Second Circuit Holds Conspiracy to Present a Baseless Immigration Document Is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

The Second Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Filipino lawful permanent resident convicted of knowing making or presenting materially false statements to immigration authorities, which categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Court held that knowingly presenting to immigration authorities a required document that the presenter knows lacks any reasonable basis in law or fact is inherently deceitful conduct that impairs an important government function, satisfying the BIA's two-part definition of moral turpitude, which the Court adopted as its own post-Loper Bright. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the subclause could sweep in innocent conduct, explaining that his own hypotheticals, such as filing a meritless asylum application solely to access cancellation-of-removal proceedings, themselves qualified as CIMTs, and distinguished the statute from misprision of a felony, which the Court has previously held is not categorically a CIMT because it lacks any intent element.

The full text of Nemis v. Blanche can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/25-304_opn.pdf

D.C. Circuit Holds White House Shooter's Property-Destruction Conviction Was a Crime of Violence

The D.C. Circuit has affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a firearm-during-a-crime-of-violence conviction obtained against a man who fired multiple rounds at the White House, holding that his underlying conviction for willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling within federal jurisdiction categorically involves the use of physical force against another's property.

Tracing the statute's roots to nineteenth-century arson law and the common-law offense of malicious mischief, the Court held that injuring a dwelling requires material impairment inflicted intentionally and for a wrongful purpose, and that the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States and Delligatti v. United States establish that intentionally causing such impairment necessarily involves the use of physical force. The Court also held the statute's historical pedigree confirms it reaches only injury to someone else's property, not one's own, satisfying the force clause's requirement that the property belong to "another."

The full text of United States v. Ortega-Hernandez can be found here: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/09/24-3023-2190849.pdf

Fifth Circuit Holds Knowing Use of a Passport Invalidated by Changed Circumstances Is a CIMT

The Fifth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Nigerian lawful permanent resident found inadmissible for a prior conviction for using a forged passport, holding that knowing use of a false or invalidated passport is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

No longer deferring to the BIA under Loper Bright, the Court independently held that using a document known to be false, or a once-valid passport known to have become void, involves the kind of fraud or deceit against the issuing government that has long defined moral turpitude, regardless of whether the specific conduct involved forgery or merely continued use of an invalidated document.

The full text of Ademola v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-60475-CV0.pdf

Fifth Circuit Holds Illegal Firearms Export Conviction Falls Under Security-Related Removability Ground

The Fifth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Haitian lawful permanent resident convicted of smuggling fifty firearms to Haiti concealed in vehicles, rejecting his argument that the security-related removability ground for violating export laws should be read narrowly to require an actual national security or public safety threat.

The Court held that the plain text of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i), covering any activity violating a law prohibiting the export of goods, is satisfied by the petitioner's federal conviction for unlicensed firearms exportation regardless of whether the specific shipment endangered national security, rejecting his noscitur a sociis argument as subordinate to the statute's plain text. A dissenting judge argued the majority's reading would extend to trivial regulatory violations like exporting a bag of chips and urged that the provision be read, in context, to require an actual public-safety or national-security nexus.

The full text of Olibris v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-60322-CV0.pdf

Ninth Circuit Holds Murder-for-Hire Resulting in Death Is Not Categorically a Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has partly granted a habeas petition filed by a man convicted of hiring a hit man to murder two business associates, holding that his solicitation convictions tied to those killings cannot stand because murder-for-hire resulting in death is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a).

The Court held that while the death-results element of the murder-for-hire statute likely satisfies the physical force requirement, it lacks any mens rea requirement and can be satisfied by an accidental killing, meaning it does not categorically require the intentional use of force needed to qualify as a crime of violence.

The full text of United States v. Henrikson can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/15/23-2132.pdf

Third Circuit Determines that Federal Conviction for Attempted Murder of a Witness is a Crime of Violence

The Third Circuit has determined that a conviction for attempted murder of a federal witness is a crime of violence because the government must necessarily prove that the defendant at least attempted to use physical force.

The full text of U.S. v. Smith can be found here:

www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242020p.pdf

Fifth Circuit Finds that Conviction for Influencing a Federal Official by Threatening Assault is Crime of Violence

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for influencing a federal official by threatening assault is a crime of violence because it involves threats of physical force.

The full text of McLean v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-61098-CV0.pdf

Fourth Circuit Finds that Federal Conviction for Inducing a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity is Aggravated Felony and Crime of Child Abuse

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony and a crime of child abuse. In so holding, the court determined that “Esquivel-Quintana’s holding is narrow, applying only to a strict liability statute, and that it does not inform the broader question of whether an offense with a criminal mens rea constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.”

The full text of Hsieh v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241013.P.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds Voluntary Manslaughter is Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence. In a footnote, the court noted that its caselaw determining that California’s voluntary manslaughter statute is not a crime of violence is no longer tenable in light of intervening caselaw.

The full text of US v. Draper can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/10/17/17-15104.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds that Aiding and Abetting Hobbs Act Robbery is Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence because aiding and abetting is simply a form of accomplice liability and does not change that the statute involves the actual or threatened use of violent force.

The full text of United States v. Eckford can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/15/17-50167.pdf

Eighth Circuit finds that Assaulting, Opposing, Impeding, or Resisting a Federal Officer with Use of a Deadly Weapon or Infliction of Bodily Injury is a Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for assaulting, opposing, resisting, or impeding a federal officer with use of a deadly weapon or with infliction of bodily injury is a crime of violence.

The full text of US v. Medearis can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/23/04/221841P.pdf

Ninth Circuit Analyzes Federal Solicitation Offense

The Ninth Circuit has determined that solicitation of transportation of an explosive in interstate commerce with intent that the explosive kill, injure, or intimidate another person or damage property constitutes the attempted use of violent force.

“In this case, we conclude that someone who solicits a violation of § 844(d) categorically solicits the attempted use of physical force: transporting or receiving an explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any person, or damage property, is categorically a substantial step toward the use of violent force.”

The full text of US v. Linehan can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/12/22/21-50206.pdf

Sixth Circuit Finds Federal Conviction for Exporting Stolen Vehicles is Aggravated Felony

The Sixth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for exporting stolen vehicles qualifies as a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the federal mens rea of “willful blindness” was broader than required mens rea prescribed by the agency for receipt of stolen property.

The full text of Tantchev v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0195p-06.pdf

BIA Finds that Federal Conviction for Unlawfully Selling or Disposing of Firearm or Ammunition is not Firearms Offense

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a federal conviction for unlawfully selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm or ammunition is not a deportable firearms offense. The BIA found the statute overbroad both because it involves offenses involving ammunition, and not firearms, and because disposing of a firearm does not require a transfer of money. The BIA further concluded that the statute is indivisible, and therefore, a conviction under the statute will never trigger firearms-related deportability.

The full text of Matter of Ortega-Quezada can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1522551/download

Fourth Circuit Finds Conviction for Damage to Government Property is not Crime of Violence

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a conviction under 18 USC 1361 for damaging government property is not a crime of violence. The court found the statute does necessarily require violent force to be used against the property. Noting that the damage had to exceed a specific amount to sustain a conviction, the court concluded that “[t]he amount of damage to property, while defining felonious conduct under Section 1361, does not necessarily correlate with the type of the force employed.'“

The full text of US v. Melaku can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/216122.P.pdf

Second Circuit Finds that Making False Statements is a CIMT

The Second Circuit has determined that making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude because the conviction “necessarily requires ‘deceit and an intent to impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government.’”

The full text of Cupete v. Garland can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/caf0e426-7c20-43be-be1c-90754628fc71/7/doc/20-3441_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/caf0e426-7c20-43be-be1c-90754628fc71/7/hilite/

Eleventh Circuit Addresses Whether Misuse of a SSN is a CIMT

The Eleventh Circuit has remanded a case to the Board for further analysis about whether a federal conviction for misuse of a social security number is a crime involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the court noted that fraud requires that a misrepresentation be made to obtain a benefit from someone or cause a detriment to someone. “A violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) can sometimes be for the ‘purpose of obtaining anything of value from any person’—which would involve fraud—but under the categorical approach the ‘least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction’ is the false representation of the Social Security number for ‘any other purpose,’ i.e., for a nonfraudulent purpose.”

“Our holding today does not foreclose the possibility that a conviction for a violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT. But if the BIA is going to hold that it is, it will need to do what it has so far failed to do in Mr. Zarate’s case—it will have to apply its two pronged moral turpitude standard in toto and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is ‘reprehensible,’ i.e., conduct that is ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.’”

The full text of Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here:

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202011654.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds that Assaulting a Mail Carrier with Intent to Steal Mail, while Placing the Mail Carrier’s Life in Jeopardy by the Use of a Dangerous Weapon is Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, while placing the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, is a crime of violence. “The ‘use of a dangerous weapon,’ especially when deployed to put the victim’s life in jeopardy, reflects force that is capable of causing death or serious injury.“

The court noted that the crime of assaulting a mail carrier is divisible. “§ 2114(a) is divisible into basic and aggravated offenses—a point on which the parties agree. The basic offense, punishable by ‘not more than ten years,’ is contained in the clause preceding the semicolon. That crime consists of assaulting any person with custody or control of mail matter or other government property with intent to steal the property, or otherwise attempting or successfully robbing the person of the property. The aggravated offense, which follows the semicolon, carries a term of imprisonment of ‘not more than twenty-five years.’ That crime consists of the basic offense committed in one of three aggravated ways: (1) wounding the person with custody or control of mail matter or other government property; (2) placing the person’s ‘life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon’; or (3) committing a subsequent offense under § 2114(a).”

The court also concluded that the aggravated offense is itself divisible. “Here, the second clause of § 2114(a) presents disjunctive elements, not alternative factual means of committing a single offense. A person commits the aggravated offense under § 2114(a) and exposes himself to an extra fifteen years’ imprisonment if he ‘wounds the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense.’ In context, the three items in the aggravated clause are substantively different elements concerning different conduct and involving different proof.”

The full text of US v. Buck can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/01/11/18-17271.pdf

BIA Finds Offense Clause of Federal Conspiracy Statute to be Divisible

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that the “offense clause” of the federal conspiracy statute (which criminalizes conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States) is divisible with respect to the object of the conspiracy. The BIA then concluded that conspiracy to sell counterfeited currency is a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Matter of Al Sabsabi can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1380821/download

Eighth Circuit Finds Illegal Reentry Conviction is Not Aggravated Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for illegal reentry, on its own, is not an aggravated felony. Rather, a court must perform an independent inquiry into whether the prior removal order was based on an aggravated felony conviction.

The full text of Lopez Chavez v. Garland can be found here:

https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/03/183735P.pdf