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BIA Finds AZ Drug Statute Divisible

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that an Arizona conviction criminalizing conduct involving “dangerous drugs” is divisible with respect to the identity of the drug. The BIA noted that certain substances carry more severe punishment, an indication that the substances are elements of the offense. Proceeding to the modified categorical approach, the BIA determined the substance at issue was methamphetamine, and as such, the respondent was convicted of a deportable offense.

The full text of Matter of P-B-B- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1296956/download

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Eleventh Circuit Permits APA Review of Denied L-1A Petition after Initiation of Removal Proceedings

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that the “zipper clause” does not prevent a District Court from reviewing the denial of a L-1A visa petition even after removal proceedings are commenced against the applicant. The court noted that an L-1A visa petition cannot be reviewed in removal proceedings, nor is it a decision to commence removal proceedings or execute a removal order.

The full text of Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201911193.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit finds Retroactive Application of Stop-Time Rule to be Impermissible

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that the application of the stop-time rule to a pre-IIRIRA conviction would be impermissibly retroactive when the conviction did not render the individual deportable at the time of the plea, and when the individual would have been eligible for 212(c) relief.

“When he pled guilty to resisting an officer with violence on July 17, 1995, he would likely have known that his guilty plea would not render him immediately deportable. And but for the later enactment of the stop-time rule, that guilty plea also would not have cut off his accumulation of continuous presence towards eligibility for waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c). Thus, by pleading guilty, Mr. Rendon gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. Applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.”

The full text of Rendon v. Attorney General can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201910197.op2.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit finds GA Drug Statutes Divisible

The Eleventh Circuit has determined that Georgia’s drug statutes are divisible with respect to the identity of the substance. As such, the court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that the petitioner’s conviction involved ecstasy, a drug listed in the Controlled Substance Act as MDMA.

The full text of Gordon v. Attorney General can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201814513.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Remands CAT Case for Lesbian Targeted by Los Zetas

The Ninth Circuit has remanded a request for protection under the Convention Against Torture filed by a lesbian woman who had been targeted by Los Zetas. “Both the IJ and the BIA relied on national efforts to combat drug cartels and the corruption of public officials in order to find that ‘the government’ would not acquiesce in any torture Petitioner might suffer. Yet the record compels the conclusion that the corruption of public officials remains a problem, including specifically with regard to Los Zetas. The BIA even admitted that ‘there are corrupt officials.’”

“In addition to the extensive country conditions evidence indicating the prevalence of acquiescence by public officials in the torture committed by Los Zetas generally, Petitioner testified that she was personally beaten severely and threatened with death at gunpoint by a member of Los Zetas, while Mexican police officers looked on and did not nothing but laugh. This testimony, which the IJ found credible, establishes the acquiescence of public officials in a past instance of torture.” “As explained above, the country conditions evidence shows that corruption of government officials, especially of the police with regard to drug cartels, and specifically with regard to Los Zetas, remains a major problem in Mexico. The country conditions evidence certainly does not indicate that low level government corruption has been so rectified as to render insufficient Petitioner’s testimony regarding acquiescence by specific police officers in Petitioner’s specific circumstances.”

“In summary, the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner has established the requisite level of acquiescence by public officials to satisfy that aspect of her CAT claim. She testified to multiple instances of such acquiescence in the past involving her personal circumstances, and presented extensive country conditions evidence documenting the widespread problem of public official acquiescence in Zetas crimes generally.”

With respect to internal relocation, “neither the IJ nor the BIA expressly stated that the burden was on Petitioner to prove impossibility of relocation, [but] their analyses strongly indicate that they applied this reasoning anyway. The BIA concluded that the IJ “‘found an absence of evidence indicating that the applicant could not relocate.’ The IJ stated that ‘Mexico is a large country’ and ‘[i]t seems unlikely that there is nowhere in Mexico that the applicant could live without being harmed.’ Neither the IJ nor the BIA cited any affirmative ‘[e]vidence that [Petitioner] could relocate to a part of [Mexico] where . . . she is not likely to be tortured.’”

“Moreover, contrary to the IJ’s and BIA’s findings, extensive record evidence shows that Los Zetas operate in many parts of Mexico.” “Neither the IJ nor the BIA cited any evidence that there are states in Mexico where Los Zetas are unable to operate.” “Even if Los Zetas did not find her, Petitioner is at heightened risk throughout Mexico on account of her sexual orientation. Extensive record evidence demonstrates that LGBTQ individuals are at risk throughout Mexico. We have rejected reasoning such as the IJ employed here, that an applicant can be deemed able to safely relocate based on hiding her fundamental identity.”

The full text of Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/06/26/18-71460.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Rules that PSGs of " Mexican Professionals who Refuse to Cooperate with Drug Cartels" and "Mexican 'Agronomists' who Refuse to Help Cultivate Drugs" are not Socially Distinct

The Ninth Circuit has determined that proposed social groups of “Mexican professionals who refuse to cooperate with drug cartels” and “Mexican agronomists who refuse to help cultivate drugs” lack social distinction. “Nothing in the record addresses whether Mexican society views either of Mr. Diaz-Torres’s proposed social groups as distinct. No laws or proposed legislation so indicate. Nor do any country conditions reports or news articles mention such a group.”

“Moreover, to the extent some of Mr. Diaz-Torres’s testimony does relate to the social distinction requirement, it did not satisfy his burden of proof as to that element. After all, the social distinction requirement is concerned with how others view Mr. Diaz-Torres—not how he believes others view him. Objective evidence ‘such as country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and is perceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular society.’ By contrast, the testimony of the applicant alone is insufficient to establish the social distinction of a proposed group unless the petitioner ‘satisfies the trier of fact that the [petitioner’s] testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate’ that the petitioner’s proposed group is socially distinct.”

The full text of Diaz-Torres v. Barr can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/06/29/18-70141.pdf

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Two Courts Vacate Third Country Asylum Ban

The Ninth Circuit and the District of DC have both determined that the third country asylum ban - which renders most individuals ineligible for asylum if they transited through a third country en route to the US southern border - is unlawful.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr (which is currently stayed) can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/07/06/19-16487.pdf

The District of DC’s decision in Capitol Area Immigrants Rights’ Coalition v. Trump can be found here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rth46otzfmBz07LxDIKlZzNlpFjk-CAD/view

This is excellent news for asylum seekers, as well as individuals whose asylum claims were denied solely on the basis of the third country ban. These latter individuals may now be able to reopen their proceedings to again pursue their asylum claims.

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Ninth Circuit Affirms that CA Petty Theft is a CIMT (but with a Twist!)

The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its prior precedent that a conviction in California for petty theft is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Although the court recognized that the California Supreme Court had clarified that non-permanent takings are criminalized under the petty theft statute (a conclusion that would render any pre-Diaz Lizarraga convictions to be overbroad as CIMTs), it also held that it was bound by the court’s prior precedent that petty theft is a CIMT. Only an en banc court could reverse that precedent.

The full text of Silva v. Barr can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/07/10/16-70130.pdf

An amended opinion can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/03/30/16-70130.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds that OR Conviction for Manufacture or Delivery of Marijuana is Divisible

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for manufacturing or delivering marijuana is divisible between delivery and manufacture. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner was convicted of manufacturing marijuana, a felony offense under the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). The court recognized that delivery of marijuana would not be an aggravated felony because Oregon delivery offenses include solicitation offenses, which are not criminalized in the CSA.

The full text of Dominguez v. Barr can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/07/21/18-72731.pdf

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Eighth Circuit Finds that MN Conviction for Obstruction of Legal Process is not Categorically a CIMT

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for obstruction of legal process is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court emphasized that the statute defines a general intent crime, and “ there is a realistic probability that Minnesota would apply its obstruction of legal process statute to cases that lacked the requisite degree of scienter necessary to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.” Moreover, the conduct criminalized “need not result in any harm or injury whatsoever.”

The full text of Ortiz v. Barr can be found here:

https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/20/06/191285P.pdf

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Seventh Circuit finds that IL Definition of Cocaine is Overbroad

The Seventh Circuit has determined that the Illinois definition of cocaine, which includes optical, positional, and geometric isomers, is overbroad as compared to the definition of cocaine in the Controlled Substance Act, which includes only optical and geometric isomers.

The full text of US v. Ruth can be found here:


https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/20-1034/20-1034-2020-07-20.pdf?ts=1595264438

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Sixth Circuit Remands Whistleblower's Asylum Claim

The Sixth Circuit has remanded a whistleblower’s asylum claim where the agency indicated that the corrupt government officials targeted the asylum seeker because he interfered with their business arrangements, and not because of his political opinions. “In cases such as those cited above, where a petitioner seeks asylum after refusing to take part in a corrupt government scheme, the corrupt officials will almost always be motivated, at least in part, by their own pecuniary interest. But where, as in Skripkov’s case, a petitioner’s anticorruption activities manifest themselves through acts of public protest, the government officials’ pecuniary interest and their desire to quell the petitioner’s political activities typically become inseparable.”

The full text of Skripkov v. Barr can be found here:

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/20a0223p-06.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Holds that VA Conviction for Discharge of a Firearm is not a Firearms Offense

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia statute criminalizing willful discharge of a firearm in a public place without resulting bodily injury is not a firearms offenses because it does not contain an antique firearms exception. “We hold that the plain language of Virginia Code § 18.2-280(A), as supported by later acts of Virginia’s legislature and by decisions of its appellate courts, prohibits conduct involving the use of ‘any firearm,’ including antique firearms. Thus, Gordon was not required to identify a prosecution under the Virginia statute involving an antique firearm to defend against removal.”

“Our conclusion is not affected by the government’s claim that the Virginia conviction nevertheless qualifies as a removable offense because Gordon failed to present evidence of a conviction in Virginia under Section 18.2-280(A) for the discharge of an antique firearm.” “The flaw in the government’s argument, however, is its failure to recognize that when the state, through plain statutory language, has defined the reach of a state statute to include conduct that the federal offense does not, the categorical analysis is complete; there is no categorical match.”

The full text of Gordon v. Barr can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/191539.P.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Holds that VA Convictions for Leaving an Accident and Identity Theft are not Categorically CIMTs

The Fourth Circuit has determined that the Virginia statutes governing leaving an accident and identity theft do not match the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude.

“[T]he failure-to-stop conviction requires no culpable mental state or reprehensible conduct. As to the culpable mental state, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 does not require any showing of intent, nor has the Virginia Supreme Court read an element of intent into the statute; thus, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 cannot have the required culpable mental state to qualify as a CIMT. As the Government acknowledges, the statute does not require actual knowledge that an accident or injury took place, but rather that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the accident resulted in injury or property damage.”

“The Supreme Court of Virginia has made it clear that it is possible for a defendant to be guilty of violating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 for merely failing to satisfy the reporting requirements in the statute, even if the defendant remained at the scene of the accident. The Government does not argue that failing to comply with the reporting requirements categorically violates a social norm. And for good reason. We cannot see how failing to comply with the reporting requirements (e.g., failing to report one’s name, address, driver’s license number, and vehicle registration number) categorically violates a social norm. Failure to comply with the reporting requirements is not behavior ‘that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved.’”

The court noted that the identify theft statute does not require an intent to deceive the government or obstruct a governmental function. “In Virginia, it is a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) to provide false identification to someone who is not law enforcement, such as a ‘loss prevention manager at a store investigating a shoplifting accident.’” “Further, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1) does not require a perpetrator to use the name of an actual person, as the statute proscribes the use of the identity of a ‘false or a fictitious person’.”

The full text of Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/191841.P.pdf

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Third Circuit Reaffirms Constitutional Right to a Prolonged Detention Bond Hearing

The Third Circuit has reaffirmed that a mandatory detainee under 236(c) can bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to prolonged detention. A district court hearing a habeas claim in these circumstances should consider four factors: 1) the length of detention; 2) whether detention is likely to continue; 3) the reasons for delay; and 4) whether the conditions of confinement are meaningfully different from criminal detention. Once a bond hearing is ordered in a prolonged detention setting, the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is a flight risk or a danger to the community.

The full text of German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192663p.pdf

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Third Circuit Clarifies that Serious Physical Injury is not Required to Show Past Persecution

The Third Circuit has determined that its precedent does not require a showing of serious physical injury (or any physical harm at all) in order to demonstrate past persecution. Similarly, the court clarified that threats of harm need not be imminent in order to rise to the level of persecution.

The full text of Blanco v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/193658p.pdf

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Second Circuit finds that Petitioner does not Need to File a New I-589 with a Changed Country Conditions MTR

The Second Circuit has determined that a petitioner who sought reopening based on changed country conditions, and who had previously filed an asylum application in Immigration Court, was not required to file a new application with the motion to reopen.

The full text of Tanusantoso v. Barr can be found here:

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-1440/18-1440-2020-06-23.html

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Second Circuit Holds that Declaration Need not Make out Prima Facie Case for Suppression

The Second Circuit has held that a petitioner’s declaration, on its own, need not make out a prima facie case for suppression in order for the petitioner to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Rather, if the declaration could support a basis for exclusion, then it must be supported by testimony. After testimony, if the petitioner has made out a prima facie case, then the burden of proof shifts to the government to show that the evidence should be admitted. “It is only once the affidavit has been considered and a hearing held that the applicant must have made a prima facie showing for the burden to shift to the government and suppression to be determined.”

“Millan-Hernandez was no more than a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped for a possible traffic violation. As the Police Report reflects, even the driver was not Millan-Hernandez was no more than a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped for a possible traffic violation. As the Police Report reflects, even the driver was not accused or suspected of a crime, he was subject to no alcohol-related examination, and he received no citation for the swerve. These facts raise significant questions about the legality of the prolonged detention of the driver and the passengers. Although the timeline is inexact, the documents submitted by Millan-Hernandez leave little doubt that the July 2017 stop was extended beyond what was reasonably necessary to address and resolve the immediate traffic concern: The traffic inquiry lasted a matter of minutes; the occupants of the vehicle were then detained for approximately two hours as the local officer directed the group to await the arrival of CBP agents.”

“Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Millan-Hernandez presented sufficient evidence that her seizure was based on her race to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. She declared in her affidavit that, once the officer determined that the car’s driver had a foreign passport, he did not question the driver further as to the alleged traffic violation before demanding that all of the passengers produce their ‘papers.’ The Police Report is consistent with Millan-Hernandez’s account. Neither it nor anything else in the record reveals an alternative plausible basis for questioning and detaining the passengers, and the officer did not report inquiring of the passengers about any traffic or civil infractions, nor issuing any citations.” “We have recognized that, when a law enforcement officer detains and questions an individual about her immigration status although she is not suspected of a crime, those circumstances offer a strong suggestion that the search or seizure was improperly based on race.”

The full text of Millan-Hernandez v. Barr can be found here:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5255578c-4d1d-4db5-ac16-bbbd78d43c08/23/doc/18-2107_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5255578c-4d1d-4db5-ac16-bbbd78d43c08/23/hilite/

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