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Viewing entries tagged
federal crimes
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence. In a footnote, the court noted that its caselaw determining that California’s voluntary manslaughter statute is not a crime of violence is no longer tenable in light of intervening caselaw.
The full text of US v. Draper can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/10/17/17-15104.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence because aiding and abetting is simply a form of accomplice liability and does not change that the statute involves the actual or threatened use of violent force.
The full text of United States v. Eckford can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/15/17-50167.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for assaulting, opposing, resisting, or impeding a federal officer with use of a deadly weapon or with infliction of bodily injury is a crime of violence.
The full text of US v. Medearis can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that solicitation of transportation of an explosive in interstate commerce with intent that the explosive kill, injure, or intimidate another person or damage property constitutes the attempted use of violent force.
“In this case, we conclude that someone who solicits a violation of § 844(d) categorically solicits the attempted use of physical force: transporting or receiving an explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any person, or damage property, is categorically a substantial step toward the use of violent force.”
The full text of US v. Linehan can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/12/22/21-50206.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for exporting stolen vehicles qualifies as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the federal mens rea of “willful blindness” was broader than required mens rea prescribed by the agency for receipt of stolen property.
The full text of Tantchev v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0195p-06.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a federal conviction for unlawfully selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm or ammunition is not a deportable firearms offense. The BIA found the statute overbroad both because it involves offenses involving ammunition, and not firearms, and because disposing of a firearm does not require a transfer of money. The BIA further concluded that the statute is indivisible, and therefore, a conviction under the statute will never trigger firearms-related deportability.
The full text of Matter of Ortega-Quezada can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction under 18 USC 1361 for damaging government property is not a crime of violence. The court found the statute does necessarily require violent force to be used against the property. Noting that the damage had to exceed a specific amount to sustain a conviction, the court concluded that “[t]he amount of damage to property, while defining felonious conduct under Section 1361, does not necessarily correlate with the type of the force employed.'“
The full text of US v. Melaku can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude because the conviction “necessarily requires ‘deceit and an intent to impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government.’”
The full text of Cupete v. Garland can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has remanded a case to the Board for further analysis about whether a federal conviction for misuse of a social security number is a crime involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the court noted that fraud requires that a misrepresentation be made to obtain a benefit from someone or cause a detriment to someone. “A violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) can sometimes be for the ‘purpose of obtaining anything of value from any person’—which would involve fraud—but under the categorical approach the ‘least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction’ is the false representation of the Social Security number for ‘any other purpose,’ i.e., for a nonfraudulent purpose.”
“Our holding today does not foreclose the possibility that a conviction for a violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT. But if the BIA is going to hold that it is, it will need to do what it has so far failed to do in Mr. Zarate’s case—it will have to apply its two pronged moral turpitude standard in toto and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is ‘reprehensible,’ i.e., conduct that is ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.’”
The full text of Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202011654.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, while placing the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, is a crime of violence. “The ‘use of a dangerous weapon,’ especially when deployed to put the victim’s life in jeopardy, reflects force that is capable of causing death or serious injury.“
The court noted that the crime of assaulting a mail carrier is divisible. “§ 2114(a) is divisible into basic and aggravated offenses—a point on which the parties agree. The basic offense, punishable by ‘not more than ten years,’ is contained in the clause preceding the semicolon. That crime consists of assaulting any person with custody or control of mail matter or other government property with intent to steal the property, or otherwise attempting or successfully robbing the person of the property. The aggravated offense, which follows the semicolon, carries a term of imprisonment of ‘not more than twenty-five years.’ That crime consists of the basic offense committed in one of three aggravated ways: (1) wounding the person with custody or control of mail matter or other government property; (2) placing the person’s ‘life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon’; or (3) committing a subsequent offense under § 2114(a).”
The court also concluded that the aggravated offense is itself divisible. “Here, the second clause of § 2114(a) presents disjunctive elements, not alternative factual means of committing a single offense. A person commits the aggravated offense under § 2114(a) and exposes himself to an extra fifteen years’ imprisonment if he ‘wounds the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense.’ In context, the three items in the aggravated clause are substantively different elements concerning different conduct and involving different proof.”
The full text of US v. Buck can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/01/11/18-17271.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that the “offense clause” of the federal conspiracy statute (which criminalizes conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States) is divisible with respect to the object of the conspiracy. The BIA then concluded that conspiracy to sell counterfeited currency is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Matter of Al Sabsabi can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for illegal reentry, on its own, is not an aggravated felony. Rather, a court must perform an independent inquiry into whether the prior removal order was based on an aggravated felony conviction.
The full text of Lopez Chavez v. Garland can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the federal conspiracy statute and a statute criminalizing misuse of visas are both overbroad and divisible. The conspiracy statute is divisible between offenses against the United States (overbroad) and offenses to defraud the United States (crimes involving moral turpitude). The offense clause must then be evaluated by determining if the underlying offense is a removable offense under the categorical and modified categorical approaches. In this case, the underlying offense was 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2012), which punishes fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents. The Board found this statute to be divisible into four separate offenses.
“For clarity of our analysis, we will treat the four phrases of the statute as numbered one through four. Phrase one outlines, at minimum, conduct such as possessing with no illegal use or intent to illegally use, an altered or counterfeit immigration document. We conclude that such conduct is not a crime involving moral turpitude.” “The criminal indictment establishes that the respondent was convicted under phrase four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). Since the respondent knowingly committed fraud undermining the immigration system, we conclude that his conviction involves moral turpitude.”
The full text of Matter of Nemis can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license is an aggravated felony. The court deferred to the agency’s determination that “illicit trafficking in firearms” means “any unlawful trading or dealing” in firearms.
The full text of Chacon v. Wilkinson can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/02/18/18-71515.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has concluded that a conviction for unauthorized use of a social security number is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court noted that “[a] § 408(a)(7)(B) offense necessarily involves intentional deception: a person commits the offense if, ‘with intent to deceive’, she ‘falsely represents a number to be the social security account number . . assigned . . . to [her] or to another person’ when that number has not been assigned to her or such other person.” The Court then concluded that “deceptive intent is sufficient for an offense to constitute a CIMT.”
The full text of Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-60376-CV0.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a conviction for RICO conspiracy is not a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes because “the elements of a RICO conspiracy focus on the agreement to commit a crime, which does not ‘necessitate the existence of a threat or attempt to use force.’”
The full text of United States v. Green can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201710346.op2.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision in Matter of Ortega-Lopez that a federal conviction for aiding and abetting another person who sponsored or exhibited an animal in an animal fighting venture is a crime involving moral turpitude. The court also deferred to the BIA’s conclusion that, pursuant to the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal if the alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed, regardless whether the alien meets the immigration prerequisites for inadmissibility or deportability.
The full text of Ortega-Lopez v. Barr can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/10/20/18-72441.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction for attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act is not categorically a crime of violence under the federal sentencing law. “The Government may obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery by proving that: (1) the defendant specifically intended to commit robbery by means of a threat to use physical force; and (2) the defendant took a substantial step corroborating that intent. The substantial step need not be violent.”
The full text of US v. Taylor can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit finds that federal convictions for kidnapping resulting in death and carjacking resulting in death are crimes of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines.
The full text of United States v. Ross can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for misprision of a felony is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it has no evil intent requirement. “The BIA’s decision that misprision categorically constitutes a CIMT is also unmoored from its own precedent. The BIA and courts have consistently 12 declared offenses that involve appreciably higher levels of moral culpability to be 13 insufficiently grave to qualify as CIMTs.” The Second Circuit decision aligns it with similar case law in the Ninth Circuit.
The full text of Mendez v. Barr can be found here:
