These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
stop-time rule
The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that the date of commission of an inadmissible offense - not the date of conviction - is what triggers the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal.
The full text of Rudnitskyy v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/09/14/21-1098.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Order to Show Cause lacking the date and time of the first deportation hearing is sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule for suspension of deportation.
The full text of Gutterrez-Alm v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/03/15/17-71012.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a respondent who moves to reopen proceedings to seek cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents must make a prima facie showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. In addition, the issuance of administratively final removal order does not stop the accrual of physical presence for cancellation purposes. Finally, the BIA declined to determined if the decision in Niz Chavez represents a fundamental change in law warranting sua sponte reopening.
The full text of Matter of Chen can be found here:
The Tenth Circuit has determined that the issuance of a final removal order does not trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal.
The full text of Estrada-Cardona can be found here: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110725741.pdf
The Second Circuit has concluded that Orders to Show Cause that were missing the time and location information of the first deportation hearing still triggered the stop-time provision.
The full text of Jiang v. Garland can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that service of a Notice to Appear that is missing the time and date of the first removal hearing does not stop the accrual of physical presence for voluntary departure, even if the respondent is subsequently served with a notice of hearing containing the missing information.
The full text of Matter of M-F-O- can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the issuance of a final removal order (after service of a defective Notice to Appear) does not trigger the stop-time rule for purposes of cancellation of removal.
The full text of Cantor v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/11/03/19-73085.pdf
The Supreme Court has determined that the time and place of a removal hearing must be included in a Notice to Appear - and not a subsequent notice of hearing - to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. In so doing, the court overturns any circuit precedent permitting a so-called “two-step stop-time rule.”
The full text of Niz-Chavez v. Garland can be found here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-863_new_5426.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has concluded that “[w]here a notice to appear fails to specify the time or place of a respondent’s initial removal hearing, the subsequent service of a notice of hearing specifying this information perfects the notice to appear and ends the accrual of physical presence for purposes of voluntary departure.”
The full text of Matter of Viera-Garcia can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has concluded that stop-time rule articulated in Pereira v. Sessions does not apply to Orders to Show Cause that are missing the time and location information for the first deportation hearing. In addition, the court reaffirmed that an individual in deportation proceedings cannot apply for cancellation of removal.
The full text of Perez-Perez v. Wilkinson can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Barton v. Barr on the stop-time rule, and found that a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense that rendered him inadmissible within seven years of his admission was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
The full text of Argueta v. Barr can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that the application of the stop-time rule to a pre-IIRIRA conviction would be impermissibly retroactive when the conviction did not render the individual deportable at the time of the plea, and when the individual would have been eligible for 212(c) relief.
“When he pled guilty to resisting an officer with violence on July 17, 1995, he would likely have known that his guilty plea would not render him immediately deportable. And but for the later enactment of the stop-time rule, that guilty plea also would not have cut off his accumulation of continuous presence towards eligibility for waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c). Thus, by pleading guilty, Mr. Rendon gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. Applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.”
The full text of Rendon v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.pdf
An amended opinion can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.op2.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has declined to address a challenge to the two-step stop time rule put forth by the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez. Instead, the court simply held that the petitioner waited too long to bring the challenge, as she had not even applied for cancellation of removal when she was in proceedings. This decision is oddly reasoned in my view, as the Board did not deny the motion to reopen on timeliness grounds, but instead, assumed the petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling.
The full text of Chen v. Barr can be found here:
The Supreme Court has determined that a criminal offense can trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents even if the offense is not the basis for the charge of removability. Accordingly, a lawful permanent resident can trigger the stop-time rule with an offense that triggers inadmissibility, even if the lawful permanent resident is not seeking admission.
The full text of Barton v. Barr can be found here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-725_f2bh.pdf
The Tenth Circuit has rejected a two-step stop time rule for cancellation of removal. Service of a Notice to Appear that lacks the time of the first removal hearing does not trigger the stop time rule, and the rule is still not triggered when the Immigration Court issues a hearing notice that contains this information. “d. In our view, the stop-time rule is triggered by one complete notice to appear rather than a combination of documents.”
The full text of Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr can be found here:
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/19/19-9517.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has held that when a Notice to Appear is lacking the time and place information for a first hearing, the subsequent service of a Notice of Hearing with that information completes the document and triggers the stop time rule for cancellation of removal purposes. In so doing, the court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Mendoza Hernandez.
The full text of Yanez-Pena v. Barr can be fond here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-60464%20-CV0.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a Notice to Appear that is missing the time and date of a first hearing does not trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal, even if the Immigration Court subsequently issues a notice of hearing containing the missing information. In so doing, the court declined to follow the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Mendoza Hernandez , finding it inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions. The court also overruled its prior decision in Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General.
The full text of Guadalupe v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192239p.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for en banc rehearing in Lopez v. Sessions, a case dealing with the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal.
The order granting en banc review can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/01/23/15-72406_en_banc_order.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the Immigration Court may “complete” a Notice to Appear by issuing a notice of hearing specifying the time and place of the first removal hearing. Issuance of the notice of hearing is sufficient to trigger the stop time rule for cancellation of removal purposes. The court determined that the statute was unambiguous, making it unnecessary to defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, which reached the same outcome. The court also noted that its decision was at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lopez v. Barr.
The full text of Garcia -Romo v. Barr can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/19a0255p-06.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that in “cases where a notice to appear does not specify the time or place of an alien’s initial removal hearing, the subsequent service of a notice of hearing containing that information perfects the deficient notice to appear, triggers the ‘stop-time’ rule, and ends the alien’s period of continuous residence or physical presence in the United States.” The Board determined that this was consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, since Pereira had accumulated the required 10 years by the time he was properly served with a notice of hearing.
The full text of Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez can be found here:
