schedule for filing objections, and did the objection comply with that schedule; and how much of the merits had been discussed or determined prior to the objection? In addition, the court may consider: if the recipient does not speak English, did she object promptly after receiving adequate translation services and notice; did the person have legal counsel at the outset, and if she obtained counsel only later, did counsel object promptly after entering the case; and did the noncitizen file any prior objections but omit this objection?

The full text of Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D05-17/C:21-1179:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2877448:S:0

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Seventh Circuit finds BIA Abused its Discretion in Denying Motion to Accept Late Brief

The Seventh Circuit has found that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion when it denied a motion to accept a late-filed brief filed by a respondent who had only received his record of proceedings days before the briefing deadline. “The Board provided only two reasons for denying Olu‐ wajana’s motion to submit a brief out of time: (1) the second request for an extension of the briefing deadline was denied, and (2) the brief was received 33 days late. Neither basis supports the Board’s decision. First, the mere fact that the Board denied a second extension request cannot justify the rejection of a late brief. The agency’s own regulation prohibits the Board from extending the briefing deadline more than ‘one time per case.’ But the same regulation goes on to say that the Board ‘may consider a brief that has been filed out of time.’ Thus, the Board’s rules envision that a late brief may be accepted even though a second extension of the briefing deadline is barred. It was nonsensical for the Board to deny Oluwajana permissible relief because he was not first granted relief that the Board’s rules prohibit. We will not sustain a decision based on the Board’s interpretation of its rules that causes ‘unreasonable, unfair, and absurd re‐sults.’ Next, and more obviously, the Board clearly erred in finding that Oluwajana submitted his brief 33 days late. After the Board granted the initial request to extend the briefing dead‐ line, the due date was February 24, 2021, not February 3. So, when Oluwajana submitted his brief on March 8, it was only 12 days past due, not the month and more stated in the Board’s order. The Board abuses its discretion when it exercises that discretion based on factual determinations ‘contrary to the detailed evidence in the record.’”

The full text of Oluwajana v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D03-09/C:21-1804:J:Manion:aut:T:fnOp:N:2844564:S:0

An amended opinion can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2022/D05-03/C:21-1804:J:Manion:aut:T:aOp:N:2871246:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Adopts Aggregate Harm Approach to CAT Claims

The Seventh Circuit has determined that when evaluating whether an applicant for protection under the Convention Against Torture has demonstrated a clear probability of torture, the agency must evaluate the aggregate risk of torture. “[W]e adopt the aggregate risk approach for the determination of substantial risk and hold that the agency may address risk factors individually so long as it considers all sources of and reasons for risk cumulatively to determine whether there is a substantial risk of torture,”

The full text of Nyandwi v. Garland can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D10-08/C:20-3215:J:Kirsch:aut:T:fnOp:N:2774468:S:0

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Seventh Circuit Suggests that Hardship Determination is Reviewable

The Seventh Circuit has concluded that it may have jurisdiction to review a hardship determination in the context of a cancellation of removal application as long as the appeal “raises either pure legal questions or the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.” The court did not ultimately have to reach a definitive conclusion on this issue, finding that the petition for review raised pure legal issues. “The first is whether an IJ commits error when he fails to make an express credibility finding, and then holds that gap in the record against the applicant. Such an error would go to the procedural sufficiency of the hearing, which is a legal point. The second question relates to the hardship issue and the IJ’s and Board’s application of the standard for such evidence to the facts before them.”

The court concluded that “when an IJ says nothing about credibility, yet later based his decision on the applicant’s failure to produce evidence supporting otherwise undisputed testimony, he commits procedural error.” “The statute requires the IJ to make an express credibility finding, both to ensure that the evidence is properly assessed, and to facilitate meaningful review by both the Board and the court. Because the IJ did not do so here, we cannot rely on this ground for his decision. Perhaps the Board had a similar concern, as it chose to rest its decision exclusively on the hardship ground.”

With respect to the hardship determination, the court recognized that “the Board does not commit an ‘error of law’ every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy, but where, as here, some facts important to the subtle determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship have been … seriously mischaracterized, we conclude that an error of law has occurred.” “At some point, the individual hardship described by an IJ will diverge too much from the actual hardship shown in the record. The error in such a case is procedural: the failure to take into account the entire record, no matter what the final conclusion might be.” The IJ and the Board cannot simply announce that there is no evidence on a point that is in fact well covered in the record. Between the IEP and Mitten’s testimony, there was ample disinterested evidence on which to base an assessment of the severity of Melanie’s condition. We have no way of knowing whether, had the IJ and Board looked at this evidence, they still would have found that Martinez-Baez failed to establish the requisite hardship to a qualifying relative.”

The full text of Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D02-01/C:20-1078:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2654024:S:0

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